0 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

“Womb Transplant Babies”: A Preliminary Exploration of Recent Biomedical Advances

Paige Comstock Cunningham

Extract
In September 2014, a little boy named Vincent was born prematurely, but healthy. While such a birth would usually attract the attention of family and friends, baby Vincent’s arrival made world news. He is the world’s first “womb transplant baby.” Like Louise Brown, Vincent is marked for history. Weeks after Vincent’s birth, two more women gave birth to boys, this time each mother carrying her child in the same womb in which she herself was gestated. . .

. . . This essay explores some of the research and issues raised by uterus transplantation. As is appropriate for an emerging biomedical technology, we approach these new developments with caution. My conclusions are preliminary. While I address some of the arguments pro and con, I will merely suggest some of the theological and biblical themes. These merit a lengthier treatment and charitable dialogue with others.

Cunningham PC. “Womb Transplant Babies”: A Preliminary Exploration of Recent Biomedical Advances. Dignitas. 2014 Winter;21(4):4-14.

The ambiguous victim: Miklós Nyiszli’s narrative of medical experimentation in Auschwitz-Birkenau

Marius Turda

Extract
While recent scholarship has – for the past two decades – endeavoured to transcend initial reservations about these forms of testimony, the difficulty with some of these memoirs – namely their authors’ implicit complicity in unethical medical research and in the Nazi Holocaust in general – remains however problematic. To address this thorny issue, in this article I consider the memoirs of a Jewish inmate doctor and forensic pathologist who worked with and for SS medical officers in Auschwitz, particularly Josef Mengele. His name was Mikló Nyiszli. . .

Turda M. The ambiguous victim: Miklós Nyiszli’s narrative of medical experimentation in Auschwitz-Birkenau. Historein. 2014; 14(1): 43–58. doi: 10.12681/historein.232

The law and physician-assisted dying

Tom Koch

Canadian Medical Association Journal, CMAJ — Canadian Medical Association Journal

Extract
For most Canadians, the arguments that began on Oct. 14, 2014, at the Supreme Court in Ottawa are about medical aid in dying. But what is really at stake in Carter et al v Attorney General of Canada et al is Canadian law itself, the meaning of its guarantees, promises and injunctions.

Koch T. The law and physician-assisted dying. Can Med Assoc J. 2014 Nov 18;186(17):1336.

Abortion in Chile: The practice under a restrictive regime

Lidia Casas, Lieta Vivaldi

Abstract
This article examines, from a human rights perspective, the experience of women, and the practices of health care providers regarding abortion in Chile. Most abortions, as high as 100,000 a year, are obtained surreptitiously and clandestinely, and income and connections play a key role. The illegality of abortion correlates strongly with vulnerability, feelings of guilt and loneliness, fear of prosecution, physical and psychological harm, and social ostracism. Moreover, the absolute legal ban on abortion has a chilling effect on health care providers and endangers women’s lives and health. Although misoprostol use has significantly helped to prevent greater harm and enhance women’s agency, a ban on sales created a black market. Against this backdrop, feminists have taken action in aid of women. For instance, a feminist collective opened a telephone hotline, Linea Aborto Libre (Free Abortion Line), which has been crucial in informing women of the correct and safe use of misoprostol. Chile is at a crossroads. For the first time in 24 years, abortion law reform seems plausible, at least when the woman’s life or health is at risk and in cases of rape and fetal anomalies incompatible with life. The political scenario is unfolding as we write. Congressional approval does not mean automatic enactment of a new law; a constitutional challenge is highly likely and will have to be overcome.

Casas L, Vivaldi L. Abortion in Chile: The practice under a restrictive regime. Reprod Health Matters. 2014 Nov;22(44):70-81.

Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience

Kimberley Brownlee

From the chapter introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to consider two types of dissent that are generally described as conscientious, namely, civil disobedience and conscientious objection, both of which raise pressing normative questions not only about the proper parameters of dissenters’ rights and duties within a reasonably good society, but also about both the scope of legitimate toleration of assertions of conscientiousness and the appropriate legal and political responses to conscientious disobedience. In what follows, I begin by outlining the conceptual territory of civil disobedience and conscientious objection. I then offer a qualified endorsement of the moral justifiability of these two practices before examining both the scope and legitimacy of their status as moral rights and their grounds for legal defensibility. Among other things, I challenge the dominant liberal position that, in relation to both moral rights and legal defenses, a more compelling case can be made on behalf of private conscientious objection than on behalf of civil disobedience.

