The Invention of a Human Right: Conscientious Objection at the United Nations, 1947-2-11

Jeremy K Kessler

Columbia Human Rights Law Review
Columbia Human Rights Law Review

Abstract
The right of conscientious objection to military service is the most startling of human rights. While human rights generally seek to protect individuals from state power, the right of conscientious objection radically alters the citizen-state relationship, subordinating a state’s decisions about national security to the beliefs of the individual citizen. In a world of nation-states jealous of their sovereignty, how did the human right of conscientious objection become an international legal doctrine? By answering that question, this Article both clarifies the legal pedigree of the human right of conscientious objection and sheds new light on the relationship between international human rights law and national sovereignty.


Kessler JK. The Invention of a Human Right: Conscientious Objection at the United Nations, 1947-2-11. Columbia Hum R Law R. 2013;44(753-791.

Selective conscientious objection in the United States

Joseph E Capizzi

Journal of Church & State
Journal of Church & State

Extract
It is this author’s position that the concerns of the selective conscientious objector ought to be legally recognized, not because an exemption is granted to the pacifist, but because it is the right thing to do in a democratic society that is respectful of its members’ religious commitments. This is not proposed as yet another right to add to the ever-growing list of individual rights in our society. The point of this essay is not to argue implicitly in defense of liberalism by arguing explicitly for a right deriving therefrom. Rather, it is proposed that the recognition of selective conscientious objection is necessary due to the presence of two existent legal concepts: the free exercise of religion, already extended to pacifists, and the right to confessional neutrality. “Compelling state interests” simply do not, in point of fact, override confessional neutrality. The government’s arguments about the feasibility of determining sincere selective objectors, about the drain of manpower that it claims would occur, and that the selective objector is merely a “political” dissenter and as such should not be granted this privilege, are not convincing.


Capizzi JE. Selective conscientious objection in the United States. J Church State. 1996 Spring;38(2):339-363.