Dr. W. J. Stanley (22 April, p. 247) raises the question of the legal position of the doctor refusing to accede to the termination of a pregnancy on medical grounds. Let us be clear in our minds that, once the Bill becomes law, any doctor refusing to consider abortion on medical or social grounds could be liable to be prosecuted for negligence. . .
Extract Under the title of Medical Termination of Pregnancy, this Bill would expose to legal action a surgeon who refused to abort on sound clinical grounds, and therefore in good faith, yet his defence would be stronger if he claimed he refused to abort on grounds of conscience.
Extract It has gradually dawned upon the politicians that a doctor might have objections, and at a very late stage a ” conscience clause” has been included, but only against strong opposition. . . . The clause allows for objection on moral or religious grounds, but how does the doctor stand if he objects on clinical grounds ? As a psychiatrist, patients are referred to me for termination of pregnancy, usually the sole grounds for referral being that the patient is depressed as a result of having an unwanted pregnancy. Many psychiatrists consider that there are no, or virtually no, psychiatric grounds for termination of pregnancy, but how will the psychiatrist stand when the new Bill becomes law ? If he does not consider that there are adequate clinical grounds for termination of pregnancy, is he liable to be sued for negligence? The situation must have no parallel in the whole of the history of medicine, and clarification of the doctor’s position is, in my opinion, urgently needed.
Stanley W. (Correspondence) Abortion Bill. Br Med Journal. 1967 Apr 22;2(5546):247.
Extract Of course, one must accord anybody the right to act according to his or her conscience, but where a conscientious objection precludes normal medical practice, it is surely right to ask whether it is proper to inflict one’s views on one’s patients. While fully aware that it might provoke serious objections on many grounds, I would suggest that each regional hospital board has a duty to ensure that situations such as these, where the entire consultant establishment in a specialty refuses for conscientious reasons to follow accepted practice, to the possible detriment of patients, do not in future arise.
Thomas JM. (Correspondence) Termination of Pregnancy Bill. Br Med J. 1967;1(5538):502. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1840881/pdf/brmedj02124-0088a.pdf
The B.M.A. Council was not unanimous in approving the joint B.M.A./ R.C.O.G. report on Mr. Steel’s Bill. I for one spoke against and voted against acceptance on precisely the two grounds which Dr. P. A. T. Wood (4 February, p. 299) finds objectionable. . .
Extract I have during recent years encountered two patients who when asked about anxiety recalled abortions that had been carried out 20 or more years before. There are few people so miserable as the childless menopausal woman who bitterly recalls the abortion of her first child. Unfortunately the human conscience has a long memory.
Extract During the whole of that time I have proudly shouldered both the duty and the responsibility of being permitted to carry out any medical or surgical treatment needed by any of my patients, even abortion, albeit this latter only subject to certain reasonable legal safeguards. In fact, I have not carried out a single abortion, or even felt tempted to. Under the proposed Abortion Bill, as I see it, I am summarily to be deprived of this professional right for no fault of mine, and only a limited number of certain doctors are to be designated as having a licence to kill unborn babies. But in an emergency, it seems, my right-and duty-to do the necessary are restored to me. Aren’t we back to ” square one “? What constitutes an emergency ?
Abstract How is the doctor to know that the patient (and any relative or friend who backs her up) is not lying about the alleged misfortune which makes or will make the bearing of a child intolerable ? Here the temptation would surely be for the puzzled medical officer or general practitioner to sit back and meekly accept the role of ” sucker.” It seems to me that the proposed clause would operate simply as a clumsy method of ” abortion on demand.”
Extract It would be a sad reflection upon our medical generation if it went down in history at our recent preoccupation with salaries and terms of service allowed the passage of a Bill which opened the door to abortion on non-medical indications. How many realize that clause I” (1) c says that abortion may be performed legally if the ” woman’s capacity as a mother will be severely overstrained ” ? In medical terms this means precisely nothing, but the pressures upon doctors to perform or authorize abortions under this clause will be hard to resist, and the way to ” abortion on demand ” will be wide open.
Extract Dr. D. G. Withers (16 April, p. 978) questions the right of a gynaecologist to ” refuse to do the work he is employed to do on the grounds of moral prejudice.” I would question Dr. Withers’s knowledge of the current medical status of termination of pregnancy. I would question, too, his use of the words ” moral prejudice.” As it is axiomatic that in medical discussions on this subject a Catholic is held incapable of an objective and unbiased view, my personal opinions will carry no weight with Dr. Withers. He should know, however, that there is no indication for termination of pregnancy about which there is universal agreement among gynaecologists (or other doctors). For each and every suggested indication there is a substantial body of competent informed non-Catholic medical opinion which opposes termination. These doctors, too, may be accused of (or praised for) moral prejudice.