Conscientious objection and emergency contraception

Robert F Card

The American Journal of Bioethics
The American Journal of Bioethics

Abstract
This article argues that practitioners have a professional ethical obligation to dispense emergency contraception, even given conscientious objection to this treatment. This recent controversy affects all medical professionals, including physicians as well as pharmacists. This article begins by analyzing the option of referring the patient to another willing provider. Objecting professionals may conscientiously refuse because they consider emergency contraception to be equivalent to abortion or because they believe contraception itself is immoral. This article critically evaluates these reasons and concludes that they do not successfully support conscientious objection in this context. Contrary to the views of other thinkers, it is not possible to easily strike a respectful balance between the interests of objecting providers and patients in this case. As medical professionals, providers have an ethical duty to inform women of this option and provide emergency contraception when this treatment is requested.


Card RF. Conscientious objection and emergency contraception. Am. J. Bioeth. 2007;7(6):8-14.

The Growing Abuse of Conscientious Objection

Rebecca J Cook, Bernard M Dickens

American Medical Association Journal of Ethics
American Medical Association Journal of Ethics

Extract
Religious initiatives to propose, legislate, and enforce laws that protect denial of care or assistance to patients, (almost invariably women in need), and bar their right of access to lawful health services, are abuses of conscientious objection clauses that aggravate public divisiveness and bring unjustified criticism toward more mainstream religious beliefs. Physicians who abuse the right to conscientious objection and fail to refer patients to nonobjecting colleagues are not fulfilling their profession’s covenant with society.


Cook RJ, Dickens BM. The Growing Abuse of Conscientious Objection. Am Med Ass J Ethics. 2006 May;8(5):337-340.

Physician Participation in Executions: Care Giver or Executioner?

Peter A Clark

The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics

Abstract
The fear of many is that some physicians have been co-opted by the penal authorities and state legislatures in this country to believe that physician participation is a civic duty and one that is in the prisoner’s best interest. In reality, these physicians are being used as a means to an end. They are being used by certain states to medicalize executions in order to make them more palatable to the American public and to prevent capital punishment from being declared unconstitutional because it is “cruel and unusual punishment.” A basic tenet of the principle of respect for persons is that one may never use another person as a means to an end. Legislating that physicians must be present at executions uses these physicians as pawns, or means, in order to legitimize capital punishment. This not only violates the rights of these physicians but violates the basic ethical principles of the medical profession and distorts the physicians’ role in society.


Clark PA. Physician Participation in Executions: Care Giver or Executioner?. J Law Med Ethics. 2006 Spring;34(1)95-104.

An Essential Prescription: Why Pharmacist-Inclusive Conscience Clauses are Necessary

Brian P Knestout

Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy

Extract
Conclusion

. . . The only solution to this dilemma may be the solution that the APhA suggested, namely, to endorse a conscience clause, but simultaneously require pharmacists to refer a valid prescription to another service provider. Those members of the profession who bear the burden of this course of action are those who believe that a referral is equivalent to the act itself. However, such a view safeguards most of the ethical goals of pharmacists while simultaneously serving the public need for effective provision of legally prescribed drugs.


Knestout BP. An Essential Prescription: Why Pharmacist-Inclusive Conscience Clauses are Necessary. J Contemp Health Law Pol. 2006 Spring;22(2):349-382.

(Correspondence) Conscientious objection in medicine: the ethics of responding to bird flu

E Murray, P de Zulueta

British Medical Journal, BMJ
British Medical Journal

Extract
We question Savulescu’s statement that a specialist valuing her own life more than her duty to her patients during a bird flu epidemic would be demonstrating values “incompatible with being a doctor.” . . . recklessly to treat a highly contagious individual without taking adequate precautions would be imprudent and irresponsible. Equity and fairness requires a professional to judiciously balance the needs of one patient with the needs of others, including those of his or her own family.


Murray E, de_Zulueta P. Conscientious objection in medicine: the ethics of responding to bird flu. Br Med J. 2006;332(7538):425.

Conscientious Objection and Collaborative Practice: Conflicting or Complementary Initiatives?

