Abstract At the dawn of the 20th century, postmodern academics stressed the cultural differences among human beings. Philosophers predicated differing value systems based on these cultural differences, and conflicts have arisen among those who hold distinctly different religious traditions. Many people believe there can be no universal system to explain reality and thus form the basis for norms in human behavior. However, at the close of the 20th century scientists and philosophers had come full circle: physics quite literally became metaphysics, and ethical systems made sense. Rush Kidder interviewed two dozen “men and women of good conscience” from around the world and asked them if there is a single set of values that wise people use to make decisions. They answered with a resounding YES! Thus, in addition to the customary principles of beneficence, nonmalfeasance, honesty, and so forth, the author proposes a set of ethical principles based on those universal values, adapted to fit nursing administrators’ dual responsibilities. Ethical decision making and behavior, the author contends, help to reconcile perspectives and interests and to keep values and mission uppermost in one’s mind. In the process, ethical behavior establishes long-term relations of trust and cooperation, which in turn promote consistency and stability in an unstable world..
Extract Bruce Ackerman’s “We The People: Transformations” is elegantly conceived, theoretically clever, rhetorically inventive, and empirically convincing, but it remains ideologically inadequate. . . . In the absence of attention to how people in the United States have come to think about a higher law, Ackerman has fallen back on a Whiggish view where love of liberty and justice is assumed to be part of the human endowment, at least of American humans. Fused convictions about democratic governance and liberal aspirations motivate Ackerman’s We the People. . . . This Whiggish overlay upon the argument of Transformations appears most strikingly in the discussion of Reconstruction, in which all acts are optimized-whether those of intransigent Radical Republicans or white supremacist Southern Redeemers. Some higher force is orchestrating this partisan cacophony into a melodious resolution. . . . I will pose the proposition that two higher law concepts have polarized American politics from Alexander Hamilton through Ronald Reagan, and that they need to be put into the picture of Ackerman’s grand transformative moments.
Extract The problem of conscience in ethics consultation is a central part of the creation and selection of the particular standards to which we hold ourselves accountable and the very process by which we come to know,choose, and act on what is right. Finding such standards and agreeing on how to maintain personal and professional integrity forces each of us to regard in the most serious terms the core issues of our work and its meaning. And though external sources such as our profession, religion, or community may all at times influence our sense of appropriate and inappropriate behavior, on some level, each of us must also face these questions personally. At a certain point, we face a confrontation with what we are culturally shaped by modernity to “see” as our own privatized internal guide – our conscience. Turning towards conscience is turning towards a particular kind of confrontation with ourselves.
Abstract Bioethics has focused on the areas of individual ethical choices — patient care — or public policy and law. There are however, important arenas for ethical choices that have been overlooked. Health care is populated with intermediate arenas such as hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, and health care systems. This essay argues that bioethics needs to develop a language and concepts for institutional ethics. A first step in this direction is to think about institutional conscience.
Abstract The powers of medicine, as well as the faith put into it, endows the doctor a particular place within our social organisation. Possessor of its knowledge on the actions on the bodies, its power interferes with that of the society elites which imposes limits as well as obligations to profit the search of individual and collective well being. The doctor, magician or therapist, incites fear from the moment he attributes his powers only on the basis of his knowledge. We therefore have to consider him on the same level as the rest of society and while recognizing the special role of his profession, make sure that he is aware that he is not above the law, that he is linked to each of his patients due to the trust that they place in him. But this contract between two individuals is as well, and increasingly a social contract which places the medical practice in the complex game of social relations, even if at times it is seen on a more economic level. And that is why it is important to insert another social limit that would remind the doctor that his interventions affect the human body, and therefore the respect of a person and her identity and integrity. A medical science that is too proud or paternalistic, cannot keep to itself the mastery of new biomedical technology. It must be shared with his patients who now have a new role in healthcare, as holders of subjective rights. Should not the new “drama” of medical science, rather than imposing limits on some promoters of “promethenne” médecine, be that of reinforcing the obligations doctors have in general to serve their purpose towards social, collective and individual means that so often don’t inspire the trust that should be linked to conscience? Slave of a collective healthcare system, the doctor should still feel useful if his freedom to serve those that he helps is preserved. This does not necessarily mean that his participation in establishing certain social norms is impossible, however, it requires a definition of those issues that are relevant to the medical function. This search towards equilibrium, however ambiguous, and some even say impossible, appears to be even more acute in the sphere of biomedical practices. The monopoly conserved—and even reinforced—of the physician to protect the individuals at the beginning or at the end of their life, is added to a doctor’s burden, to a certain extent, of the weight of all the individual’s desires, of contradictory interests, and desire to do all that is possible in a world with real limitation. We therefore have to admit that his conscience can allow him to decline care to the patients that require it when he cannot or does not want to change their wishes. But even by acting this way, and that is why the clause of conscience distinguishes itself from contractual liberty, the doctor who refuses the administration of care must continue to have compassion towards his patients. So we can now wager, based on what we have just stated, that the medical practice will be a contributing factor in making law conform to the role that Aguesseau wanted for justice: “Juger humainement des choses humaines”.
