Religion Archives - Page 4 of 12 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

Termination of pregnancy as emergency obstetric care: the interpretation of Catholic health policy and the consequences for pregnant women

An analysis of the death of Savita Halappanavar in Ireland and similar cases

Marge Berer

Abstract
Issues arising from the death of Savita Halappanavar in Ireland in October 2012 include the question of whether it is unethical to refuse to terminate a non-viable pregnancy when the woman’s life may be at risk. In Catholic maternity services, this decision intersects with health professionals’ interpretation of Catholic health policy on treatment of miscarriage as well as the law on abortion. This paper explores how these issues came together around Savita’s death and the consequences for pregnant women and maternity services worldwide. It discusses cases not only in Ireland but also the Americas. Many of the events presented are recent, and most of the sources are media and individual reports. However, there is a very worrying common thread across countries and continents. If further research unearths more cases like Savita’s, any Catholic health professionals and/or hospitals refusing to terminate a pregnancy as emergency obstetric care should be stripped of their right to provide maternity services. In some countries these are the main or only existing maternity services. Even so, governments should refuse to fund these services, and either replace them with non-religious services or require that non-religious staff are available at all times specifically to take charge of such cases to prevent unnecessary deaths. At issue is whether a woman’s life comes first or not at all.

Berer M. Termination of pregnancy as emergency obstetric care: the interpretation of Catholic health policy and the consequences for pregnant women: An analysis of the death of Savita Halappanavar in Ireland and similar cases. Reproductive Health Matters 2013;21(41):9–17

Seeing through the secular illusion

Iain T Benson

Dutch Reformed Theological Journal (NGTT)

Abstract
Only when it is recognized that not all ‘faiths’ are religious and that all citizens operate out of some sort of faith commitments can we be properly in a position to evaluate nonreligious faiths alongside religiously informed ones. This re-adjustment of the usual way of examining matters then should lead, Professor Benson argues, to a more accurate way of viewing current education and politics (and their areas of avoidance) as well as such things as fair access to the public square by religious believers and their communities. The long dominance of atheistic and agnostic forms of social ordering (including funding for such things as education and health care) is based, in part, on a belief that stripping religious frameworks from public sector projects is ‘neutral’ when it is not.

In addition, the focus on a rights based jurisprudence has a tendency to view rights such as the freedom of religion in individualist ways that ignore the communal importance of religion. The paper will suggest that moves to put pressure on the associational dimension of religions ignore the communal nature of certain forms of belief to the detriment of a more co-operative society and far from encouraging human freedom, actually reduce it.

In the long run, the importance of religions and their communities to the public sphere – which has been recognized by the Constitutional Court of South Africa – will be encouraged by this fresh and more accurate way of viewing belief systems and the communities that form around them. The more accurate way of understanding both the reality of and the need for more articulate public beliefs, will, Benson argues, provide a richer ground for such things as public school curriculum which often drift in the face of fears of moral imperialism and metaphobia (fear of metaphysics).

Benson IT. Seeing through the secular illusion. Nederduitse Gereformeerde Teologiese Tydskrif. 2013;54(Supplement 4)

The attack on Western religions by Western law

Re-framing pluralism, liberalism and diversity

Iain T. Benson

International Journal for Religious Freedom

Abstract
This paper discusses how law is increasingly being used to attack religious associations under the guise of “equality” advancement and “non-discrimination” restrictions. I explore two important insights: first that the concept of “transformation” has been distorted, to shelter approaches to law that fail to respect properly associational diversity. When misused, “transformation” seeks to change the moral viewpoints or religious beliefs of religious associations by force of law. Second, the paper discusses the expansion of law so that it becomes a threat to associations. The “goods of religion” and the “limits of law” need to be more widely recognized and understood both by religious communities and by those involved in law, politics and the media. These insights demonstrate how “equality activists” employ a rhetoric of “equality” to produce inequality, “diversity” to produce homogeneity and “non-discrimination” to discriminate against religious communities and religious beliefs. Several solutions for identifying these errors and resisting them are outlined in brief.

Benson IT. The attack on Western religions by Western law: Re-framing pluralism, liberalism and diversity. International Journal for Religious Freedom, Volume 6, Issue 1/2, 2013

The uneasy (and changing) relationship of health care and religion in our legal system

Robert K. Vischer

Absract
This article provides a brief introduction to the interplay between law and religion in the health care context. First, I address the extent to which the commitments of a faith tradition may be written into laws that bind all citizens, including those who do not share those commitments. Second, I discuss the law’s accommodation of the faith commitments of individual health care providers—hardly a static inquiry, as the degree of accommodation is increasingly contested. Third, I expand the discussion to include institutional health care providers, arguing that the legal system’s resistance to accommodating the morally distinct identities of institutional providers reflects a short-sighted view of the liberty of conscience. Finally, I offer some tentative thoughts about why these dynamics become even more complicated in the context of Islamic health care providers.

Vischer RK. The uneasy (and changing) relationship of health care and religion in our legal system. Theor Med Bioeth. 2013 Apr;34(2):161-70. doi: 10.1007/s11017-013-9248-2. PubMed PMID: 23546737

(Book Review) Why Tolerate Religion?

