Abstract The dominant approach to conscience in contemporary bioethics presumes that conscience functions to promote personal moral integrity, and therefore presumes that the relevant values are inherently personal. This approach fails to demonstrate when and why claims of conscience should be taken seriously by others. I draw on Hannah Arendt’s deliberative model of conscience and Cheshire Calhoun’s social model of integrity to develop an alternative relational view of conscience – one that demonstrates that the relevant values are social as well as personal. I show how the goal of improving ethical practice over time constrains which conscience claims should be taken seriously by others.
Extract Once we have concluded that death is what is in the best interest of an infant, it is unreasonable not to bring about this death as painlessly and as much controlled in terms of timing by the parents as is feasible.
Jooyoung Cheon, Nessa Coyle, Debra L. Wiegand, Sally Welsh
Abstract Nurses encounter ethical dilemmas in their clinical practice especially those associated with palliative and end-of-life care. The Hospice and Palliative Nurses Association (HPNA) members were asked to participate in an ethics survey. The survey aimed to identify ethical issues experienced by hospice and palliative nurses, identify resources available to them and barriers if any to their use, and to identify how HPNA can be of support to hospice and palliative nurses.
One hundred twenty-nine (n = 129) HPNA members completed the online survey. The information from each of the surveys was carefully reviewed, and responses were collapsed into 6 themes.
The ethical dilemmas included inadequate communication, provision of nonbeneficial care, patient autonomy usurped/threatened, issues with symptom management and the use of opioids, issues related to decision making, and issues related to discontinuing life-prolonging therapies.
Approximately two-thirds of the nurses used resources in an attempt to resolve the ethical issues, including a formal ethics consultation, involvement of the palliative/hospice team, consulting with other professionals, and use of educational resources.
One-third of the nurses said there were institutional or personal barriers that prevented the ethical dilemma from being resolved. Participants suggested ways that HPNA could help them to effectively manage ethical dilemmas.
Eva Elizabeth Bolt, Marianne C Snijdewind, Dick L Willems, Agnes van der Heide, Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen
Abstract Background Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (EAS) in patients with psychiatric disease, dementia or patients who are tired of living (without severe morbidity) is highly controversial. Although such cases can fall under the Dutch Euthanasia Act, Dutch physicians seem reluctant to perform EAS, and it is not clear whether or not physicians reject the possibility of EAS in these cases.
Aim To determine whether physicians can conceive of granting requests for EAS in patients with cancer, another physical disease, psychiatric disease, dementia or patients who are tired of living, and to evaluate whether physician characteristics are associated with conceivability. A cross-sectional study (survey) was conducted among 2269 Dutch general practitioners, elderly care physicians and clinical specialists.
Results The response rate was 64% (n=1456). Most physicians found it conceivable that they would grant a request for EAS in a patient with cancer or another physical disease (85% and 82%). Less than half of the physicians found this conceivable in patients with psychiatric disease (34%), early-stage dementia (40%), advanced dementia (29–33%) or tired of living (27%). General practitioners were most likely to find it conceivable that they would perform EAS.
Conclusions This study shows that a minority of Dutch physicians find it conceivable that they would grant a request for EAS from a patient with psychiatric disease, dementia or a patient who is tired of living. For physicians who find EAS inconceivable in these cases, legal arguments and personal moral objections both probably play a role.
Abstract In this article I argue that it is not morally justified for physicians to perform virginity tests. First, I contend that, on the basis of the principle of non-maleficence, physicians should not perform virginity tests, because of the potential harms to those who are tested that can result from such tests. Second, I highlight some of the social harms that the practice causes, and argue that physicians ought not to be complicit in causing these harms. Third, I argue that physicians ought not to perform virginity tests on the grounds that testing for virginity is scientifically impossible, and physicians are morally obliged to practise according to scientific principles. Finally, I contend that an ethically sound response to virginity testing requires that the medical profession as a whole should follow the example of the Quebec College of Physicians in declaring this practice by physicians as unethical.
Mithya Lewis-Newby, Mark R Wicclair, Thaddeus Mason Pope, Cynda Rushton, Farr A Curlin, Douglas Diekema, Debbie Durrer, William Ehlenbach, Wanda Gibson-Scipio, Bradford Glavan, Rabbi Levi Langer, Constantine Manthous, Cecile Rose, Anthony Scardella, Hasan Shanawani, Mark D Siegel, Scott D. Halpern, Robert D Truog, Douglas B White
Abstract Rationale: Intensive care unit (ICU) clinicians sometimes have a conscientious objection (CO) to providing or disclosing information about a legal, professionally accepted, and otherwise available medical service. There is little guidance about how to manage COs in ICUs.