Brownlee K. Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience. In: Marmor A editors. The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Law. 2012;527-539.

(Book Review) Moral Conscience Through the Ages: Fifth Century BCE to the Present

THE (Times Higher Education)
Reproduced with permission

Tom Palaima

Richard Sorabji. Moral Conscience Through the Ages: Fifth Century BCE to the Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 240 pp. ISBN 9780199685547

Always let your conscience be your guide,” sings Jiminy Cricket, conscience personified as a kindly bowler-hatted cricket, to Pinocchio in Walt Disney’s 1940 film classic about a wooden puppet being transformed into a real-life boy. It is one of the few significant social pronouncements about the role of conscience in making us human not found in Richard Sorabji’s compact history of the ideas that important thinkers and doers, beginning with Euripides and Plato and ending with Martin Luther, Thomas Hobbes, Henry David Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud and Mahatma Gandhi, have had about how a conscience works, where it comes from, and what good it is, if any – Nietzsche had no use for conscience, believing that modern men “inherit thousands of years of the vivisection of conscience”.

Sorabji’s close reading of subtle arguments spanning 25 centuries, as he transliterates key Greek and Latin terms and does his best to define their particular meanings in different periods, enables us to see how later figures took up or rejected earlier ideas. Gandhi, for example, came to believe unshakeably in his “still small voice within” – no Jiminy Cricket for him – as “the true voice of God”, as it steeled his commitment to non-violent social actions. Gandhi’s voice of God, we learn, sounded a lot like Tolstoy in his 1894 treatise The Kingdom of God is Within You and Socrates in Plato’s Apology, set in 399BC.

The Greek word for conscience first appears in passages in the work of late 5th-century playwrights where characters wrestle with what we would call moral choices, or defects in Sorabji’s view. The Greek compound verbal formation expresses the notion of a shared knowing (sun: “with” and oida: “know”, literally “I saw and I still see”), Latin con-sciens. The precise meaning of conscience is further complicated by the abstract nouns used for it that are derived from other verbal roots, eg, sunesis and the Latinised sunderesis. The notion of with-ness is the common element.

The key question is: shared with whom? In Sorabji’s view – surprisingly given the role that conscience plays in our interactions with others – we share our thoughts about moral behaviour and moral choices with ourselves. Conscience splits us into two people. From this come expressions like “I could not live with myself” and feelings of having a voice within or a cricket or guardian angel advising from without, as in Freud’s superego or Socrates’ daimōn.

Sorabji also argues that the original concept of conscience, ie, “sharing knowledge with oneself of a defect”, was a largely secular idea. Stoics and Christians turned conscience into a religious concept associated with the law or will of gods or God. Michel de Montaigne, Hobbes and John Locke began a resecularisation process that continued through Thoreau’s civil disobedience and then on to conscientious objection to armed service during the First World War.

But what does a largely secular idea in ancient Greek look like in context? Sorabji gives few original source passages at any length. Conscience appears as a daimōn in Plato’s Apology and arguably also in Euripides’ Orestes, where grief is called a terrible goddess in a kind of chiasmus. So how the Greeks viewed daimones becomes relevant to whether conscience ab origine is secular or religious or something in between. And Hesiod’s thoughts two centuries earlier in Works and Days about daimones as immortal and beneficent guardians of justice should be relevant, too.

Tom Palaima is professor of Classics, University of Texas at Austin.

Striking a Balance: Conscientious Objection and Reproductive Health Care from the Colombian Perspective

Luisa Cabal, Monica Arango Olaya, Valentina Montoya Robledo

Abstract
Conscientious Objection or conscientious refusal (CO) in access to reproductive health care is at the center of current legal debates worldwide. In countries such as the US and the UK, constitutional dilemmas surrounding CO in the context of reproductive health services reveal inadequate policy frameworks for balancing CO rights with women’s rights to access contraception and abortion. The Colombian Constitutional Court’s holistic jurisprudence regarding CO standards has applied international human rights norms so as to not only protect women’s reproductive rights as fundamental rights, but to also introduce clear limits for the exercise of CO in health care settings. This paper reviews Latin American lines of regulation in Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico City to argue that the Colombian Court’s jurisprudence offers a strong guidance for future comprehensive policy approaches that aim to effectively balance tensions between CO and women’s reproductive rights..

