The Conscience of the Pharmacist

John J Conley

Proceedings of the Sixteenth University Faculty for Life Conference
Proceedings of the University Faculty for Life

Abstract
Recent legal efforts to force pharmacists to distribute potentially abortifacient drugs constitute a violation of conscience. This campaign of coercion violates religious freedom, professional deontology, and the right to refuse even material cooperation in acts of grave evil.


Conley JJ. The Conscience of the Pharmacist. In: Koterski JW editors. Proceedings of the UFL Life and Learning Conference XVII. 2007;431-437.

The history of autonomy in medicine from antiquity to principlism

Toni C Saad

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy

Abstract
Respect for Autonomy (RFA) has been a mainstay of medical ethics since its enshrinement as one of the four principles of biomedical ethics by Beauchamp and Childress’ in the late 1970s. This paper traces the development of this modern concept from Antiquity to the present day, paying attention to its Enlightenment origins in Kant and Rousseau. The rapid C20th developments of bioethics and RFA are then considered in the context of the post-war period and American socio-political thought. The validity and utility of the RFA are discussed in light of this philosophical-historical account. It is concluded that it is not necessary to embrace an ethic of autonomy in order to guard patients from coercion or paternalism, and that, on the contrary, the dominance of autonomy threatens to undermine those very things which have helped doctors come to view and respect their patients as persons.


Saad TC. The history of autonomy in medicine from antiquity to principlism. Med Health Care Phil. 2018;21(1):125-137.

Reasons, reasonability and establishing conscientious objector status in medicine

Robert F Card

Journal of Medical Ethics
Journal of Medical Ethics

Abstract
This paper builds upon previous work in which I argue that we should assess a provider’s reasons for his or her objection before granting a conscientious exemption. For instance, if the medical professional’s reasoned basis involves an empirical mistake, an accommodation is not warranted. This article poses and begins to address several deep questions about the workings of what I call a reason-giving view: What standard should we use to assess reasons? What policy should we adopt in order to evaluate the reasons offered by medical practitioners in support of their objections? I argue for a reasonability standard to perform the essential function of assessing reasons, and I offer considerations in support of a policy establishing conscientious objector status in medicine.


Card RF. Reasons, reasonability and establishing conscientious objector status in medicine. J Med Ethics 2017 Apr;43(4):222-225. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103792

Conscientious objection to vaccination

Steve Clarke, Alberto Giubilini, Mary Jean Walker

Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
Vaccine refusal occurs for a variety of reasons. In this article we examine vaccine refusals that are made on conscientious grounds that is, for religious, moral, or philosophical reasons. We focus on two questions: first, whether people should be entitled to conscientiously object to vaccination against contagious diseases (either for themselves or for their children) second, if so, to what constraints or requirements should conscientious objection (CO) to vaccination be subject. To address these questions, we consider an analogy between CO to vaccination and CO to military service. We argue that conscientious objectors to vaccination should make an appropriate contribution to society in lieu of being vaccinated. The contribution to be made will depend on the severity of the relevant disease(s), its morbidity, and also the likelihood that vaccine refusal will lead to harm. In particular, the contribution required will depend on whether the rate of CO in a given population threatens herd immunity to the disease in question: for severe or highly contagious diseases, if the population rate of CO becomes high enough to threaten herd immunity, the requirements for CO could become so onerous that CO, though in principle permissible, would be de facto impermissible.


Clarke S, Giubilini A, Walker MJ. Conscientious objection to vaccination. Bioethics. 2017 Mar;31(3):155-161.

Assisted Dying Bill for England and Wales

Raphael Cohen-Almagor

Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Global Views on Choosing to End Life
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Global Views on Choosing to End Life

Abstract
This paper is aimed to suggest an improved set of guidelines for physician-assisted suicide. Thus it is very practical, based on 25 years of research in eight countries and it does not expand on the underpinning theoretical basis for the guidelines. I have been an advocate of physician-assisted suicide and explained the reasoning elsewhere, primarily in The Right to Die with Dignity and Euthanasia in the Netherlands. I support the idea that patients should be able to decide the time of their death with the help and support of the medical profession. People have human dignity. At the end of their lives, the medical profession should respect their wishes and help them to the best of their abilities. By ‘dignity’ it is meant worthiness, merit. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as “the state or quality of being worthy of honour or respect”. Kant explained that human beings are end in themselves and that for something to be an end in itself, “it doesn’t have mere relative value (a price) but has intrinsic value (i.e. dignity)”. He further elucidated that autonomy is the basis for the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature. Kant calls dignity an unconditional and incomparable worth that admits of no equivalent. All rational creatures have it, by virtue of their reason, and dignity constrains the ways in which we can legitimately interact. In a similar fashion, Dworkin asserted that individuals have a right to dignity because they are human. I argue that dignity is both objective and subjective concept. It is socially constructed and made up of values and feelings that one feels about oneself, about one’s self-worth and respect. It is further argued that legislation of physician-assisted suicide is a matter of moral necessity and political expediency.


Cohen-Almagor R. Assisted Dying Bill for England and Wales. In: Cholbia M editors. Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Global Views on Choosing to End Life. 2017;29-44.