Objectives: To provide clinicians, hospital administrators, and policymakers with recommendations for managing COs in the critical care setting.
Methods: This policy statement was developed by a multidisciplinary expert committee using an iterative process with a diverse working group representing adult medicine, pediatrics, nursing, patient advocacy, bioethics, philosophy, and law.
Main Results: The policy recommendations are based on the dual goals of protecting patients’ access to medical services and protecting the moral integrity of clinicians. Conceptually, accommodating COs should be considered a “shield ” to protect individual clinicians’ moral integrity rather than as a “sword” to impose clinicians’ judgments on patients. The committee recommends that: (1) COs in ICUs be managed through institutional mechanisms, (2) institutions accommodate COs, provided doing so will not impede a patient’s or surrogate’s timely access to medical services or information or create excessive hardships for other clinicians or the institution, (3) a clinician’s CO to providing potentially inappropriate or futile medical services should not be considered sufficient justification to forgo the treatment against the objections of the patient or surrogate, and (4) institutions promote open moral dialogue and foster a culture that respects diverse values in the critical care setting.
Conclusions: This American Thoracic Society statement provides guidance for clinicians, hospital administrators, and policymakers to address clinicians’ COs in the critical care setting.
Abstract On a proceduralist account of democracy, collective decisions derive their justification-at least in part-from the qualities of the process through which they have been made. To fulfill its justificatory function, this process should ensure that citizens have an equal right to political participation as a respectful response to their equal status as agents capable of self-legislation. How should democratic participation be understood if it is to offer such a procedural justification for democratic decisions? I suggest that, in order to overcome the structural procedural disadvantages affecting the actual, effective opportunities that citizens who hold nonmainstream views have to exercise their right to political participation, the enhancement of such opportunities requires securing space for contestation. Against this background, I vindicate the (currently underestimated) role of conscientious objection as a form of political participation.
Abstract Doing ‘good medical ethics’ requires acknowledgment that it is often practised in non-ideal circumstances! In this article I present the distinction between ideal theory (IT) and non-ideal theory (NIT). I show how IT may not be the best solution to tackle problems in non-ideal contexts. I sketch a NIT framework as a useful tool for bioethics and medical ethics and explain how NITs can contribute to policy design in non-ideal circumstances. Different NITs can coexist and be evaluated vis-à-vis the IT. Additionally, I address what an individual doctor ought to do in this non-ideal context with the view that knowledge of NITs can facilitate the decision-making process. NITs help conceptualise problems faced in the context of non-compliance and scarcity in a better and more realistic way. Deciding which policy is optimal in such contexts may influence physicians’ decisions regarding their patients. Thus, this analysis-usually identified only with policy making-may also be relevant to medical ethics. Finally, I recognise that this is merely a first step in an unexplored but fundamental theoretical area and that more work needs to be done.
Extract In September 2014, a little boy named Vincent was born prematurely, but healthy. While such a birth would usually attract the attention of family and friends, baby Vincent’s arrival made world news. He is the world’s first “womb transplant baby.” Like Louise Brown, Vincent is marked for history. Weeks after Vincent’s birth, two more women gave birth to boys, this time each mother carrying her child in the same womb in which she herself was gestated. . .
. . . This essay explores some of the research and issues raised by uterus transplantation. As is appropriate for an emerging biomedical technology, we approach these new developments with caution. My conclusions are preliminary. While I address some of the arguments pro and con, I will merely suggest some of the theological and biblical themes. These merit a lengthier treatment and charitable dialogue with others.
Extract While recent scholarship has – for the past two decades – endeavoured to transcend initial reservations about these forms of testimony, the difficulty with some of these memoirs – namely their authors’ implicit complicity in unethical medical research and in the Nazi Holocaust in general – remains however problematic. To address this thorny issue, in this article I consider the memoirs of a Jewish inmate doctor and forensic pathologist who worked with and for SS medical officers in Auschwitz, particularly Josef Mengele. His name was Mikló Nyiszli. . .