Tag: Jason Marsh

Reasonability and Conscientious Objection in Medicine: A Reply to Marsh and an Elaboration of the Reason-Giving Requirement

Robert F. Card

Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
In this paper I defend the Reasonability View: the position that medical professionals seeking a conscientious exemption must state reasons in support of their objection and allow those reasons to be subject to evaluation. Recently, this view has been criticized by Jason Marsh as proposing a standard that is either too difficult to meet or too easy to satisfy. First, I defend the Reasonability View from this proposed dilemma. Then, I develop this view by presenting and explaining some of the central criteria it uses to assess whether a conscientious objection is proper grounds for extending an exemption to a medical practitioner.

Card RF. Reasonability and Conscientious Objection in Medicine: A Reply to Marsh and an Elaboration of the Reason-Giving Requirement. Bioethics 2014 Jul; 28(6):320-6. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12022.

Conscientious Refusals and Reason-Giving

Jason Marsh

Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly considering whether a version of the reason-giving requirement can be salvaged despite this important difficulty.

Marsh J. Conscientious Refusals and Reason-Giving. Bioethics. 2014;28(6):313-319.

Conscientious refusals and reason-giving

Jason Marsh

Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly considering whether a version of the reason-giving requirement can be salvaged despite this important difficulty.

Marsh J. Conscientious refusals and reason-giving. Bioethics. 2013 Feb 28. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12012. [Epub ahead of print] PubMed
PMID: 23445457