Situating requests for medical aid in dying within the broader context of end-of-life care: ethical considerations

Lori Seller, Marie Eve-Bouthillier, Veronique Fraser

Journal of Medical Ethics
Journal of Medical Ethics

Abstract
Background
Medical aid in dying (MAiD) was introduced in Quebec in 2015. Quebec clinical guidelines recommend that MAiD be approached as a last resort when other care options are insufficient; however, the law sets no such requirement. To date, little is known about when and how requests for MAiD are situated in the broader context of decision-making in end-of-life care; the timing of MAiD raises potential ethical issues.

Methods A retrospective chart review of all MAiD requests between December 2015 and June 2017 at two Quebec hospitals and one long-term care centre was conducted to explore the relationship between routine end-of-life care practices and the timing of MAiD requests.

Results Of 80 patients requesting MAiD, 54% (43) received the intervention. The median number of days between the request for MAiD and the patient’s death was 6 days. The majority of palliative care consults (32%) came less than 7 days prior to the MAiD request and in another 25% of cases occurred the day of or after MAiD was requested. 35% of patients had no level of intervention form, or it was documented as 1 or 2 (prolongation of life remains a priority) at the time of the MAiD request and 19% were receiving life-prolonging interventions.

Interpretation We highlight ethical considerations relating to the timing of MAiD requests within the broader context of end-of-life care. Whether or not MAiD is conceptualised as morally distinct from other end-of-life options is likely to influence clinicians’ approach to requests for MAiD as well as the ethical importance of our findings. We suggest that in the wake of the 2015 legislation, requests for MAiD have not always appeared to come after an exploration of other options as professional practice guidelines recommend.

Seller L, Bouthillier M, Fraser V. Situating requests for medical aid in dying within the broader context of end-of-life care: ethical considerations. J Med Ethics. 2019;45:106-111 .

Drawing the line on physician-assisted death

Lynn A Jansen, Steven Wall, Franklin G Miller

Journal of Medical Ethics
Journal of Medical Ethics

Abstract
Drawing the line on physician assistance in physician-assisted death (PAD) continues to be a contentious issue in many legal jurisdictions across the USA, Canada and Europe. PAD is a medical practice that occurs when physicians either prescribe or administer lethal medication to their patients. As more legal jurisdictions establish PAD for at least some class of patients, the question of the proper scope of this practice has become pressing. This paper presents an argument for restricting PAD to the terminally ill that can be accepted by defenders as well as critics of PAD for the terminally ill. The argument appeals to fairness-based paternalism and the social meaning of medical practice. These two considerations interact in various ways, as the paper explains. The right way to think about the social meaning of medical practice bears on fair paternalism as it relates to PAD and vice versa. The paper contends that these considerations have substantial force when directed against proposals to extend PAD to non-terminally ill patients, but considerably less force when directed against PAD for the terminally ill. The paper pays special attention to the case of non-terminally ill patients who suffer from treatment-resistant depression, as these patients present a potentially strong case for extending PAD beyond the terminally ill.


Jansen LA, Wall S, Miller FG. Drawing the line on physician-assisted death. J Med Ethics. 2019;45:190-197.

Rawls, Reasonableness, and Conscientious Objection in Health Care

Xavier Symons

Rawls, Reasonableness, and Conscientious Objection in Health Care

Abstract
Much ink has been spilled in recent years over the controversial topic of conscientious objection in health care. In particular, commentators have proposed various ways with which we might distinguish legitimate conscience claims from those that are poorly reasoned or based on prejudice. The aim of this chapter is to argue in favor of the “reasonableness” approach to conscientious objection, viz., the view that we should develop an account of “reasonableness” and “reasonable disagreement” and use this as a way of distinguishing licit and illicit conscience claims. The author discusses Rawls’ account of “reasonableness” and “reasonable disagreement,” and consider how this might guide us in regulating conscientious objection in health care. The author analyzes the “public reason” account offered in Card (2007, 2014), and argue that we should modify Card’s account to include a consensus among regulators about what counts as “basic medical care.” The author suggests that Medical Conscientious Objection Review boards should consider whether conscience-based refusals are based on defensible ethical foundations.


