Philosophy Archives - Page 7 of 13 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

Triangular reflective equilibrium: A conscience-based method for bioethical deliberation

Y Michael Barilan, Margherita Brusa

Abstract
Following a discussion of some historical roots of conscience, we offer a systematized version of reflective equilibrium. Aiming at a comprehensive methodology for bioethical deliberation, we develop an expanded variant of reflective equilibrium, which we call ‘triangular reflective equilibrium’ and which incorporates insights from hermeneutics, critical theory and narrative ethics. We focus on a few distinctions, mainly between methods of justification in ethics and the social practice of bioethical deliberation, between coherence in ethical reasoning, personal integrity and consensus formation, and between political and moral deliberation. The ideal of deliberation is explicated as a sharing of conscience within a special commitment to sincerity and openness to persuasion. Personal growth in wisdom is an indirect by-product of the continuous practice of moral deliberation. This is explicated in the light of Sternberg’s balance theory of wisdom and in the context of medicine as a profession embodying altruistic responsibilities of care in democratic and pluralistic societies.

Barilan YM, Brusa M. Triangular reflective equilibrium: A conscience-based method for bioethical deliberation. Bioethics. 2011;25(6):304-319.

Would Accommodating Some Conscientious Objections by Physicians Promote Quality in Medical Care?

Douglas B White, Baruch Brody

Journal of the American Medical Association

Abstract
Conclusion
The notion that protecting physicians’ consciences benefits physicians at the expense of patients has created an overly simplistic dialogue about conscience in medicine. Viewing the issue from a societal perspective and conceptualizing medical quality as a public good allow a more robust understanding of the relationship between CBR and quality medical care. Policies that allow some CBRs while also ensuring patients’ access to the requested services may yield better overall medical quality by fostering a diverse workforce that possesses integrity, sensitivity to patients’ needs, and respect for diversity. This analysis is necessary for a genuine public discussion about how to handle moral pluralism among patients and physicians. The societal perspective should be incorporated into efforts to develop a comprehensive framework for when CBRs should and should not be accommodated.

White DB, Brody B. Would Accommodating Some Conscientious Objections by Physicians Promote Quality in Medical Care?. J Am Med Ass. 2011 May 4;305(17):1804-1805.

A Life Worth Giving? The Threshold for Permissible Withdrawal of Life Support From Disabled Newborn Infants

Dominic Wilkinson

Abstract
When is it permissible to allow a newborn infant to die on the basis of their future quality of life? The prevailing official view is that treatment may be withdrawn only if the burdens in an infant’s future life outweigh the benefits. In this paper I outline and defend an alternative view. On the Threshold View, treatment may be withdrawn from infants if their future well-being is below a threshold that is close to, but above the zero-point of well-being. I present four arguments in favor of the Threshold View, and identify and respond to several counterarguments. I conclude that it is justifiable in some circumstances for parents and doctors to decide to allow an infant to die even though the infant’s life would be worth living. The Threshold View provides a justification for treatment decisions that is more consistent, more robust, and potentially more practical than the standard view.

Wilkinson D. A Life Worth Giving? The Threshold for Permissible Withdrawal of Life Support From Disabled Newborn Infants. Am J Bioeth. 2011 Feb;11(2):20-32.

Conscientious Objection, Emergency Contraception, and Public Policy

Robert F Card

Abstract
Defenders of medical professionals’ rights to conscientious objection (CO) regarding emergency contraception (EC) draw an analogy to CO in the military. Such professionals object to EC since it has the possibility of harming zygotic life, yet if we accept this analogy and utilize jurisprudence to frame the associated public policy, those who refuse to dispense EC would not have their objection honored. Legal precedent holds that one must consistently object to all forms of the relevant activity. In the case at hand, then, I argue that these professionals must also oppose morally innocuous practices that may prevent pregnancy after fertilization. These results reveal that such objectors cannot offer a plausible and consistent objection to harming zygotic life. Additionally, there are good reasons to reject the analogy itself. In either case, these findings call into question the case supporting refusals of EC based on scruples.

Card RF. Conscientious Objection, Emergency Contraception, and Public Policy. J Med Phil. 2011;36(1):53-68.

Betrayal of conscience

Jeanine Young-Mason

Extract
. . .It behooves us always to strive to understand and search for the roots of other’s humanity without which we are left with dangerous assumptions and fear. All violence breeds tragic consequences for the victims and for the perpetrators who are betraying the consciences they have been given. In sum, the tragedy is not that the perpetrators have no conscience but that they are by their actions betraying the conscience they have in denying the humanity of others.

Young-Mason J. Betrayal of conscience. Clin Nurse Spec. 2011 January;25(1):49.

Ethics in psychiatry: The lessons we learn from Nazi psychiatry

Michael Von Cranach

European Archive of Psychiatry & Clinical Neuroscience

Abstract
Under the Euthanasia Program of Nazi Germany, more than 200,000 psychiatric patients were killed by doctors in psychiatric institutions. After summarising the historical facts and the slow and still going-on process of illuminating and understanding what happened, some ethical consequences are drawn. What can we learn from history? The following aspects are addressed: the special situation of psychiatry in times of war, bioethics and biopolitics, the responsibility of the psychiatrist for the individual patient, the effects of hierarchy on personal conscience and responsibility, the unethical “curable- uncurable” distinction and the atrocious concept that persons differ in their value.

Cranach MV. Ethics in psychiatry: The lessons we learn from Nazi psychiatry. Eur Arch Psych Clin Neurosci. 2010;260(SUPPL. 2).

