Ethics Archives - Page 10 of 81 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

Dignitarian medical ethics

Linda Barclay

Abstract
Philosophers and bioethicists are typically sceptical about invocations of dignity in ethical debates. Many believe that dignity is essentially devoid of meaning: either a mere rhetorical gesture used in the absence of good argument or a faddish term for existing values like autonomy and respect. On the other hand, the patient experience of dignity is a substantial area of research in healthcare fields like nursing and palliative care. In this paper, it is argued that philosophers have much to learn from the concrete patient experiences described in healthcare literature. Dignity is conferred on people when they are treated as having equal status, something the sick and frail are often denied in healthcare settings. The importance of equal status as a unique value has been forcefully argued and widely recognised in political philosophy in the last 15 years. This paper brings medical ethics up to date with philosophical discussion about the value of equal status by developing an equal status conception of dignity.

Barclay L. Dignitarian medical ethics. J MedEthics. Published Online First: 13 October 2017. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2017-104467

Euthanasia in Belgium: Legal, Historical and Political Review

Toni C Saad

Abstract
This article describes and evaluates the Belgian euthanasia experience by considering its practice and policy, both before and after the formal decriminalisation of euthanasia in 2002. The pre-legal practice of euthanasia, the evolution of euthanasia legislation, criticism of this legislation, the influence of politics, and later changes to the 2002 Act on Euthanasia are discussed, as well as the subject of euthanasia of minors and the matter of organ procurement. It is argued that the Belgian euthanasia experience is characterised by political expedition, and that the 2002 Act and its later amendments suffer from practical and conceptual flaws. Illegal euthanasia practices remain a live concern in Belgium, something which nations who are seeking to decriminalise euthanasia should consider.

Saad TC. Euthanasia in Belgium: Legal, Historical and Political Review. Issues Law Med. 2017;32(2):183-204.

On the Philosophical Foundations of Medical Ethics: Aristotle, Kant, JS Mill and Rawls

Raphael Cohen-Almagor

Abstract
This article aims to trace back some of the theoretical foundations of medical ethics that stem from the philosophies of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill and John Rawls. The four philosophers had in mind rational and autonomous human beings who are able to decide their destiny, who pave for themselves the path for their own happiness. It is argued that their philosophies have influenced the field of medical ethics as they crafted some very important principles of the field. I discuss the concept of autonomy according to Kant and JS Mill, Kant’s concepts of dignity, benevolence and beneficence, Mill’s Harm Principle (nonmaleficence), the concept of justice according to Aristotle, Mill and Rawls, and Aristotle’s concept of responsibility..

Cohen-Almagor R. On the Philosophical Foundations of Medical Ethics: Aristotle, Kant, JS Mill and Rawls. Ethics Med Pub Health. 2017;3(4):436-444.

(Correspondence) Conscientious Objection in Health Care

Lester Liao, Ewan Goligher

New England Journal of Medicine, NEJM — New England Journal of Medicine

Extract
Stahl and Emanuel (April 6 issue)1 rightly differentiate between conscripts and physicians. Nonetheless, they state, “the profession . . . uses reflective equilibrium to self-correct. This dynamic process establishes professional obligations . . . regardless of . . . personal beliefs.”1 This point fails to recognize that conscientious objectors are engaging in the dynamic process from within the profession to counter problematic professional obligations and to correct mistakes. . .

Liao L,Goligher E. Conscientious Objection in Health Care, N Engl J Med 2017; 377:96-98 July 6, 2017 DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc1706233

Moral Disengagement-Mechanisms Propelling the Euthanasia/PAS Movement

Fabian Stahle

Abstract
The international movement that promotes the legalisation of euthanasia/physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is propelled by highly potent psychological mechanisms to overcome the resistance to its agenda. It is all about cognitive restructuring to justify inhumane actions. These are always in use when normal, well-socialised persons are coerced into accepting and participating in the killing of fellow human beings. Various scientific studies, pioneered by Albert Bandura, have shown that participators are able to endure their deeds by activating these powerful mechanisms of moral disengagement. However, those who make use of such mechanisms pay a high price. These mechanisms have a personality-changing power that dehumanizes the perpetrators. For the society that has allowed itself to be manipulated by such mechanisms for the purpose of systematizing “death on demand”, there are also serious consequences. These consequences can be described in terms of dehumanization and brutalization of that society as a whole.

