Extract Introduction: Recently, the discussion regarding the physicians’ “Right of Conscience” (ROC) has been on the rise. This issue is often confined to the “reproductive health” arena (abortions, birth control, morning-after pills, fertility treatments, etc.) within the political context. The recent dispute of the Bush-Obama administrations regarding the legal protections of health workers who refuse to provide care that violates their personal beliefs is an example of the political aspects of this dispute.
Extract The administration of former President George W. Bush and the subsequent revival of the abortion disputes in the United States have put the ethical challenges of conscientious objection in the spotlight in many international journals on bioethics in the last decade. . . . In the last few years some clear administrative guidelines have been drawn up, considering the institutional realities of developed countries, most of them with private healthcare systems. These include rules that the objection or refusal is an individual right and not an institutional right and healthcare providers have a duty to refer a woman to a similar health care service provider.
I would suggest that this is not the reality for many developing countries.
Abstract As state and local anti-discrimination provisions become more and more comprehensive, physicians who refuse to treat patients for reasons of sexual orientation or marital status are beginning to face legal liability. Increasingly, physicians are invoking codes of medical ethics alongside more familiar constitutional law claims in support of their claim to insulation from legal liability. This Article explores what medical ethics has to say about physicians who, for sincerely held religious reasons, refuse to treat patients for reasons of sexual orientation or marital status. The issue is explored through the lens of a case recently decided by the California Supreme Court in which infertility physicians refused to help a lesbian couple have a child with the aid of artificial insemination. Through a close examination of the provisions of medical ethics codes and the arguments based on those codes raised in the California case, this Article concludes that medical societies should not support carving out an exception from anti-discrimination laws for physicians who, for reasons of religious conscience, want to express their class-based biases in the clinic.
Paula N Kagan, Marlaine C Smith, W Richard Cowling, eggy L Chinn
Nursing Philosophy
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to present the theoretical and philosophical assumptions of the Nursing Manifesto, written by three activist scholars whose objective was to promote emancipatory nursing research, practice , and education within the dialogue and praxis of social justice. Inspired by discussions with a number of nurse philosophers at the 2008 Knowledge Conference in Boston, two of the original Manifesto authors and two colleagues discussed the need to explicate emancipatory knowing as it emerged from the Manifesto. Our analysis yielded an epistemological framework based on liberation principles to advance praxis in the discipline of nursing. This paper adds to what is already known on this topic, as there is not an explicit contribution to the literature of this specific Manifesto, its significance, and utility for the discipline. While each of us have written on emancipatory knowing and social justice in a variety of works, it is in this article that we identify, as a unit of knowledge production and as a direction towards praxis, a set of critical values that arose from the emancipatory conscienceness and intention seen in the framework of the Nursing Manifesto.
Abstract Background: In elderly care registered nurses (RNs) and nurse assistants (NAs) face ethical challenges which may trouble their conscience.
Objective: This study aimed to illuminate meanings of RNs’ and NAs’ lived experience of troubled conscience in their work in municipal residential elderly care.
Design: Interviews with six RNs and six NAs were interpreted separately using a phenomenological hermeneutic method.
Settings: Data was collected in 2005 among RNs and NAs working in special types of housings for the elderly in a municipality in Sweden.
Participants: The RNs and NAs were selected for participation had previously participated in a questionnaire study and their ratings in the questionnaire study constituted the selection criteria for the interview study.
Results: The RNs’ lived experience of troubled conscience was formulated in two themes. The first theme is ‘being trapped in powerlessness’ which includes three sub-themes: being restrained by others’ omission, being trapped in ethically demanding situations and failing to live up to others’ expectations. The second theme is ‘being inadequate’ which includes two sub-themes: lacking courage to maintain one’s opinion and feeling incompetent. The NAs’ lived experience of troubled conscience was formulated in the two themes. The first is ‘being hindered by pre-determined conditions’ which includes two sub-themes: suffering from lack of focus in one’s work and being restrained by the organisation. The second theme is ‘being inadequate’ which includes two sub-themes: lacking the courage to object and being negligent.
Conclusions: The RNs’ lived experience of troubled conscience were feelings of being trapped in a state of powerlessness, caught in a struggle between responsibility and authority and a sense of inadequacy fuelled by feelings of incompetence, a lack of courage and a fear of revealing themselves and endangering residents’ well-being. The NAs’ lived experience of troubled conscience was feelings of being hindered by pre-determined conditions, facing a fragmented work situation hovering between norms and rules and convictions of their conscience. To not endangering the atmosphere in the work-team they are submissive to the norms of their co-workers. They felt inadequate as they should be model care providers. The findings were interpreted in the light of Fromm’s authoritarian and humanistic conscience.
