Law Archives - Page 13 of 39 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion

Andrew Koppelman

Abstract
In two recent papers, Brian Leiter argues that there is no good reason for law to single out religion for special treatment and religion is not an apt candidate for respect in the “thick” sense of being an object of favorable appraisal. Special treatment would be appropriate only if there were some “moral reason why states should carve out special protections that encourage individuals to structure their lives around categorical demands that are insulated from the standards of evidence and reasoning we everywhere else expect to constitute constraints on judgment and action.” Favorable appraisal would be called for “[o]nly if there were a positive correlation between beliefs that were culpably without epistemic warrant and valuable outcomes. Both arguments depend on a radically impoverished and conception of what religion is and what it does. In this paper, I will explain what Leiter leaves out and offer a hypothesis about why. I will also engage with some related reflections by Simon Blackburn and Timothy Macklem, both of whom influence, in different ways, Leiter’s analysis.

Koppelman A. How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion. 47 San Diego L. Rev. 961 (2010).

Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?

Brian Leiter

Abstract
Most Western constitutions, including the American, single out religious beliefs and practices for special kinds of legal solicitude and protection. In this essay, I want to ask a question about the moral foundations of such a legal practice. Should we think of what I will refer to generically as “the law of religious liberty” as grounded in the moral attitude of respect for religion or on the moral attitude of tolerance of religion? My question will not be which of these moral ideals best explains the existing law of religious liberty in the United States, or elsewhere, though legal doctrine is a relevant data point for the inquiry. Instead, I want to ask which of these moral attitudes makes the most sense given what religion is. Of course, our legal practices offer some evidence about “what makes the most sense” because they are, quite obviously, not detached from our moral attitudes. But the law is but one data point among others, and if it were to turn out that aspects of existing legal doctrine in the United States should yield before the best account of the moral foundations of religious liberty that is a conclusion I am happy to endorse.

Leiter B. Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect? 47 San Diego L. Rev. 935 (2010).

Alternative Burdens on Freedom of Conscience

Adam J. Kolber

Abstract
Suppose a pharmacist refuses to dispense pills that induce abortion claiming that dispensing such pills runs counter to principles he holds dear. Indeed, the pharmacist claims that forcing him to dispense the pills would violate his freedom of conscience. He even claims that he would not have become a pharmacist had he foreseen an obligation to dispense such pills at the time he entered his profession. Should the pharmacist’s job be protected if he is making a bona fide claim of conscience? And does it matter whether the pharmacist’s objection to dispensing the pills is rooted in religious or nonreligious reasons?

Kolber AJ. Alternative Burdens on Freedom of Conscience, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 919 (2010).

The Significance of Conscience

Kent Greenawalt

Abstract
Conscience, like most words that describe human experience and recommend human action, has changed its meanings over time and takes on subtly different meanings in different contexts. Since the time of Thomas Aquinas, when conscience referred to moral judgments about action, and our founding era, when “freedom of conscience” dominantly referred to individual religious liberty, our understanding has evolved. In this paper, I concentrate on present usage. My aims are partially descriptive and mainly normative. My hope is that by clarifying various ways the notion of conscience is conceived, I can contribute to a thoughtful elaboration of normative issues concerning responses to assertions of conscience and to near relatives of such assertions.

Greenawalt K. The Significance of Conscience. 47 San Diego L. Rev. 901 (2010).

Against freedom of conscience

Richard J. Arneson

Abstract
Is there a moral right to freedom of conscience? Should a legal right to freedom of conscience be established in each country on Earth? This essay argues for negative answers to both questions.

Extract
The term freedom of conscience might refer to freedom of thought and the freedom of expression that sustains freedom of thought. In this sense we might affirm the right of each person to form individual opinions about the right and the good, about what we owe one another by way of due consideration of others, and about what is worthy of pursuit in life, on the basis of free discussion of these matters. In the present discussion, these freedoms, important as they might be, are not under consideration. Let us assume freedom of thought and expression are secured. The status of freedom of conscience in the sense that is our concern in this discussion is still wide open.

Arneson RJ. Against freedom of conscience. 47 San Diego L. Rev. 1015 2010

Obstacles and challenges following the partial decriminalisation of abortion in Colombia

Eduardo Díaz Amado, Maria Cristina Calderón García, Katherine Romero Cristancho, Elena Prada Salas, Eliane Barreto Hauzeur

Abstract
During a highly contested process, abortion was partially decriminalised in Colombia in 2006 by the Constitutional Court: when the pregnancy threatens a woman’s life or health, in cases of severe fetal malformations incompatible with life, and in cases of rape, incest or unwanted insemination. However, Colombian women still face obstacles to accessing abortion services. This is illustrated by 36 cases of women who in 2006-08 were denied the right to a lawful termination of pregnancy, or had unjustified obstacles put in their path which delayed the termination, which are analysed in this article. We argue that the obstacles resulted from fundamental disagreements about abortion and misunderstandings regarding the ethical, legal and medical requirements arising from the Court’s decision. In order to avoid obstacles such as demands for a judge’s authorisation, institutional claims of conscientious objection, rejection of a claim of rape, or refusal of health insurance coverage for a legal termination, which constitute discrimination against women, three main strategies are suggested: public ownership of the Court’s decision by all Colombian citizens, a professional approach by those involved in the provision of services in line with the law, and monitoring of its implementation by governmental and non-governmental organisations.

Amado ED, García MCC, Cristancho KR, Salas EP, Hauzeur EB. Obstacles and challenges following the partial decriminalisation of abortion in Colombia. Reprod Health Matters. 2010;118-126.