Making Rules and Unmaking Choice: Federal Conscience Clauses, the Provider Conscience Regulation, and the War on Reproductive Freedom

Rachel White-Domain

Extract
Conclusion
This Comment analyzes the PCR, which is currently under review by the Obama Administration. As currently written, the PCR promises to have devastating effects on the healthcare system. . .

Commenters have predicted that the PCR will be used to discriminate against patients based on their sexual orientation. 196 And because reproductive healthcare remains so controversial in this country, women will be disproportionately disadvantaged by the PCR, which now allows almost all employees-not only the doctor, but potentially the nurse, the pharmacist, the pharmacist’s assistant, the receptionist, the ambulance driver, and the janitor-to have a say in whether she can access her chosen healthcare without interference.

The PCR brought the ongoing debate over conscience clauses into the national spotlight. . . .this Comment argues that any analysis of conscience clauses must recognize that what is at stake is access to healthcare services, and that reduction of healthcare access can be accomplished not only explicitly, for example through the explicit redefining of the term “abortion,” but also through “strategic ambiguity.” . . .

White-Domain R. Making Rules and Unmaking Choice: Federal Conscience Clauses, the Provider Conscience Regulation, and the War on Reproductive Freedom. DePaul Law Rev. 2010 Summer;59(4):1249-1281.

Professional Conscientious Objection in Medicine with Attention to Referral

Thomas A Cavanaugh

Extract
What duties accompany conscientious objection? To sum up what follows: The obligations to the patient remain unchanged, but for the denial of the contested request.

Specifically, what do these obligations entail? First, following from the very meaning of professing—and to develop a point previously mooted—full disclosure imposes the obligation to promulgate to the relevant parties one’s conscientious objection. This includes one’s prospective and current patients, colleagues, employers, and relevant institutions, for example hospitals and insurance companies. . . .

Second, conscientious objector status obliges the relevant professional to explain her reasons for her objection to those patients who request further information. . . . the patient is due the offer of an explanation. This does not, however, amount to the professional’s having a right to pontificate concerning the relevant matter. Rather, the interested patient ought to receive some answer to the question as to why the professional objects. Certainly, not all patients will be interested to know why. Those who are not interested ought not to be treated as captive audiences; those who do want to know ought to receive a considerate and considered answer. . .

Third, conscientious objector status bears exclusively on the patient’s contested request; it does not relate to the other care the physician, nurse, or pharmacist provides for the patient. If a relationship exists with the patient . . . the physician, nurse, or pharmacist must provide care to which she does not object. . .

Fourth, conscientious objector status requires the continued maintenance of confidentiality, particularly with respect to the fact that the professional objects to something the patient requests. . . .the professional must strenuously and scrupulously protect the patient’s privacy specifically concerning the patient’s request and the practitioner’s conscientious objection.

Finally, as earlier noted, while conscientious objection does not require referral to a third party who will abide by the patient’s request, it does require transfer of relevant documents, returning a prescription, and, more generally, acts which, while they may result in the act to which one objects, do not require one to aim at that act.

Cavanaugh T. Professional Conscientious Objection in Medicine with Attention to Referral. Ave Maria Law Rev. 2011;9(1):190-206.

Are there different spheres of conscience?

Erica J Sutton, Ross EG Upshur

Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice

Abstract
Interest in understanding the meaning of conscience and conscientious objection in medicine has recently emerged in the academic literature. We would like to contribute to this debate in four ways: (1) to underscore and challenge the existing hierarchy of conscientious objection in health care; (2) to highlight the importance of considering the lay public when discussing the role of conscientious objection in medicine; (3) to critique the numerous proposals put forth in favour of implementing review boards to assess whether appeals to conscience are justifiable, reasonable and sincere; and (4) to introduce the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Siracusa Principles into the dialogue around conscience and suggest that perhaps conscientious objection is a human right.

Sutton EJ, Upshur RE. Are there different spheres of conscience? J Eval Clin Pract. 2010;16(2):338-343.

Access to Prescription Drugs: A Normative Economic Approach to Pharmacist Conscience Clause Legislation

Joanna K Sax

Abstract
Legal scholarship in this area debates the fairness of conscience clauses. The debate appears to be at an impasse and is, in any event, unsatisfying. This Article proposes the application of welfare economics as the guiding principle in policy determinations and presents an alternative approach to the current debate surrounding pharmacist conscience clauses. The theoretical application of welfare economics demonstrates that pharmacist conscience clause legislation may not maximize individuals’ well-being. A common law approach, whereby a pharmacist may be held liable for refusing to fill a prescription for a non-medical reason, most likely can reach the appropriate balance to minimize total social costs. If however, states refuse to repeal pharmacist conscience clause legislation or states continue to pass pharmacist conscience clause legislation, duty-to-fill legislation, which places a statutory duty on pharmacies or pharmacists to fill valid prescriptions, may be needed. If this is the case, duty-to-fill legislation should include a provision that pharmacies cannot refuse to carry any FDA approved medication due to any religious or personal objections. Importantly, duty-to-fill legislation does not alter any of the professional responsibilities and gatekeeper functions of a pharmacist. The pharmacist’s job to ensure the prescription is valid and legal remains. The expertise required for drug allergies or interactions is still a critical component of the profession. Interesting to note in this debate is that the word science is within the word conscience.

Sax JK. Access to Prescription Drugs: A Normative Economic Approach to Pharmacist Conscience Clause Legislation. Maine Law Review. 2010 Feb 17;63(1):90-129.