Francesca Minerva Archives - Protection of Conscience Project Library

Cosmetic surgery and conscientious objection

Francesca Minerva

Abstract
In this paper, I analyse the issue of conscientious objection in relation to cosmetic surgery. I consider cases of doctors who might refuse to perform a cosmetic treatment because: (1) the treatment aims at achieving a goal which is not in the traditional scope of cosmetic surgery; (2) the motivation of the patient to undergo the surgery is considered trivial; (3) the patient wants to use the surgery to promote moral or political values that conflict with the doctor’s ones; (4) the patient requires an intervention that would benefit himself/herself, but could damage society at large.

Minerva F. Cosmetic surgery and conscientious objection. Journal of Medical Ethics. Published Online First: 02 March 2017. doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103804

Conscientious objection in Italy

Francesca Minerva

Abstract
The law regulating abortion in Italy gives healthcare practitioners the option to make a conscientious objection to activities that are specific and necessary to an abortive intervention. Conscientious objectors among Italian gynaecologists amount to about 70%. This means that only a few doctors are available to perform abortions, and therefore access to abortion is subject to constraints. In 2012 the International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN) lodged a complaint against Italy to the European Committee of Social Rights, claiming that the inadequate protection of the right to access abortion implies a violation of the right to health. In this paper I will discuss the Italian situation with respect to conscientious objection to abortion and I will suggest possible solutions to the problem.

Minerva F. Conscientious objection in Italy. J Med Ethics doi:10.1136/medethics-2013-101656

After-birth abortion: Why should the baby live?

Alberto Giubilini, Francesca Minerva

Abstract
Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus’ health. By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled.

Giubilini A, Minerva F. After-birth abortion: Why should the baby live?. J Med Ethics. 2013;39(5):261-263.