Abstract Debates regarding the development of new reproductive technologies (NRTs), funding for infertility treatments, and non-medical criteria for access to infertility treatments frequently invoke “rights to reproduce” or “procreative rights”. The claim of this right – literally the right to have children – is not the same thing as many other “reproductive rights” that are invoked in contraception, abortion, and pregnancy management discussions.
The author argues that the claim of a right to bear or beget children, which may in turn support research into NRTs and then funding and access claims, is not justified. Framing procreative decisions in terms of rights claims is a problematic ethical project, which in turn creates difficulties for the establishment of legal procreative rights. There are two critical problems: first, the distinction between positive (entitlement) and negative (liberty) rights claims leaves those requiring reproductive assistance in need of a different justification for their claims than those who need no help; second, a procreative right is generally claimed to be limited by the rights or interests of the future children, but a right of non-conception is an intemally contradictory concept.
The author then discusses variations of procreative rights claims, including claims of rights to enter reproductive contracts or to seek assistance, and other conceptual foundations for reproductive decisions. Thus, while reproductive rights are often helpful in protecting individuals and families from undue governmental intrusion, rights are shown to be a problematic, inadequate, and inappropriate framework to describe both the legal and moral status of claims for assisted procreation.
Abstract The legitimacy of the refusal of South Australian nurses to care for second trimester abortion patients on grounds of conscience is examined as a test case for a theory of permissible limits on the autonomy of health care professionals. In cases of health care professional (HCP) conscientious refusal, it is argued that a balance be struck between the HCPs’ claims to autonomous action and the consequences to them of having their autonomous action restricted, and the entitlement of patients to care and the consequences for them of being refused such care. Conscientious action that results in the disruption or termination of health care services, however, is always impermissible on two grounds. Firstly, because it is at this point that the action ‘… invades a patient’s autonomy, puts a patient at serious risk … [and] treats a patient unjustly’ (1) Secondly, because the consequences of such refusals turn them into political acts-acts of civil disobedience. It is arguable that in order for acts of civil disobedience to be legitimate, certain obligations are required of the dissenter by the community. It is concluded that the actions of the South Australian nurses, which have over the last few years both terminated and disrupted second trimester services, are morally impermissible.
Extract There is a peculiar and disturbing feature of our times. On the one hand, biomedicine unceasingly extends its power to shape our lives and our culture. . . On the other hand, our protean selves and malleable culture are themselves more wary than ever about responding to that challenge with what might be the only means at our disposal: the search for some coherent, plausible view of what constitutes the good of human beings and their societies. In the absence of such a view, all the real power is in the hands of science, which can decisively bring about fundamental changes even without aiming deliberately to do so. Only an understanding of the self that has substance and direction can fight back, setting its own counteragenda. Choice alone cannot do that. For its part also, a society that itself lacks a compass, devoted only to fostering a minimalist civic accord, is in no less vulnerable a position. If there is no common picture of what biomedicine can do to foster a good human life-if the very question of what constitutes such a life has been banished in the name of pluralism-then that life will be pushed about in ways it is helpless to control, a frail ship that has lost its direction on a stormy, confused sea.
Extract Canadian physicians cannot consistently accept the principle of respect for people in the name of medical ethics, and then perform procedures they know to be medically inappropriate, harmful and demeaning only because they do not want to offend a misplaced cultural sensitivity.
Extract Termination of pregnancy is the act of a powerful person (the pregnant woman) against a voiceless, innocent and powerless person. How does the misuse of power by women in this situation prove that their androgynous and gynocentric approaches to the use of power are different or better? . . . I agree with McEvoy that we must determine what abortion means over time to those most affected by it – women. However, she has failed to do that analysis.