The Inevitability of Assessing Reasons in Debates about Conscientious Objection in Medicine

Robert F Card

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Abstract
This article first critically reviews the major philosophical positions in the literature on conscientious objection and finds that they possess significant flaws. A substantial number of these problems stem from the fact that these views fail to assess the reasons offered by medical professionals in support of their objections. This observation is used to motivate the reasonability view , one part of which states: A practitioner who lodges a conscientious refusal must publicly state his or her objection as well as the reasoned basis for the objection and have these subjected to critical evaluation before a conscientious exemption can be granted (the reason-giving requirement). It is then argued that when defenders of the other philosophical views attempt to avoid granting an accommodation to spurious objections based on discrimination, empirically mistaken beliefs, or other unjustified biases, they are implicitly committed to the reason-giving requirement. This article concludes that based on these considerations, a reason-giving position such as the reasonability view possesses a decisive advantage in this debate.


      Card RF. The Inevitability of Assessing Reasons in Debates about Conscientious Objection in Medicine. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2017 Jan;26(1):82-96. doi: 10.1017/S0963180116000669

      Objection to conscience. An argument against conscience exemptions in healthcare

      Alberto Giubilini

      Bioethics
      Bioethics

      Abstract
      I argue that appeals to conscience do not constitute reasons for granting healthcare professionals exemptions from providing services they consider immoral (e.g. abortion). My argument is based on a comparison between a type of objection that many people think should be granted, i.e. to abortion, and one that most people think should not be granted, i.e. to antibiotics. I argue that there is no principled reason in favour of conscientious objection qua conscientious that allows to treat these two cases differently. Therefore, I conclude that there is no principled reason for granting conscientious objection qua conscientious in healthcare. What matters for the purpose of justifying exemptions is not whether an objection is ‘conscientious’, but whether it is based on the principles and values informing the profession. I provide examples of acceptable forms of objection in healthcare.


      Giubilini A. Objection to conscience. An argument against conscience exemptions in healthcare. Bioethics. 2016;31(5):400-408.

      Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada: An Ethical Analysis of Conscientious and Religious Objections

      Timothy Christie, John Sloan, Dylan Dahlgren, Fred Koning

      Bioethique Online
      Bioethique Online

      Abstract
      Background: The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has ruled that the federal government is required to remove the provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada that prohibit medical assistance in dying (MAID). The SCC has stipulated that individual physicians will not be required to provide MAID should they have a religious or conscientious objection. Therefore, the pending legislative response will have to balance the rights of the patients with the rights of physicians, other health care professionals, and objecting institutions.

      Objective: The objective of this paper is to critically assess, within the Canadian context, the moral probity of individual or institutional objections to MAID that are for either religious or conscientious reasons.

      Methods: Deontological ethics and the Doctrine of Double Effect.

      Results: The religious or conscientious objector has conflicting duties, i.e., a duty to respect the “right to life” (section 7 of the Charter) and a duty to respect the tenets of his or her religious or conscientious beliefs (protected by section 2 of the Charter).

      Conclusion: The discussion of religious or conscientious objections to MAID has not explicitly considered the competing duties of the conscientious objector. It has focussed on the fact that a conscientious objection exists and has ignored the normative question of whether the duty to respect one’s conscience or religion supersedes the duty to respect the patient’s right to life.


      Christie T, Sloan J, Dahlgren D, Koning F. Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada: An Ethical Analysis of Conscientious and Religious Objections. Bioethique Online. 2016 Aug 17;5(14):1-9.

      Conscientious Objection in Healthcare Provision: A New Dimension

      Peter West-Oram, Alena Buyx

      Bioethics
      Bioethics

      Abstract
      The right to conscientious objection in the provision of healthcare is the subject of a lengthy, heated and controversial debate. Recently, a new dimension was added to this debate by the US Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell vs. Hobby Lobby et al. which effectively granted rights to freedom of conscience to private, for-profit corporations. In light of this paradigm shift, we examine one of the most contentious points within this debate, the impact of granting conscience exemptions to healthcare providers on the ability of women to enjoy their rights to reproductive autonomy. We argue that the exemptions demanded by objecting healthcare providers cannot be justified on the liberal, pluralist grounds on which they are based, and impose unjustifiable costs on both individual persons, and society as a whole. In doing so, we draw attention to a worrying trend in healthcare policy in Europe and the United States to undermine women’s rights to reproductive autonomy by prioritizing the rights of ideologically motivated service providers to an unjustifiably broad form of freedom of conscience.


      West-Oram P, Buyx A. Conscientious Objection in Healthcare Provision: A New Dimension. Bioethics. 2016 Jun;30(5):336-343.

      Cross Cultural Perspectives on Dignity, Bioethics, and Human Rights

      Maria Isabel Cornejo-Plaza, Darryl RJ Macer

      Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics
      Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics

      Abstract
      The concept of dignity is the foundation of fundamental rights expressed in international declarations on human rights and bioethics. Sometimes there are collisions of rights, which must be weighed. However, more often dignity is invoked in order to argue for or against the same issue. Is it possible that a concept can be so broad that it becomes meaningless? What do we mean when we argue for moral decisions based on dignity? This paper aims at understanding dignity as a construct, in an analytical and evolutionary cross-cultural approach, from a Western and Eastern view, and then considers its impact on the teaching of human rights and biolaw.


      Cornejo-Plaza MI, Macer DR. Cross Cultural Perspectives on Dignity, Bioethics, and Human Rights. Eubios J Asian & Int Bioethics. 2016 May;26(3):90-95.