Taking Conscience Seriously

Elizabeth Sepper

Virginia Law Review
Virginia Law Review

Abstract
For too long, the conventional account of morality in medicine has placed conscience firmly on one side of the moral divide. The archetypal doctor who refuses to participate in controversial treatments – most commonly end-of-life care, abortion, sterilization, and contraception – has been the lodestar of legislative efforts and scholarly accounts. In the name of institutional conscience, healthcare facilities have also been permitted to assert moral or religious objections to care and impose them on employees and affiliates of all beliefs and backgrounds. Doctors, nurses, and institutions that are willing to deliver controversial care have been virtually absent from discussions. This Article aims to reframe the debate by taking conscience seriously. Through engagement with the moral philosophical literature, it makes two inter-related arguments. First, conscience equally may compel a doctor or nurse to deliver a controversial treatment to a patient in need. Yet existing legislation meant to protect conscience, paradoxically, has undermined the consciences of these doctors and nurses. Second, endowing healthcare institutions with conscience via legislation is theoretically and practically problematic. By privileging the institutions’ rights to refuse to provide certain treatments, legislation impinges on the rights of individual providers to provide care they feel obligated by conscience to deliver. Ultimately, if legislation is to protect conscience, it must negotiate between competing claims of conscience of health providers and the facilities in which they work — regardless of whether they refuse or are willing to provide controversial care. This Article introduces a new framework for achieving a better balance between the interests of institutions, individual doctors and nurses, and the patients who depend on them for care. 

Sepper E. Taking Conscience Seriously. 98 Va. L. Rv. 1501, 1532-39 (2012)

Conscientious Refusals and Reason-Giving

Jason Marsh

Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly considering whether a version of the reason-giving requirement can be salvaged despite this important difficulty.


Marsh J. Conscientious Refusals and Reason-Giving. Bioethics. 2014;28(6):313-319.

Conscientious refusals and reason-giving

Jason Marsh

Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly considering whether a version of the reason-giving requirement can be salvaged despite this important difficulty.


Marsh J. Conscientious refusals and reason-giving. Bioethics. 2013 Feb 28. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12012. [Epub ahead of print] PubMed
PMID: 23445457

Conscience in health care and the definitions of death

Yutaka Kato

Croatian Medical Journal
Croatian Medical Journal

Abstract
Brain death or neurologic death has gradually become recognized as human death over the past decades worldwide. Nevertheless, in Japan, the New York State, and the State of New Jersey, one can be exempt from death determination based on neurologic criteria even in the state of brain death. In Japan, the 1997 Act on Organ Transplantation legalized brain death determination exclusively when organs were to be procured from brain-dead patients. Even after the 2009 revision, the default definition of death continued to be cardio-pulmonary criteria, despite the criticism.

The cases of Japan and the United States provide a good reference as social experiments of appreciating conscientious or religio-cultural dimensions in health care. This text theoretically examines the 1997 Act on Organ Transplantation of Japan and its 2009 revision, presenting some characteristics of Japan’s case compared to American cases and the implications its approach has for the rest of the world. This is an example in which a foreign idea that did not receive widespread support from Japanese citizens was transformed to fit the religio-cultural landscape.

Hans-Martin Sass argued for “a formula for a global Uniform Determination of Death statute, based on the ‘entire brain including brain stem’ criteria as a default position, but allowing competent adults by means of advance directives to choose other criteria for determining death during the process of dying.” These cases provide a good reference as social experiments in order to evaluate this formula.

In the text, the term “conscience” or its adjective form is chosen as a superordinate concept to moral/religious belief according to conventional usage. Conscience might appear universal whereas religio-cultural dimension differs among nations. In this text, conscience is considered to manifest itself within different societal traditions.


Kato Y. Conscience in health care and the definitions of death. Croat Med J. 2013  Feb;54(1):75-7.

Managing uncertainty: A grounded theory of stigma in transgender health care
encounters

Tonia Poteat, Danielle German, Deanna Kerrigan

Social Science & Medicine
Social Science & Medicine

Abstract
A growing body of literature supports stigma and discrimination as fundamental causes of health disparities. Stigma and discrimination experienced by transgender people have been associated with increased risk for depression, suicide, and HIV. Transgender stigma and discrimination experienced in health care influence transgender people’s health care access and utilization. Thus, understanding how stigma and discrimination manifest and function in health care encounters is critical to addressing health disparities for transgender people. A qualitative, grounded theory approach was taken to this study of stigma in health care interactions. Between January and July 2011, fifty-five transgender people and twelve medical providers participated in one-time in-depth interviews about stigma, discrimination, and health care interactions between providers and transgender patients. Due to the social and institutional stigma against transgender people, their care is excluded from medical training. Therefore, providers approach medical encounters with transgender patients with ambivalence and uncertainty. Transgender people anticipate that providers will not know how to meet their needs. This uncertainty and ambivalence in the medical encounter upsets the normal balance of power in provider-patient relationships. Interpersonal stigma functions to reinforce the power and authority of the medical provider during these interactions. Functional theories of stigma posit that we hold stigmatizing attitudes because they serve specific psychological functions. However, these theories ignore how hierarchies of power in social relationships serve to maintain and reinforce inequalities. The findings of this study suggest that interpersonal stigma also functions to reinforce medical power and authority in the face of provider uncertainty. Within functional theories of stigma, it is important to acknowledge the role of power and to understand how stigmatizing attitudes function to maintain systems of inequality that contribute to health disparities.


