Protection of Conscience Project Library
Service, not Servitude
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More specifically, this article explores the question: Is it morally permissible for a lawyer to decline representation of a prospective client who seeks to obtain a legal but immoral objective, if the lawyer reasonably believes that the prospective client will be otherwise unable to obtain legal representation?
Collett TS. The Common Good and the Duty to Represent: Must the Last Lawyer in Town Take Any Case? South Texas Law Review. 1999;40(137-179)
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Conclusion
Tennessee Formal Ethics Opinion 96-F-140 attempts to disconnect morality from the lawyer’s work. The Board’s disregard of the lawyer’s moral and religious objections to accepting the appointment suggests either a hostility to the particular religious beliefs asserted by the inquiring lawyer or a willingness to demand lawyers accept being treated as mere means to clients’ and courts’ ends. Hostility to religious beliefs is deeply troubling when exhibited by those who are charged with providing lawyers’ guidance in discerning their professional obligations, but the second possible interpretation of the opinion is equally chilling. To the extent that the Board’s opinion represents the members’ considered judgment that lawyers are obligated to act as amoral facilitators of any action not proscribed by positive law, the power of the state is dramatically enlarged and the power of the individual and other social institutions dangerously diminished. This result cannot be tolerated under the terms of the First Amendment, nor can it be reconciled with the lawyer’s basic human rights.
Collett TS. Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments in Unjust Civil Cases. Wake Forest Law Review. 1997;32: 635-670.