(Correspondence) A question of conscience

W Lindesay Neustatter

British Medical Journal, BMJ
British Medical Journal

Extract
While I respect Mr Walley’s sincerity, like Dr Salm I question his logic. I have in mind in particular his reference to the conscientious objector’s exemption from service in the armed Forces in war. For there the comparison with Mr Walley’s experience breaks down. To be analogous it would mean that the conscientious objector could have the privilege of holding a commission-somewhat similar to a consultancy- but reserving the right not to shoot at the enemy when in action.


Neustatter WL. (Correspondence) A question of conscience. Br Med J. 1976;2(6027):108.

(Correspondence) A question of conscience

David Hooker

British Medical Journal, BMJ
British Medical Journal

Extract
The “will of the people, as expressed through Parliament,” does not make abortion right any more than bashing old ladies on the head would be if made “legal” in this way. Moreover, for those of us who oppose abortion it is more than a matter of conscience. It is a very positive conviction that abortion is wrong.


Hooker D. (Correspondence) A question of conscience. Br Med J. 1976;2(6027):108.

(Correspondence) A question of conscience

Lillian Versteeg

British Medical Journal, BMJ
British Medical Journal

Extract
Mr R Walley’s “Personal Paper” (12 June, p 1456) shocked me profoundly. Those of us who recall the policy of appointing to mental institutions in Nazi Germany only those doctors prepared to take part in “euthanasia” of mentally defectives must recoil from the implications of the policy he encountered.


Versteeg L. (Correspondence) A question of conscience. Br Med J. 1976;2(6026):43.

(Correspondence) A question of conscience

JM Alston

British Medical Journal, BMJ
British Medical Journal

Extract
The account which Mr Walley gave of the pressure put on him to agree to carry out abortion against his conscience is a more fully explained example of this method of appointing consultant gynaecologists than others recorded before. . . Whether a candidate believes that abortions should be on demand or restricted, he should answer the questions put to Mr Walley by saying, “I shall do what I think is right and best for each patient.” . . .Can the Department convince anyone that it will suppress dragooning of the kind that Mr. Walley and others have experienced, or should the Minister be taken to court for making a directive which takes away the benefit to Mr. Walley and others of the conscientious objection clause of the 1967 Abortion Act ?


Alston J. (Correspondence) A question of conscience. Br Med J. 1976;2(6026):43.

(Correspondence) A question of conscience

R Salm

British Medical Journal, BMJ
British Medical Journal

Extract
R Walley’s article (12 June, p 1456) makes sad reading, for he is both illogical and, if I may say so, a little selfish. The will of the people, as expressed through Parliament, now lays down that certain abortion facilities shall be provided in the NHS, and the area health authorities have the duty to see that this regulation is implemented. In all fairness, it is wrong of Mr Walley to object if the authorities prefer to engage staff who are willing to comply with the current service requirements.


Salm R. (Correspondence) A question of conscience. Br Med J. 1976;1(6025):1593b.


A question of conscience

Robert L Walley

British Medical Journal, BMJ
British Medical Journal

Extract
It was indeed a surprise to be informed by an eminent professor, after a hospital interview, that as a Roman Catholic gynaecologist “there is no place for you to practise within the National Health Service.” One had always assumed, quite naively it seems, that the British “system” is based on fair play and, above all, respect for the individual conscience. It soon became quite obvious that in order to stay in the specialty in Britain I would have had to change a conscientiously held abhorrence to the direct taking of human life. I chose to leave country, home, and family in order to practise medicine in full freedom of conscience.


Walley R. A question of conscience. Br. Med. J.. 1976;1(6023):1456-1458.


(Points from Letters) Abortion (Amendment) Bill

JB Clarke

British Medical Journal, BMJ
British Medical Journal

Extract
Medical ethics are the collective conscience of the profession. It is axiomatic of a profession that its ethical standards are decided by its members. A profession sets a standard of conduct for its members and the essence of professional freedom for a doctor is his right to act in professional matters uninfluenced by any consideration other than the judgement of his fellows.


Clarke J. (Points from Letters) Abortion (Amendment) Bill. Br Med J. 1975 Aug 09;3(5979):373.

(Correspondence) Abortion and Promiscuity

RG Wilkins

British Medical Journal, BMJ
British Medical Journal

Extract
To refuse to terminate a pregnancy on a matter of conscience is both legally and ethically acceptable, as is a refusal in the absence of the requisite medical, psychiatric, and social indications. But to refuse a termination because the continuation of the pregnancy is held to be a valid means of managing a behavioural disorder, “promiscuity,” is a more questionable matter. In such circumstances the continuation of the pregnancy becomes a therapeutic procedure for which valid consent must surely be obtained.

Keywords:

Wilkins R. (Correspondence) Abortion and Promiscuity. Br Med J. 1975 Jul 26;3(5977):233.

Abortion Conscience Clauses

Marc D Stern

Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems
Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems

Extract
Despite the rulings in Roe and Doe, physicians, nurses, and denominational hospitals opposed to abortions have continued to refuse to perform them. They have argued that Roe and Doe, as judicial interpretations of the fourteenth amendment, do not apply to private activity, and that in any event the free exercise clause protects those who, for religious or moral reasons, object to abortion. These claims are not without difficulties. . . . Since Roe and Doe, Congress and many state legislatures have enacted laws to protect both institutions and individuals who refuse to participate in abortions for religious or moral reasons. These so-called “conscience clauses” limit the power of the courts to compel the performance of abortion where a refusal to participate is religiously or morally based. This article will explore the problems these statutes raise. The conclusion reached is that, for the most part, well-drafted conscience amendments are constitutional.


Stern MD. Abortion Conscience Clauses. Columbia J Law Soc Probl. 1975 Summer;11(4):571-627.

(Correspondence) Abortion (Amendment) Bill

MBH Wilson

British Medical Journal, BMJ
British Medical Journal

Extract
Every woman has indeed a right to compassion and medical care in unwanted pregnancy, and every fetus has a right to be considered. . .It is very difficult to believe that the enormous number of induced abortions since the Abortion Act became law has only replaced abortions which would have occurred anyway. . .When the Abortion Act was passed my voice was not heard speaking against it. This was because it appeared to put on paper the indications for termination which were already accepted by many gynaecologists who were never prosecuted. It seemed to me logical that the written law should correspond with the law as administered. It was with surprise that I observed the Act’s effects on my own patients. A number of pregnant women requested terminations when I knew that such a course would formerly have been against their principles. The Act had affected their consciences.


Wilson M. (Correspondence) Abortion (Amendment) Bill. Br Med J. 1975 Jul 12;3(5975):99.