Poteat T, German D, Kerrigan D. Managing uncertainty: A grounded theory of stigma in transgender health care encounters. Soc Sci Med. 2013 May;84:22-9.doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.02.019

(Correspondence) Redefining Physicians’ Role in Assisted Dying

Edward Lowenstein, Marcia Angell

New England Journal of Medicine, NEJM
New England Journal of Medicine

Extract
To the Editor: As two of the original petitioners to bring a Death with Dignity Act before Massachusetts voters, we are pleased that Prokopetz and Lehmann believe “there is a compelling case for legalizing assisted dying,” as they state in their Perspective article (July 12 issue).1 However, we oppose their idea that physicians who agree that assisted dying is sometimes indicated might outsource the actual writing of the prescription to a government agency, presumably because they find that final step “incompatible with the physician’s role as healer” (in the words of the statement on the subject by the American Medical . . .


Angell M., Lowenstein E. Letter re: Redefining Physicians’ Role in Assisted Dying. N Engl J Med 2013; 368:485-486 January 31, 2013 DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc1209798

The fox and the grapes: An Anglo-Irish perspective on conscientious objection to the supply of emergency hormonal contraception without prescription

Cathal T. Gallagher, Alice Holton, Lisa J. McDonald, Paul J. Gallagher

Journal of Medical Ethics
Journal of Medical Ethics

Abstract
Emergency hormonal contraception (EHC) has been available from pharmacies in the UK without prescription for 11 years. In the Republic of Ireland this service was made available in 2011. In both jurisdictions the respective regulators have included conscience clauses  which allow pharmacists to opt out of providing EHC on religious or moral grounds providing certain criteria are met. In effect, conscientious objectors must refer patients to other providers who are willing to supply these medicines. Inclusion of such clauses leads to a cycle of cognitive dissonance on behalf of both parties.

Objectors convince themselves of the existence of a moral difference between supply of EHC and referral to another supplier, while the regulators must feign satisfaction that a form of regulation lacking universality will not lead to adverse consequences in the long term. We contend that whichever of these two parties truly believes in that which they purport to must act to end this unsatisfactory status quo. Either the regulators must compel all pharmacists to dispense emergency contraception to all suitable patients who request it, or a pharmacist must refuse either to supply EHC or to refer the patient to an alternative supplier and challenge any subsequent sanctions imposed by their regulator.


Gallagher CT, Holton A, McDonald LJ, Gallagher PJ. The fox and the grapes: An Anglo-Irish perspective on conscientious objection to the supply of emergency hormonal contraception without prescription. J Med Ethics. 2013 Oct;39(10):638-42.doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100975. Epub 2013 Jan 30.

Conscientious objections in pharmacy practice in Great Britain

Zuzana Deans
Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
Pharmacists who refuse to provide certain services or treatment for reasons of conscience have been criticized for failing to fulfil their professional obligations. Currently, individual pharmacists in Great Britain can withhold services or treatment for moral or religious reasons, provided they refer the patient to an alternative source. The most high-profile cases have concerned the refusal to supply emergency hormonal contraception, which will serve as an example in this article.

I propose that the pharmacy profession’s policy on conscientious objections should be altered slightly. Building on the work of Brock and Wicclair, I argue that conscientious refusals should be acceptable provided that the patient is informed of the service, the patient is redirected to an alternative source, the refusal does not cause an unreasonable burden to the patient, and the reasons for the refusal are based on the core values of the profession. Finally, I argue that a principled categorical refusal by an individual pharmacist is not morally permissible. I claim that, contrary to current practice, a pharmacist cannot legitimately claim universal exemption from providing a standard service, even if that service is available elsewhere.


Deans Z. Conscientious objections in pharmacy practice in Great Britain. Bioethics. 2013 Jan;27(1):48-57. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01918.x. Epub
2011 Jul 29. PubMed PMID: 21797914.

Professional QOL of Japanese nurses/midwives providing abortion/childbirth care

M. Mizuno, E. Kinefuchi, R. Kimura

Nursing Ethics
Nursing Ethics

Abstract
This study explored the relationship between professional quality of life and emotion work and the major stress factors related to abortion care in Japanese obstetric and gynecological nurses and midwives. . . . Multiple regression analysis revealed that of all the evaluated variables, the Japanese version of the Frankfurt Emotional Work Scale score for negative emotions display was the most significant positive predictor of compassion fatigue and burnout. The stress factors “thinking that the aborted fetus deserved to live” and “difficulty in controlling emotions during abortion care” were associated with compassion fatigue. These findings indicate that providing abortion services is a highly distressing experience for nurses and midwives.


Mizuno M, Kinefuchi E, Kimura R. Professional QOL of Japanese nurses/midwives providing abortion/childbirth care. Nurs Ethics January 17, 2013 0969733012463723

Beyond abortion: Why the Personhood Movement Implicates Reproductive Choice

Jonathon F Will

American Journal of Law & Medicine
American Journal of Law & Medicine

Abstract
This paper describes the background of the Personhood Movement and its attempt to achieve legal protection of the preborn from the earliest moments of biological development. Following the late 2011 failure of the personhood measure in Mississippi, the language used within the Movement was dramatically changed in an attempt to address some of the concerns raised regarding implications for reproductive choice. Putting abortion to one side, this paper identifies why the personhood framework that is contemplated by the proposed changes does not eliminate the potential for restrictions on contraception and in vitro fertilization (IVF) that put the lives of these newly recognized persons at risk; nor should it if proponents intend to remain consistent with their position. The paper goes on to suggest what those restrictions might look like based on recent efforts being proposed at the state level and frameworks that have already been adopted in other countries.


Will JF. Beyond abortion: Why the Personhood Movement Implicates Reproductive Choice. Am J Law Med. 2013;39(573-616.