Stahle F. Moral Disengagement-Mechanisms Propelling the Euthanasia/PAS Movement. J Ethics Ment Health. 2017;10 (1-15)

The Conscience of the Pharmacist

John J Conley

Proceedings of the Sixteenth University Faculty for Life Conference — Proceedings of the University Faculty for Life

Abstract
Recent legal efforts to force pharmacists to distribute potentially abortifacient drugs constitute a violation of conscience. This campaign of coercion violates religious freedom, professional deontology, and the right to refuse even material cooperation in acts of grave evil.

Conley JJ. The Conscience of the Pharmacist. In: Koterski JW editors. Proceedings of the UFL Life and Learning Conference XVII. 2007;431-437.

The history of autonomy in medicine from antiquity to principlism

Toni C Saad

Abstract
Respect for Autonomy (RFA) has been a mainstay of medical ethics since its enshrinement as one of the four principles of biomedical ethics by Beauchamp and Childress’ in the late 1970s. This paper traces the development of this modern concept from Antiquity to the present day, paying attention to its Enlightenment origins in Kant and Rousseau. The rapid C20th developments of bioethics and RFA are then considered in the context of the post-war period and American socio-political thought. The validity and utility of the RFA are discussed in light of this philosophical-historical account. It is concluded that it is not necessary to embrace an ethic of autonomy in order to guard patients from coercion or paternalism, and that, on the contrary, the dominance of autonomy threatens to undermine those very things which have helped doctors come to view and respect their patients as persons.

Saad TC. The history of autonomy in medicine from antiquity to principlism. Med Health Care Phil. 2018;21(1):125-137.

Mistakes and missed opportunities regarding cosmetic surgery and conscientious objection

Toni C Saad

Abstract
In her paper Cosmetic surgery and conscientious objection’, Minerva rightly identifies cosmetic surgery as an interesting test case for the question of conscientious objection in medicine. Her treatment of this important subject, however, seems problematic. It is argued that Minerva’s suggestion that a doctor has a prima facie duty to satisfy patient preferences even against his better clinical judgment, which we call Patient Preference Absolutism, must be regarded with scepticism. This is because (1) it overlooks an important distinction regarding autonomy’s meaning and place in clinical practice, and (2) it makes obsolete the important concepts of expert clinical judgment and beneficence. Finally, we discuss two ideas which emerge from consideration of cosmetic surgery in relation to conscientious objection. These are the possible analogy between clinical judgment and conscientious objection, and the possible role the goals of medicine can play in defining the scope of conscientious objection.

Saad TC. Mistakes and missed opportunities regarding cosmetic surgery and conscientious objection. J Med Ethics. 2018;44(9):649-650.

Professional and conscience-based refusals: the case of the psychiatrist’s harmful prescription

Morten Magelssen

Abstract
By way of a case story, two common presuppositions in the academic debate on conscientious objection in healthcare are challenged. First, the debate typically presupposes a sharp division between conscience-based refusals based on personal core moral beliefs and refusals based on professional (eg, medical) reasons. Only the former might involve the moral gravity to warrant accommodation. The case story challenges this division, and it is argued that just as much might sometimes be at stake morally in refusals based on professional reasons. The objector’s moral integrity might be equally threatened in objections based on professional reasons as in objections based on personal beliefs. Second, the literature on conscientious objection typically presupposes that conflicts of conscience pertain to well-circumscribed and typical situations which can be identified as controversial without attention to individualising features of the concrete situation. However, the case shows that conflicts of conscience can sometimes be more particular, born from concrete features of the actual situation, and difficult, if not impossible, to predict before they arise. Guidelines should be updated to address such ‘situation-based’ conscientious refusals explicitly.

Magelssen M. Professional and conscience-based refusals: the case of the psychiatrist’s harmful prescription. Journal of Medical Ethics Published Online First: 24 April 2017. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2017-104162

Reasons, reasonability and establishing conscientious objector status in medicine

Robert F Card

Abstract
This paper builds upon previous work in which I argue that we should assess a provider’s reasons for his or her objection before granting a conscientious exemption. For instance, if the medical professional’s reasoned basis involves an empirical mistake, an accommodation is not warranted. This article poses and begins to address several deep questions about the workings of what I call a reason-giving view: What standard should we use to assess reasons? What policy should we adopt in order to evaluate the reasons offered by medical practitioners in support of their objections? I argue for a reasonability standard to perform the essential function of assessing reasons, and I offer considerations in support of a policy establishing conscientious objector status in medicine.

Card RF. Reasons, reasonability and establishing conscientious objector status in medicine. J Med Ethics 2017 Apr;43(4):222-225. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103792