Author Summary Why is modern science less efficient than it used to be, why has revolutionary science declined, and why has science become so dishonest? One plausible explanation behind these observations comes from an essay First and second things published by CS Lewis. First Things are the goals that are given priority as the primary and ultimate aim in life. Second Things are subordinate goals or aims – which are justified in terms of the extent to which they assist in pursuing First Things. The classic First Thing in human society is some kind of religious or philosophical world view. Lewis regarded it as a ‘universal law’ that the pursuit of a Second Thing as if it was a First Thing led inevitably to the loss of that Second Thing: ‘You can’t get second things by putting them first; you can get second things only by putting first things first’. I would argue that the pursuit of science as a primary value will lead to the loss of science, because science is properly a Second Thing. Because when science is conceptualized as a First Thing the bottom-line or operational definition of ‘correct behaviour’ is approval and high status within the scientific community. However, this does nothing whatsoever to prevent science drifting-away from its proper function; and once science has drifted then the prevailing peer consensus will tend to maintain this state of corruption. I am saying that science is a Second Thing, and ought to be subordinate to the First Thing of transcendental truth. Truth impinges on scientific practice in the form of individual conscience (noting that, of course, the strength and validity of conscience varies between scientists). When the senior scientists, whose role is to uphold standards, fail to posses or respond-to informed conscience, science will inevitably go rotten from the head downwards. What, then, motivates a scientist to act upon conscience? I believe it requires a fundamental conviction of the reality and importance of truth as an essential part of the basic purpose and meaning of life. Without some such bedrock moral underpinning, there is little possibility that individual scientific conscience would ever have a chance of holding-out against an insidious drift toward corruption enforced by peer consensus.
Journal’s Extract Just as physicians can object to providing services due to their ethical and/or religious beliefs, medical students can have conscience-based objections to participating in educational activities. In 1996, the Medical Student Section of the American Medical Association (AMA) introduced a resolution calling on the AMA to adopt a policy in support of exemptions for students with ethical or religious objections. In that report, students identified abortion, sterilization, and procedures performed on animals as examples of activities that might prompt requests for conscience-based exemptions (CBEs). In response to the student initiative, the Council on Medical Education recommended the adoption of seven “principles to guide exemption of medical students from activities based on conscience.” The House of Delegates adopted these principles in their entirety.
American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics
Pediatrics
Abstract Health care professionals may have moral objections to particular medical interventions. They may refuse to provide or cooperate in the provision of these interventions. Such objections are referred to as conscientious objections. Although it may be difficult to characterize or validate claims of conscience, respecting the individual physician’s moral integrity is important. Conflicts arise when claims of conscience impede a patient’s access to medical information or care. A physician’s conscientious objection to certain interventions or treatments may be constrained in some situations. Physicians have a duty to disclose to prospective patients treatments they refuse to perform. As part of informed consent, physicians also have a duty to inform their patients of all relevant and legally available treatment options, including options to which they object. They have a moral obligation to refer patients to other health care professionals who are willing to provide those services when failing to do so would cause harm to the patient, and they have a duty to treat patients in emergencies when referral would significantly increase the probability of mortality or serious morbidity. Conversely, the health care system should make reasonable accommodations for physicians with conscientious objections.
Abstract Although “proximity” is itself an indefinite concept, we are not without tools in deciphering it. For we have at our disposal a well-developed, longtested method of analyzing proximity with an eye toward the just imposition of culpability: moral philosophy’s “principles of cooperation.” By turning to these principles, we have at our fingertips a ready-made set of factors to consider in assessing whether one’s conduct should be deemed proximate versus remote to another’s fraud. The principles of cooperation also provide a framework around which we can organize securities fraud jurisprudence in general. For the insights gleaned from the principles regarding moral culpability in many respects parallel the conclusions reached by courts and commentators construing liability under the securities laws. Perhaps, in addition to the assistance it provides us in resolving the difficult issue of proximity, this framework could serve as a useful aid in resolving other, and future, securities fraud questions..
Abstract We provide comprehensive, practical guidance for physicians on when to offer, recommend, perform, and refer patients for induced abortion and feticide. We precisely define terminology and articulate an ethical framework based on respecting the autonomy of the pregnant woman, the fetus as a patient, and the individual conscience of the physician. We elucidate autonomy-based and beneficence-based obligations and distinguish professional conscience from individual conscience. The obstetrician’s role should be based primarily on professional conscience, which is shaped by autonomy-based and beneficence-based obligations of the obstetrician to the pregnant and fetal patients, with important but limited constraints originating in individual conscience.
