This paper discusses how law is increasingly being used to attack religious associations under the guise of “equality” advancement and “non-discrimination” restrictions. I explore two important insights: first that the concept of “transformation” has been distorted, to shelter approaches to law that fail to respect properly associational diversity. When misused, “transformation” seeks to change the moral viewpoints or religious beliefs of religious associations by force of law. Second, the paper discusses the expansion of law so that it becomes a threat to associations. The “goods of religion” and the “limits of law” need to be more widely recognized and understood both by religious communities and by those involved in law, politics and the media. These insights demonstrate how “equality activists” employ a rhetoric of “equality” to produce inequality, “diversity” to produce homogeneity and “non-discrimination” to discriminate against religious communities and religious beliefs. Several solutions for identifying these errors and resisting them are outlined in brief.
Introduction: In the medical setting, conscience legislation serves to protect health care professionals who refuse to provide certain procedures or services that would violate their consciences. The “Personhood Movement,” on the other hand, is characterized by advocates’ attempts to adopt legislation or constitutional amendments at the state and/or federal level that would extend the legal and moral protection associated with personhood to members of the human species at the earliest stages of biological development. The relationship between conscience legislation and the Personhood Movement may not be self-evident, but the connection becomes apparent when considering trends in conscience legislation. This is particularly true in the context of expanding legal protection to health care professionals who object to certain forms of birth control, such as emergency contraception (EC).
Since 1996, twenty-eight states have adopted legislation mandating insurance coverage of prescription contraceptives for women. Most of these policies include language that allows providers to opt out of the requirement because of religious or moral beliefs—conscience clause exemptions. There is striking variation in how these exemptions are defined. This article investigates the sources and consequences of ambiguous versus precise statutory language in conscience clauses. We find that some forms of political and institutional fragmentation (party polarization and gubernatorial appointment power) are correlated with the degree of policy specificity in state contraceptive mandates. This finding reinforces previous law and policy scholarship that has shown that greater fragmentation promotes ambiguous statutory language because broad wording acts as a vehicle for compromise when actors disagree. Interestingly, it is the more precisely worded statutes that have prompted court battles. We explain this with reference to the asymmetry of incentives and mobilizing costs between those disadvantaged by broad (primarily female employees) versus precisely worded statutes (primarily Catholic organizations). Our findings suggest that the impact of statutory ambiguity on court intervention is heavily contextualized by the resources and organization of affected stakeholders.
This article provides a brief introduction to the interplay between law and religion in the health care context. First, I address the extent to which the commitments of a faith tradition may be written into laws that bind all citizens, including those who do not share those commitments. Second, I discuss the law’s accommodation of the faith commitments of individual health care providers—hardly a static inquiry, as the degree of accommodation is increasingly contested. Third, I expand the discussion to include institutional health care providers, arguing that the legal system’s resistance to accommodating the morally distinct identities of institutional providers reflects a short-sighted view of the liberty of conscience. Finally, I offer some tentative thoughts about why these dynamics become even more complicated in the context of Islamic health care providers.
New book questions preferential treatment of religious liberty
University of Chicago News Office
Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? Princeton University Press, 2012, 192 pp. ISBN: 9780691153612
The Western democratic practice of singling out religious liberty for special treatment under the law is not in sync with the world we live in today, argues University of Chicago Law School professor Brian Leiter in his new book,Why Tolerate Religion?
All people, both religious and non-religious, maintain core beliefs about what they feel they absolutely must do— a category Leiter calls “claims of conscience.” In the book, Leiter, the Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, explores whether there are good reasons for the tendency to grant legal exemptions to religious claims of conscience while largely rejecting non-religious claims.
“The current status quo is predicated on a fundamental inequality,” Leiter said. For example, he says a boy might be permitted to carry a dagger to school as part of his Sikh religion, but the same dagger would not be allowed if it were part of a family tradition.
“Namely, your claim of conscience counts if it is based in religion,” Leiter said. “My claim of conscience doesn’t count if it is not based in religion. That, it seems to me, is a pernicious and indefensible inequality in the existing legal regime.” Read more . . .
The article presents information on a proliferation in conscience clause legislation to federal and state laws in the U.S. The move is stated to be pitting individual religious autonomy against the public interest, mainly in the areas of education and health care.
Abstract: Does freedom of conscience, and perhaps freedom of thought generally, have religious roots? Ronald Beiner’s Three Versions of the Politics of Conscience: Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke traces the idea of conscience as a factor in Western political thought to ideas that crystallized in the seventeenth century. Beiner examines three leading seventeenth century thinkers – Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke – to explore whether conscience, or rather the idea of freedom of conscience, was specially a religious imperative for these thinkers: whether their religious commitments or their respect for religious integrity underlay and motivated their ideas about freedom of conscience.
Abstract: The organizers of this symposium have posed the question: is the idea of conscience fundamentally rooted in religious commitments? This question inevitably draws us back to the seventeenth century, for that is when the discourse of conscience ultimately originated. And when we consult the most important sources from that epoch, we get, I believe a clear answer to the question, although it may not be the answer that the organizers of the symposium anticipated when they conceived the theme of this gathering.
Abstract: The phrase “freedom of conscience” is, of course, not to be found in the United States Constitution: the First Amendment says only that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” However, it seems probable that one, then-contemporary Protestant conception of freedom of conscience was presupposed in these two clauses. Evidence for this conjecture can be found not only in the debate and proposals concerning the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution but also in the frequently more expansive language of early state constitutions.
Abstract: Notwithstanding the notorious difficulty of defining religion and the consequent effort on the part of jurists and academics to avoid embracing any particular definition, one model of religion has dominated modern discourse: religion as conscience. Because of the dominance of this model, alternative views – which either subordinate the conscience to other supposedly more fundamental features of religion or dispense with the psychological apparatus of conscience altogether – have been largely submerged in modern political and legal discourse. Yet they will not remain suppressed. As a number of the conference papers have attest, alternatives and challenges to the dominant model have been surfacing with increasing regularity and insistence, particularly in the last decade, in part because the logic of the model seems to have exhausted or deconstructed itself, or driven itself into a corner, but also because theoretical rivals to the conception of religion as conscience have always existed, have never disappeared, and have never stopped pressing their claims.