Extract The strength of the nondualistic-approach is that it will contribute to “meaningful dialogue about the role of the conscience” which depends on “shared definitions of the relevant terms” (Lawrence and Curlin 2007, 10). This approach of “shared definitions” can also be termed commensurability— when two people who hold incommensurable values can create common ground when one or both changes their values, empathize or agree to disagree and work towards a common goal (Glenn 2003). . . The alternative to seeking commensurability is the enforcement of a law, which is a solution that does not always resolve the underlying issues. The legal system devotes many resources to the resolving of problems, but the result is often “winner-take-all”—without regard to the long-term consequences and impact on the relationship of the parties.
Extract Lawrence and Curlin (2007) correctly note that not all disputants agree about what conscience is. However, I doubt that their distinction is as important as they think. I believe that understanding the distinctions just discussed is far more likely to lead to a satisfactory conclusion. If advocates of conscientious objection for medical professionals attended to these distinctions, they would see that what they want cannot be justified, at least not in the unqualified form most of them advocate.
Extract At what point is an individual accountable for involvement in an action that he or she believes to be immoral? This subquestion is, I believe, important to both the religious and the non-religious individual in dealing with matters of personal or professional conscience. . . Lawrence and Curlin (2007) have stated it is important to have a basic understanding of what an individual means when he or she invokes this right of conscience. I believe it is equally important for those individuals, and for the public at large, to understand that there is a spectrum of belief about one’s moral complicity. Thus two people of faith may arrive at different conclusions about when it is appropriate to invoke this right. Such variation is fundamental to the concept of an individual’s conscience.
Abstract What role should the physician’s conscience play in the practice of medicine? Much controversy has surrounded the question, yet little attention has been paid to the possibility that disputants are operating with contrasting definitions of the conscience. To illustrate this divergence, we contrast definitions stemming from Abrahamic religions and those stemming from secular moral tradition. Clear differences emerge regarding what the term conscience conveys, how the conscience should be informed, and what the consequences are for violating one’s conscience. Importantly, these basic disagreements underlie current controversies regarding the role of the clinician’s conscience in the practice of medicine. Consequently participants in ongoing debates would do well to specify their definitions of the conscience and the reasons for and implications of those definitions. This specification would allow participants to advance a more philosophically and theologically robust conversation about the means and ends of medicine.
Extract Those who act conscientiously do not “disavow responsibility” and “substitute their personal values for the fundamental rights of their patients.” Rather, they are engaging in the struggle to know and do the right thing and to understand and fulfill their moral obligations in a particular situation. This task cannot be externalized or delegated. Indeed, acting conscientiously is the heart of the ethical life, and to the extent that physicians give it up, they are no longer acting as moral agents.
Farr A Curlin, Ryan E Lawrence, Marshall H Chin, John D Lantos
New England Journal of Medicine
Abstract Background There is a heated debate about whether health professionals may refuse to provide treatments to which they object on moral grounds. It is important to understand how physicians think about their ethical rights and obligations when such conflicts emerge in clinical practice.
Methods We conducted a cross-sectional survey of a stratified, random sample of 2000 practicing U.S. physicians from all specialties by mail. The primary criterion variables were physicians’ judgments about their ethical rights and obligations when patients request a legal medical procedure to which the physician objects for religious or moral reasons. These procedures included administering terminal sedation in dying patients, providing abortion for failed contraception, and prescribing birth control to adolescents without parental approval.
Results A total of 1144 of 1820 physicians (63%) responded to our survey. On the basis of our results, we estimate that most physicians believe that it is ethically permissible for doctors to explain their moral objections to patients (63%). Most also believe that physicians are obligated to present all options (86%) and to refer the patient to another clinician who does not object to the requested procedure (71%). Physicians who were male, those who were religious, and those who had personal objections to morally controversial clinical practices were less likely to report that doctors must disclose information about or refer patients for medical procedures to which the physician objected on moral grounds (multivariate odds ratios, 0.3 to 0.5).
Conclusions Many physicians do not consider themselves obligated to disclose information about or refer patients for legal but morally controversial medical procedures. Patients who want information about and access to such procedures may need to inquire proactively to determine whether their physicians would accommodate such requests.