Cabal L, Olaya MA, Robledo VM. Striking a Balance: Conscientious Objection and Reproductive Health Care from the Colombian Perspective. Health Human Rights J. 2014;16(2):73-83.

Managing conscientious objection in health care institutions

Mark R Wicclair

Abstract
It is argued that the primary aim of institutional management is to protect the moral integrity of health professionals without significantly compromising other important values and interests. Institutional policies are recommended as a means to promote fair, consistent, and transparent management of conscience-based refusals. It is further recommended that those policies include the following four requirements: (1) Conscience-based refusals will be accommodated only if a requested accommodation will not impede a patient’s/surrogate’s timely access to information, counseling, and referral. (2) Conscience-based refusals will be accommodated only if a requested accommodation will not impede a patient’s timely access to health care services offered within the institution. (3) Conscience-based refusals will be accommodated only if the accommodation will not impose excessive burdens on colleagues, supervisors, department heads, other administrators, or the institution. (4) Whenever feasible, health professionals should provide advance notification to department heads or supervisors. Formal review may not be required in all cases, but when it is appropriate, several recommendations are offered about standards and the review process. A key recommendation is that when reviewing an objector’s reasons, contrary to what some have proposed, it is not appropriate to adopt an adversarial approach modelled on military review boards’ assessments of requests for conscientious objector status. According to the approach recommended, the primary function of reviews of objectors’ reasons is to engage them in a process of reflecting on the nature and depth of their objections, with the objective of facilitating moral clarity on the part of objectors rather than enabling department heads, supervisors, or ethics committees to determine whether conscientious objections are sufficiently genuine.

Wicclair MR. Managing conscientious objection in health care institutions. HEC Forum. 2014;26(3):267-283.

Medical students’ attitudes towards conscientious objection: a survey

Sven Jakob Nordstrand, Magnus Andreas Nordstrand, Per Nortvedt, Morten Magelssen

Abstract
Objective To examine medical students’ views on conscientious objection and controversial medical procedures.

Methods: Questionnaire study among Norwegian 5th and 6th year medical students.

Results: Five hundred and thirty-one of 893 students (59%) responded. Respondents object to a range of procedures not limited to abortion (up to 19%)—notably euthanasia (62%), ritual circumcision for boys (52%), assisted reproduction for same-sex couples (9.7%) and ultrasound in the setting of prenatal diagnosis (5.0%). A small minority (4.9%) would object to referrals for abortion. In the case of abortion, up to 55% would tolerate conscientious refusals, whereas 42% would not. Higher proportions would tolerate refusals for euthanasia (89%) or ritual circumcision for boys (72%).

Discussion: A majority of Norwegian medical students would object to participation in euthanasia or ritual circumcision for boys. However, in most settings, many medical students think doctors should not be able to refuse participation on grounds of conscience. A minority would accept conscientious refusals for procedures they themselves do not object to personally. Most students would not accept conscientious refusals for referrals.

Conclusions: Conscientious objection remains a live issue in the context of several medical procedures not limited to abortion. Although most would want a right to object to participation in euthanasia, tolerance towards conscientious objectors in general was moderate or low.

Nordstrand SJ, Nordstrand MA, Nortvedt P, Magelssen M. Medical students’ attitudes towards conscientious objection: a survey. J Med Ethics 2014;40:609-612 doi:10.1136/medethics-2013-101482

Dignity and the Ownership and Use of Body Parts

Charles Foster

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Abstract
Property-based models of the ownership of body parts are common. They are inadequate. They fail to deal satisfactorily with many important problems, and even when they do work, they rely on ideas that have to be derived from deeper, usually unacknowledged principles. This article proposes that the parent principle is always human dignity, and that one will get more satisfactory answers if one interrogates the older, wiser parent instead of the younger, callow offspring. But human dignity has a credibility problem. It is often seen as hopelessly amorphous or incurably theological. These accusations are often just. But a more thorough exegesis exculpates dignity and gives it its proper place at the fountainhead of bioethics. Dignity is objective human thriving. Thriving considerations can and should be applied to dead people as well as live ones. To use dignity properly, the unit of bioethical analysis needs to be the whole transaction rather than (for instance) the doctor-patient relationship. The dignity interests of all the stakeholders are assessed in a sort of utilitarianism. Its use in relation to body part ownership is demonstrated. Article 8(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights endorses and mandates this approach.

Foster C. Dignity and the Ownership and Use of Body Parts. Camb Q Healthc Ethics / Volume 23 / Issue 04 / October 2014, pp 417-430