Religious Freedom Archives - Page 4 of 9 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

Conscientious objection in medical students: A questionnaire survey

Sophie LM Strickland

Abstract
Objective: To explore attitudes towards conscientious objections among medical students in the UK.

Methods: Medical students at St George’s University of London, Cardiff University, King’s College London and Leeds University were emailed a link to an anonymous online questionnaire, hosted by an online survey company. The questionnaire contained nine questions. A total of 733 medical students responded.

Results: Nearly half of the students in this survey stated that they believed in the right of doctors to conscientiously object to any procedure. Demand for the right to conscientiously object is greater in Muslim medical students when compared with other groups of religious medical students.

Discussion: Abortion continues to be a contentious issue among medical students and this may contribute to the looming crisis in abortion services over the coming years. This project sheds some light on how future doctors view some of their ethical rights and obligations. Using empirical evidence, it reveals that conscientious objection is an issue in the UK medical student body today. These data could help anticipate problems that may arise when these medical students qualify and practise medicine in the community.

Conclusion: Clearer guidance is needed for medical students about the issue of conscientious objection at medical school.

Strickland SL. Conscientious objection in medical students: A questionnaire survey. J Med Ethics. 2012;38(1):22-25.

Just how much do medicine and morals mix: catholic hospitals and the potential effects of the Freedom of Choice Act

Carolyn Wendel

Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy

Extract
Conclusion
It is undeniable that Catholic hospitals play a pivotal role in the administration of health care in America. The requirement that they follow both federal law and canon law can, however, create conflicting obligations. If FOCA were to pass, Catholic hospitals would be required under federal law to provide abortions and other reproductive services in direct conflict with Catholic teachings. At the same time, because the Catholic Church would view FOCA as an unjust law operating against human good and divine good, Catholic hospitals would also have a moral obligation under church teachings to disobey the provisions of FOCA.

Unable to sell because of their inability to cooperate in an evil act, Catholic hospitals would likely engage in civil disobedi ence. And yet, such tactics would only work for so long. Suits would be brought and courts would almost certainly uphold FOCA as a valid and neutral law that is generally applicable. Despite what many would like to believe, FOCA poses a very real and imminent threat to the existence of Catholic hospitals. And the effect least talked about and yet most important is not what effect such closing would have on the Church itself, but what effect it would have on the 92 million patients that Catholic hospitals treat annually. The effects of FOCA passing and Catholic hospitals closing would be much more than a victory for the pro- choice advocates; it would be a loss to every person who has ever received treatment at a Catholic hospital and to all those who would be denied such services in the future. Perhaps we should take a cue from the medical profession itself and remember above all else: first, do no harm

Wendel C. Just how much do medicine and morals mix: catholic hospitals and the potential effects of the Freedom of Choice Act. Notre Dame J Law Ethics Pub Pol. 2011;25(2):663-688.

A matter of conscience: do conflicting beliefs and workplace demands constitute religious discrimination?

CW Von BergeN, Martin S Bressler

Journal of Behavioral Studies in Business

Abstract
Increasingly, employees maintain they should be provided an unqualified legal right to refuse work activities that violate their ethical, moral, personal, or religious convictions or beliefs-in short, their conscience. This assertion has become one of the more controversial issues confronting employers. This paper presents a brief review of conscientious objection with special attention to objection in medical related areas, followed by new discussion of freedom of conscience in the workplace.

Bergen CV, Bressler MS. A matter of conscience: do conflicting beliefs and workplace demands constitute religious discrimination? J Behavioral Studies in Business. 2011;3:1-14. Available from:

Conscientious refusals by hospitals and emergency contraception

Mark R Wicclair

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Journal’s Extract
Hospitals sometimes refuse to provide goods and services or honor patients’ decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment for reasons that appear to resemble appeals to conscience. For example, based on the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (ERD), Catholic hospitals have refused to forgo medically provided nutrition and hydration (MPNH), and Catholic hospitals have refused to provide emergency contraception (EC) and perform abortions or sterilization procedures. I consider whether it is justified to refuse to offer EC to victims of sexual assault who present at the emergency department (ED). A preliminary question, however, is whether a hospital’s refusal to provide services can be conceptualized as conscience based.

Wicclair MR. Conscientious refusals by hospitals and emergency contraception. Camb Q Healthc Ethics. 2011;20(1):130-138.

The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses: “Freedom of Conscience” Versus Institutional Accommodation

Michael J. White

Abstract:
The phrase “freedom of conscience” is, of course, not to be found in the United States Constitution: the First Amendment says only that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” However, it seems probable that one, then-contemporary Protestant conception of freedom of conscience was presupposed in these two clauses. Evidence for this conjecture can be found not only in the debate and proposals concerning the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution but also in the frequently more expansive language of early state constitutions.