Susan C Winkler, John A Gans

Journal of the American Pharmacists Association
Journal of the American Pharmacists Association

Extract
Expanding collaborative practice navigates the issue well, providing a seamless way for women to access emergency contraception without compromising the pharmacist’s ability to opt out. Such legislative initiatives are far more effective in expanding access to emergency contraception than misguided regulations that require pharmacists or pharmacies to assure dispensing of contraceptives “without delay.” In addition to blatantly insulting the professionals who are required to check their beliefs at the door, duty-to-dispense laws can have the opposite effect by limiting access to contraceptives when pharmacy practices simply choose not to carry the products rather than face sanctions if workable solutions for accommodating the patient and the pharmacist are disrupted by misguided regulations. Conscience and collaborative practice can complement each other, but only if both are available.


Winkler SC, Gans JA. Conscientious Objection and Collaborative Practice: Conflicting or Complementary Initiatives? J Am Pharm Assoc. 2006 Jan;46(1):12-13.

A new rejection of moral expertise

Christopher Cowley

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy

Abstract
There seem to be two clearly-defined camps in the debate over the problem of moral expertise. On the one hand are the “Professionals”, who reject the possibility entirely, usually because of the intractable diversity of ethical beliefs. On the other hand are the “Ethicists”, who criticise the Professionals for merely stipulating science as the most appropriate paradigm for discussions of expertise. While the subject matter and methodology of good ethical thinking is certainly different from that of good clinical thinking, they argue, this is no reason for rejecting the possibility of a distinctive kind of expertise in ethics, usually based on the idea of good justification. I want to argue that both are incorrect, partly because of the reasons given by one group against the other, but more importantly because both neglect what is most distinctive about ethics: that it is personal in a very specific way, without collapsing into relativism.


Cowley C. A new rejection of moral expertise. Med Health Care & Phil. 2005 Nov;8(3):273-279.

Promising, professional obligations, and the refusal to provide service

John K Alexander

HEC Forum
HEC Forum

Extract
Someone might want to argue that this strict adherence to promise keeping justifies a person being forced, coerced, compelled, into performing actions that are unjust or morally impermissible if they are members of an organization/profession that begins to engage in performing unjust, or morally unjustifiable actions. . . .By utilizing our moral beliefs at the appropriate time when first we make our promise to provide competent professional service to our clients, we can avoid placing ourselves in situations that compromise our deeply held moral beliefs later on. If later on we are confronted by a change in the professional setting that did not exist in the original decision making situation, then we are rationally compelled to reassess our professional position relative to the requirements of our moral beliefs and perform the appropriate action, either comply, persuade others that they are wrong or leave the professional setting.


Alexander JK. Promising, professional obligations, and the refusal to provide service. HEC Forum. 2005;17(3):178-195.

The Silence of Good People and Non-cooperation with Evil: A Response to Prof. R. Alta Charo

Sean Murphy

Protection of Conscience Project
Protection of Conscience Project

Responding to: Charo RA. The Celestial Fire of Conscience – Refusing to Deliver Medical Care N Eng J Med 352:24, June 16, 2005

Extract
It is especially noteworthy that, in an essay about the exercise of freedom of conscience by health care workers, Professor R. Alta Charo has virtually nothing to say about freedom or conscience (The Celestial Fire of Conscience- Refusing to Deliver Medical Care. N Eng J Med 352:24, June 16, 2005). “Conscience clauses,” yes: conscientious objection, to be sure: and she mentions acts of conscience and the right of conscience. But nothing about freedom, and, on the subject of conscience itself, the most she can muster is, “Conscience is a tricky business.”


Murphy S. The Silence of Good People and Non-cooperation with Evil: A Response to Prof. R. Alta Charo [Internet]. Protection of Conscience Project; 2005 Aug 19.

The Celestial Fire of Conscience — Refusing to Deliver Medical Care

R Alta Charo

New England Journal of Medicine, NEJM
New England Journal of Medicine

Abstract
Apparently heeding George Washington’s call to “labor to keep alive in your breast that little spark of celestial fire called conscience,” physicians, nurses, and pharmacists are increasingly claiming a right to the autonomy not only to refuse to provide services they find objectionable, but even to refuse to refer patients to another provider and, more recently, to inform them of the existence of legal options for care.


Charo RA. The Celestial Fire of Conscience — Refusing to Deliver Medical Care. N Engl J Med.. 2005 Jun 16;352(24).