Robert Merrihew Adams

Brian Leiter. Why Tolerate Religion? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012, 192 pp. ISBN: 9780691153612

Extract
“Why tolerate religion?” The question is raised by someone who thinks there is something wrong about religion as such. To tolerate, Brian Leiter emphasizes, is to “put up” with beliefs or practices that one regards as “wrong, mistaken, or undesirable” (p. 8). His paradigm case of principled tolerance is one in which a “dominant group has the means at its disposal to effectively and reliably change or end [a] disfavored group’s beliefs or practices, and yet . . . acknowledges that there are moral or epistemic reasons . . . to permit the disfavored group to keep on believing and doing what it does” (p. 13). Forcibly changing or ending religious belief has commonly been extremely difficult or impossible to achieve by any means short of total extermination or banishment of the disfavored group, as history shows, and is therefore a really scary project. With his stated paradigm in mind, we might think that Leiter’s statement that “the contemporary problem, at least in the post-Enlightenment secular nations, . . . is why the state should tolerate religion as such at all” (pp. 14-15), would be ominous indeed if it were an accurate reading of political reality.

Adams RM. Why Tolerate Religion? [Internet]. Notre Dame (IN): University of Notre Dame. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews; 2013 Jan 6.

Freedom of conscience and health care in the United States of America: The conflict between public health and religious liberty in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

Peter West-Oram

Abstract
The recent confirmation of the constitutionality of the Obama administration’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) by the US Supreme Court has brought to the fore long-standing debates over individual liberty and religious freedom. Advocates of personal liberty are often critical, particularly in the USA, of public health measures which they deem to be overly restrictive of personal choice. In addition to the alleged restrictions of individual freedom of choice when it comes to the question of whether or not to purchase health insurance, opponents to the PPACA also argue that certain requirements of the Act violate the right to freedom of conscience by mandating support for services deemed immoral by religious groups. These issues continue the long running debate surrounding the demands of religious groups for special consideration in the realm of health care provision. In this paper I examine the requirements of the PPACA, and the impacts that religious, and other ideological, exemptions can have on public health, and argue that the exemptions provided for by the PPACA do not in fact impose unreasonable restrictions on religious freedom, but rather concede too much and in so doing endanger public health and some important individual liberties.

West-Oram P. Freedom of Conscience and Health Care in the United States of America: The Conflict Between Public Health and Religious Liberty in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Health Care Anal. 2013 Mar 29;21(3):237-247.

Protecting positive claims of conscience for employees of religious institutions threatens religious liberty

Christopher O. Tollefsen

American Medical Association Journal of Ethics

Extract
An important good for doctors, nurses, and other health care professionals could be described as that of “professional freedom.” This is the good of being able to bring one’s professional medical knowledge and one’s commitments to the norms and values of the medical profession to bear on one’s professional judgments and actions. This is, after all, one of the important aspects of being in a profession: professionals are not merely technicians performing the same routine tasks over and over, nor are they functionaries, blindly carrying out orders from above with little or no discretion on their part. . .

Tollefson C. Protecting positive claims of conscience for employees of religious institutions threatens religious liberty. Virtual Mentor. 2013;15(3):236-239. doi: 10.1001/virtualmentor.2013.15.3.pfor2-1303.

Is there room for freedom of conscience in medical practice?

Daniel P Sulmasy, John Lane

Extract
I’m going to talk about conscience in general and about the principle of cooperation. Then you will hear from Dr. Lane about the current application of that in the current administration’s policies. . .

. . .What [conscience] really is, in some ways, is a commitment on our part. And there are two basic hinges, if you will, to the commitment that conscience is. The first is to have and to hold fundamental moral principles. That if you are to be a moral person to begin with, you have to commit yourself to having fundamental moral commitments. Then, secondly, once you have those, you commit yourself to acting in accordance with them. And that’s what in essence, conscience is.

Sulmasy DP, Lane J. ” Is there room for freedom of conscience in medical practice?” Paper presented at: That Nature that Urges Us to Care for Others Is the Heart. The American Association of Medicine and the Person Annual Meeting 2012 Oct 19-21; Florham Park NJ.

Rawls and religious paternalism

David M Shaw, Jacob Busch

Abstract
MacDougall has argued that Rawls’s liberal social theory suggests that parents who hold certain religious convictions can legitimately refuse blood transfusion on their children’s behalf. This paper argues that this is wrong for at least five reasons. First, MacDougall neglects the possibility that true freedom of conscience entails the right to choose one’s own religion rather than have it dictated by one’s parents. Second, he conveniently ignores the fact that children in such situations are much more likely to die than to survive without blood. Third, he relies on an ambiguous understanding of what is “rational” and treats children as mere extensions of their parents. Fourth, he neglects the fact that those in the original position would seek to protect themselves from persecution and enslavement and thus would not allow groups of children to be killed because of their parents’ beliefs. Finally, Rawls makes it clear that we should choose for children as we would choose for ourselves in the original position, with no particular conception of the good (such as that held by Jehovah’s Witnesses).

Shaw DM, Busch J. Rawls and religious paternalism. J Med Phil 2012 Aug;37(4):373-386.

The physician’s right of refusal: What are the limits?

Robert D Orr

Abstract
A physician’s long-established right to refuse to provide a requested service based on his or her moral beliefs is being challenged. Some authors suggest that physicians should not be licensed if they are unwilling to provide all legal services. Others would grant them the right to refuse, but require them to refer to a willing professional. What are the limits of a physician’s right to refuse? When such a right is claimed on moral grounds, what residual obligations does the physician have to the patient? How should the profession (or society) decide when a moral claim to a right to refuse is justified?

Orr RD. The physician’s right of refusal: What are the limits? Christ Bioet. 2012;18(1):30-40.