Abortion and human rights

Dorothy Shaw

Best Practice and Research Clinical Obstetrics & Gynaecology

Abstract
Abortion has been a reality in women’s lives since the beginning of recorded history, typically with a high risk of fatal consequences, until the last century when evolutions in the field of medicine, including techniques of safe abortion and effective methods of family planning, could have ended the need to seek unsafe abortion. The context of women’s lives globally is an important but often ignored variable, increasingly recognised in evolving human rights especially related to gender and reproduction. International and regional human rights instruments are being invoked where national laws result in violations of human rights such as health and life. The individual right to conscientious objection must be respected and better understood, and is not absolute. Health professional organisations have a role to play in clarifying responsibilities consistent with national laws and respecting reproductive rights. Seeking common ground using evidence rather than polarised opinion can assist the future focus.

Shaw D. Abortion and human rights. Best Practice and Research Clin Ob Gyn. 2010;24(5):633-646.

The cultural context of patient’s autonomy and doctor’s duty: Passive euthanasia and advance directives in Germany and Israel

Silke Schicktanz, Aviad Raz, Carmel Shalev

Abstract
The moral discourse surrounding end-of-life (EoL) decisions is highly complex, and a comparison of Germany and Israel can highlight the impact of cultural factors. The comparison shows interesting differences in how patient’s autonomy and doctor’s duties are morally and legally related to each other with respect to the withholding and withdrawing of medical treatment in EoL situations. Taking the statements of two national expert ethics committees on EoL in Israel and Germany (and their legal outcome) as an example of this discourse, we describe the similarity of their recommendations and then focus on the differences, including the balancing of ethical principles, what is identified as a problem, what social role professionals play, and the influence of history and religion. The comparison seems to show that Israel is more restrictive in relation to Germany, in contrast with previous bioethical studies in the context of the moral and legal discourse regarding the beginning of life, in which Germany was characterized as far more restrictive. We reflect on the ambivalence of the cultural reasons for this difference and its expression in various dissenting views on passive euthanasia and advance directives, and conclude with a comment on the difficulty in classifying either stance as more or less restrictive.

Schicktanz S, Raz A, Shalev C. The cultural context of patient’s autonomy and doctor’s duty: Passive euthanasia and advance directives in Germany and Israel. Med Health Care Phil. 2010 Jul 31;13(4):363-369.

A Most Fundamental Freedom of Choice: An International Review of Conscientious Objection to Elective Abortion

Erin Whitcomb

St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary — St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary

Abstract
Conclusion
American President Thomas Jefferson once explained, “[t]he price of freedom is eternal vigilance.”210 He also warned, “It behooves every man who values liberty of conscience for himself, to resist invasions of it in the case of others.”211 As this Note demonstrates, even in constitutional democracies that have provided their people with broad, enumerated individual liberties, the threat of erosion of rights is ever-present. No rights, even those that seem most fundamental—like freedom of conscience—are immune. They must be avidly protected and defended. The individual choice guaranteed by statutory conscience protection demonstrates respect for the autonomy of health care providers, promotes the integrity of the medical profession,212 and protects the rights of healthcare professionals without compromising those of patients. Failure to protect individual conscience rights will be devastating to any democratic society.213

The absence of a statute compelling health care professionals’ participation in abortion is irrelevant to those in functionally equivalent circumstances, just as the cases of registered nurse Sister Charles in South Africa, American nurse Catherina Cenzon-DeCarlo, and the unnamed Canadian medical student remind us. Health care professionals who are discriminated against on the basis of their conscientious unwillingness to participate in elective abortion procedures must not be left without a remedy. South Africa and Canada should enact statutory conscience protection measures without delay. Similarly, the statutory and regulatory conscience protection established thus far in the United States must be vigilantly protected from erosion.

A matter of choice for one person should not result in a matter of compulsion for another, particularly where the matter is one of such significant moral or religious import. The “freedom to choose” so often associated with elective abortion must be extended to medical professionals who would choose to follow the dictates of their own consciences in abstaining from a practice, which, in their view, is hostile to the ethical obligations of the practice of medicine and violates the profound and inherent dignity of the human person.

Whitcomb E. A Most Fundamental Freedom of Choice: An International Review of Conscientious Objection to Elective Abortion. St. John’s J Legal Com. 2010;24(4):771-809.

Making Rules and Unmaking Choice: Federal Conscience Clauses, the Provider Conscience Regulation, and the War on Reproductive Freedom

Rachel White-Domain

Extract
Conclusion
This Comment analyzes the PCR, which is currently under review by the Obama Administration. As currently written, the PCR promises to have devastating effects on the healthcare system. . .

Commenters have predicted that the PCR will be used to discriminate against patients based on their sexual orientation. 196 And because reproductive healthcare remains so controversial in this country, women will be disproportionately disadvantaged by the PCR, which now allows almost all employees-not only the doctor, but potentially the nurse, the pharmacist, the pharmacist’s assistant, the receptionist, the ambulance driver, and the janitor-to have a say in whether she can access her chosen healthcare without interference.

The PCR brought the ongoing debate over conscience clauses into the national spotlight. . . .this Comment argues that any analysis of conscience clauses must recognize that what is at stake is access to healthcare services, and that reduction of healthcare access can be accomplished not only explicitly, for example through the explicit redefining of the term “abortion,” but also through “strategic ambiguity.” . . .

White-Domain R. Making Rules and Unmaking Choice: Federal Conscience Clauses, the Provider Conscience Regulation, and the War on Reproductive Freedom. DePaul Law Rev. 2010 Summer;59(4):1249-1281.