Symons X. Rawls, Reasonableness, and Conscientious Objection in Health Care. In: Grant B, Drew J, Christensen H, editors. Applied Ethics in the Fractured State (Research in Ethical Issues in Organizations, Vol. 20). Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing Limited; 2018. p. 45-54. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1529-209620180000020004

(Correspondence) Losing doctors with integrity will harm patients and profession

Karol F Boschung

Canadian Medical Association Journal, CMAJ
Canadian Medical Association Journal

Extract
I am responding to a letter by Dr. Eric Brown about semantics in referring for medical assistance in dying (MAiD). . . The intended implication, it seems, is that any conscientious objectors should simply leave the practice of medicine.


Boschung KF. (Correspondence) Losing doctors with integrity will harm patients and profession. Can Med Assoc. J. 2018;7.

Completion of Medical Certificates of Death after an Assisted Death: An Environmental Scan of Practices

Janine Brown, Lilian Thorpe, Donna Goodridge

Healthcare Policy
Healthcare Policy

Abstract
Policies and practices have been developed to operationalize assisted dying processes in Canada. This project utilized an environmental scan to determine the spectrum of assisted death reporting practices and medical certificate of death (MCD) completion procedures both nationally and internationally. Findings suggest medically assisted dying (MAiD) is represented on the MCD inconsistently nationally and internationally. Related factors include the specifics of local assisted death legislation and variations in death-reporting legislation, variation in terminology surrounding assisted death and designated oversight agency for assisted dying reporting.


Brown J, Thorpe L, Goodridge D. Completion of Medical Certificates of Death after an Assisted Death: An Environmental Scan of Practices. Healthc Policy. 2018 Nov;14(2):59-67. doi: 10.12927/hcpol.2018.25685.

Of dilemmas and tensions: a qualitative study of palliative care physicians’ positions regarding voluntary active euthanasia in Quebec, Canada

Emmanuelle Bélanger, Anna Towers, David Kenneth Wright, Yuexi Chen, Golda Tradounsky, Mary Ellen Macdonald

Journal of Medical Ethics
Journal of Medical Ethics

Abstract
Objectives:
In 2015, the Province of Quebec, Canada passed a law that allowed voluntary active euthanasia (VAE). Palliative care stakeholders in Canada have been largely opposed to euthanasia, yet there is little research about their views. The research question guiding this study was the following: How do palliative care physicians in Quebec position themselves regarding the practice of VAE in the context of the new provincial legislation?

Methods: We used interpretive description, an inductive methodology to answer research questions about clinical practice. A total of 18 palliative care physicians participated in semistructured interviews at two university-affiliated hospitals in Quebec.

Results: Participants positioned themselves in opposition to euthanasia. Their justifications were framed within their professional commitment to not hasten death, which sat in tension with the value of patients’ autonomy to choose how to die. Participants described VAE as unacceptable if it impeded opportunities to evaluate and alleviate suffering. Further, they contested government rhetoric that positioned VAE as a way to improve end-of-life care. Participants felt that VAE would diminish the potential of palliative care to relieve suffering. Dilemmas were apparent in their narratives, about reconciling respect for patient autonomy with broader palliative care values, and the value of accompanying and not abandoning patients who make requests for VAE while being committed to neither prolonging nor hastening death.

Conclusions: This study provides insight into nuanced positions of experienced palliative care physicians in Quebec and confirms expected tensions between an important stakeholder and the practice of VAE as guided by the new legislation.


Bélanger E, Towers A, Wright DK, Chen Y, Tradounsky G, Macdonald ME. Of dilemmas and tensions: a qualitative study of palliative care physicians’ positions regarding voluntary active euthanasia in Quebec, Canada. J Med Ethics 2019;45:48-53.

Conscientious objection in reproductive health – an ancient prerogative or harmful practice

JM Thorp Jr

BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology
BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology

Extract
We must return to our Pythagorean roots and not substitute a secular group conscience to replace individual conscience, and thereby protect the rights of all parties. My hope is that our specialty will uphold the right of individual clinicians to practise according to their consciences and we will continue to welcome Hippocratic clinicians into our ranks.


BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics and GynaecologyJr JT. Conscientious objection in reproductive health – an ancient prerogative or harmful practice. BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology. 2018 Oct;125(11):1357-1358.

Weakening the ethical distinction between euthanasia, palliative opioid use and palliative sedation

Thomas David Riisfeldt

Journal of Medical Ethics
Journal of Medical Ethics

Abstract
Opioid and sedative use are common ‘active’ practices in the provision of mainstream palliative care services, and are typically distinguished from euthanasia on the basis that they do not shorten survival time. Even supposing that they did, it is often argued that they are justified and distinguished from euthanasia via appeal to Aquinas’ Doctrine of Double Effect. In this essay, I will appraise the empirical evidence regarding opioid/sedative use and survival time, and argue for a position of agnosticism. I will then argue that the Doctrine of Double Effect is a useful ethical tool but is ultimately not a sound ethical principle, and even if it were, it is unclear whether palliative opioid/sedative use satisfy its four criteria. Although this essay does not establish any definitive proofs, it aims to provide reasons to doubt—and therefore weaken—the often-claimed ethical distinction between euthanasia and palliative opioid/sedative use.


Riisfeldt TD. Weakening the ethical distinction between euthanasia, palliative opioid use and palliative sedation. J Med Ethics 2019;45:125-130.

Nurses’ use of conscientious objection and the implications for conscience

Christina Lamb, Marilyn Evans, Yolanad Babenko-Mould, Carol Wong, Ken Kirkwood

Journal of Advanced Nursing
Journal of Advanced Nursing

Absract
Aims:
To explore the meaning of conscience for nurses in the context of conscientious objection (CO) in clinical practice. Design: Interpretive phenomenology was used to guide this study.

Data sources: Data were collected from 2016 ‐ 2017 through one‐on‐one interviews from eight nurses in Ontario. Iterative analysis was conducted consistent with interpretive phenomenology and resulted in thematic findings. Review methods: Iterative, phased analysis using line‐by‐line and sentence highlighting identified key words and phrases. Cumulative summaries of narratives thematic analysis revealed how nurses made meaning of conscience in the context of making a CO.

Impact: This is the first study to explore what conscience means to nurses, as shared by nurses themselves and in the context of CO. Nurse participants expressed that support from leadership, regulatory bodies, and policy for nurses’ conscience rights are indicated to address nurses’ conscience issues in practice settings.

Results: Conscience issues and CO are current, critical issues for nurses. For Canadian nurses this need has been recently heightened by the national legalization of euthanasia, known as Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada. Ethics education, awareness, and respect for nurses’ conscience are needed in Canada and across the profession to support nurses to address their issues of conscience in professional practice.

Conclusion: Ethical meaning emerges for nurses in their lived experiences of encountering serious ethical issues that they need to professionally address, by way of conscience‐based COs.


Lamb C, Evans M, Babenko-Mould Y, Wong C, Kirkwood Ken. Nurses’ use of conscientious objection and the implications for conscience. J Adv Nurs 2018 Oct 16. doi: 10.1111/jan.13869

The Challenges of Conscience in a World of Compromise

Amy J. Sepinwall

Nomos LIX:Compromise
Nomos LIX:Compromise

Abstract
The process of crafting and passing legislation might be thought to be the locus of compromise par excellence.1 Yet, where the law that results impinges upon moral or religious belief or practice, the issue of compromise arises anew, in both senses of the word: Individuals who oppose the law on moral or religious grounds believe that their political obedience will compromise them in a fundamental way. Their plea for an exemption from the objectionable legal requirement is, then, a bid for further compromise.2 Compromise in the first sense concerns an undercutting of the self, while compromise in the second sense involves a grant of concessions. Yet, unlike compromises that arise in the legislative process, or at least in some ideal version of it,3 the compromise involved in an exemption from a neutral law of general application involves neither an exchange of benefits nor the prospect of mutual benefit-two hallmarks of compromise in, say, political (and other) negotiations.4 There are several reasons to doubt the wisdom or fairness of the requested exemptions, then.


Sepinwall AJ. The Challenges of Conscience in a World of Compromise. In: Knight J, editor. Nomos LIX: Compromise. New York:NYU Press, 2018. pp. 220-247.