White MJ. The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses: “Freedom of Conscience” Versus Institutional Accommodation. 47 San Diego L. Rev. 1075 (2010).

From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom

Michael J. Perry

Abstract
The right to moral freedom is not only analogous to the right to religious freedom. The right to moral freedom, as I explain in this essay, represents a broadening of the right to religious freedom – a broadening that for many of us is compelling.

Perry MJ. From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom. 47 San Diego L. Rev. 993 (2010).

Comment on Koppelman and Leiter

Christopher T. Wonnell

Abstract
Andrew Koppelman has offered a challenge to Brian Leiter’s view that the proper public attitude toward religion is one of tolerance rather than active respect. Let us explore the nature of that challenge and offer a few observations on the topic.

Wonnell CT. Comment on Koppelman and Leiter. 47 San Diego L. Rev. 987 (2010).

How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion

Andrew Koppelman

Abstract
In two recent papers, Brian Leiter argues that there is no good reason for law to single out religion for special treatment and religion is not an apt candidate for respect in the “thick” sense of being an object of favorable appraisal. Special treatment would be appropriate only if there were some “moral reason why states should carve out special protections that encourage individuals to structure their lives around categorical demands that are insulated from the standards of evidence and reasoning we everywhere else expect to constitute constraints on judgment and action.” Favorable appraisal would be called for “[o]nly if there were a positive correlation between beliefs that were culpably without epistemic warrant and valuable outcomes. Both arguments depend on a radically impoverished and conception of what religion is and what it does. In this paper, I will explain what Leiter leaves out and offer a hypothesis about why. I will also engage with some related reflections by Simon Blackburn and Timothy Macklem, both of whom influence, in different ways, Leiter’s analysis.

Koppelman A. How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion. 47 San Diego L. Rev. 961 (2010).

Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?

Brian Leiter

Abstract
Most Western constitutions, including the American, single out religious beliefs and practices for special kinds of legal solicitude and protection. In this essay, I want to ask a question about the moral foundations of such a legal practice. Should we think of what I will refer to generically as “the law of religious liberty” as grounded in the moral attitude of respect for religion or on the moral attitude of tolerance of religion? My question will not be which of these moral ideals best explains the existing law of religious liberty in the United States, or elsewhere, though legal doctrine is a relevant data point for the inquiry. Instead, I want to ask which of these moral attitudes makes the most sense given what religion is. Of course, our legal practices offer some evidence about “what makes the most sense” because they are, quite obviously, not detached from our moral attitudes. But the law is but one data point among others, and if it were to turn out that aspects of existing legal doctrine in the United States should yield before the best account of the moral foundations of religious liberty that is a conclusion I am happy to endorse.

Leiter B. Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect? 47 San Diego L. Rev. 935 (2010).

A Most Fundamental Freedom of Choice: An International Review of Conscientious Objection to Elective Abortion

Erin Whitcomb

St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary — St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary

Abstract
Conclusion
American President Thomas Jefferson once explained, “[t]he price of freedom is eternal vigilance.”210 He also warned, “It behooves every man who values liberty of conscience for himself, to resist invasions of it in the case of others.”211 As this Note demonstrates, even in constitutional democracies that have provided their people with broad, enumerated individual liberties, the threat of erosion of rights is ever-present. No rights, even those that seem most fundamental—like freedom of conscience—are immune. They must be avidly protected and defended. The individual choice guaranteed by statutory conscience protection demonstrates respect for the autonomy of health care providers, promotes the integrity of the medical profession,212 and protects the rights of healthcare professionals without compromising those of patients. Failure to protect individual conscience rights will be devastating to any democratic society.213

The absence of a statute compelling health care professionals’ participation in abortion is irrelevant to those in functionally equivalent circumstances, just as the cases of registered nurse Sister Charles in South Africa, American nurse Catherina Cenzon-DeCarlo, and the unnamed Canadian medical student remind us. Health care professionals who are discriminated against on the basis of their conscientious unwillingness to participate in elective abortion procedures must not be left without a remedy. South Africa and Canada should enact statutory conscience protection measures without delay. Similarly, the statutory and regulatory conscience protection established thus far in the United States must be vigilantly protected from erosion.

A matter of choice for one person should not result in a matter of compulsion for another, particularly where the matter is one of such significant moral or religious import. The “freedom to choose” so often associated with elective abortion must be extended to medical professionals who would choose to follow the dictates of their own consciences in abstaining from a practice, which, in their view, is hostile to the ethical obligations of the practice of medicine and violates the profound and inherent dignity of the human person.

Whitcomb E. A Most Fundamental Freedom of Choice: An International Review of Conscientious Objection to Elective Abortion. St. John’s J Legal Com. 2010;24(4):771-809.