Referral Archives - Page 5 of 8 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

Healthcare responsibilities and conscientious objection

Rebecca J. Cook, Monica Arango Olaya, Bernard M. Dickens

International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics

Abstract
The Constitutional Court of Colombia has issued a decision of international significance clarifying legal duties of providers,hospitals, and healthcare systems when conscientious objection is made to conducting lawful abortion. The decision establishes objecting providers’duties to refer patients to non-objecting providers, and that hospitals,clinics, and other institutions have no rights of conscientious objection. Their professional and legal duties are to ensure that patients receive timely services. Hospitals and other administrators cannot object, because they do not participate in the procedures they are obliged to arrange. Objecting providers, and hospitals, must maintain knowledge of non-objecting providers to whom their patients must be referred. Accordingly, medical schools must adequately train, and licensing authorities approve, non-objecting providers. Where they are unavailable, midwives and perhaps nurse practitioners may be trained, equipped, and approved for appropriate service delivery. The Court’s decision has widespread implications for how healthcare systems must accommodate conscientious objection and patients’ legal rights.

Cook RJ, Olaya MA, Dickens BM. Healthcare responsibilities and conscientious objection. Int J Gynaecol Obstet. 2009 Mar;104(3):249-52. Epub 2008 Nov 29.

Healthcare responsibilities and conscientious objection

Rebecca J Cook, Mónica Arango Olaya, Bernard M Dickens

Abstract
The Constitutional Court of Colombia has issued a decision of international significance clarifying legal duties of providers, hospitals, and healthcare systems when conscientious objection is made to conducting lawful abortion. The decision establishes objecting providers’ duties to refer patients to non-objecting providers, and that hospitals, clinics, and other institutions have no rights of conscientious objection. Their professional and legal duties are to ensure that patients receive timely services. Hospitals and other administrators cannot object, because they do not participate in the procedures they are obliged to arrange. Objecting providers, and hospitals, must maintain knowledge of non-objecting providers to whom their patients must be referred. Accordingly, medical schools must adequately train, and licensing authorities approve, non-objecting providers. Where they are unavailable, midwives and perhaps nurse practitioners may be trained, equipped, and approved for appropriate service delivery. The Court’s decision has widespread implications for how healthcare systems must accommodate conscientious objection and patients’ legal rights.

Cook RJ, Olaya MA, Dickens BM. Healthcare responsibilities and conscientious objection. Int J Gyn Ob. 2009 Nov 29;104(3):249-252.

(News) Morals, medicine and geography

Roger Collier

Canadian Medical Association Journal, CMAJ — Canadian Medical Association Journal

(Article compares approach to freedom of conscience in health care in the US and Canada)
Extract
Advocates of compulsory referral claim that doctors who discriminate against certain practices are, whether they know it or not, also discriminating against certain people — namely, the poor, the uneducated and those in remote areas. These people already have limited access to medical services, a problem that, all sides agree, is exacerbated when their doctors refuse to present them with all their options.

Collier R. Morals, medicine and geography. Can Med Assoc J. 2008 Nov 04;179(10):996-997.

Conscientious refusal by physicians and pharmacists: Who is obligated to do what, and why?

Dan W Brock

Abstract
Some medical services have long generated deep moral controversy within the medical profession as well as in broader society and have led to conscientious refusals by some physicians to provide those services to their patients. More recently, pharmacists in a number of states have refused on grounds of conscience to fill legal prescriptions for their customers. This paper assesses these controversies. First, I offer a brief account of the basis and limits of the claim to be free to act on one’s conscience. Second, I sketch an account of the basis of the medical and pharmacy professions’ responsibilities and the process by which they are specified and change over time. Third, I then set out and defend what I call the “conventional compromise” as a reasonable accommodation to conflicts between these professions’ responsibilities and the moral integrity of their individual members. Finally, I take up and reject the complicity objection to the conventional compromise. Put together, this provides my answer to the question posed in the title of my paper: “Conscientious refusal by physicians and pharmacists: who is obligated to do what, and why?”.

Brock DW. Conscientious refusal by physicians and pharmacists: Who is obligated to do what, and why? Theor Med Bioeth. 2008;29(3):187-200.

Conscience and clinical practice: Medical ethics in the face of moral controversy

Farr A Curlin

Abstract
Physicians sometimes refuse to provide legally permitted medical services on the grounds that they cannot do so in good conscience. Such conscientious refusals are at least as old as the Hippocratic movement. Yet new events, such as the refusal by health care professionals to prescribe or dispense post-coital (‘‘emergency’’) contraception, have kindled new debates about what physicians are obligated to do when patients request legal medical interventions to which their physicians have moral objections. In a recent national survey, we found that a large majority of physicians believe they are obligated in such circumstances to present all possible options to the patient, including information about obtaining the requested intervention, and to refer the patient to a clinician who does not object to the requested intervention. Yet a substantial minority of physicians—particularly those who are more religious and/or who themselves object to common controversial practices—disagree with these majority opinions.

Curlin FA. Conscience and clinical practice: Medical ethics in the face of moral controversy. Theor Med Bioeth. 2008;29(3):129-133.

The ethics of direct and indirect referral for termination of pregnancy

Frank A Chervenak, Laurence B McCullough

American Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology

Abstract
Referral of pregnant patients for termination of pregnancy by physicians morally opposed to the procedure is ethically controversial, with polarized positions taken by physician organizations. Based on the ethical principles of beneficence and respect for autonomy, we establish the distinction between direct and indirect referral. Direct referral is beneficence based and requires the referring physician to ensure that the referral occurs. Indirect referral is autonomy based, with a beneficence-based component that requires that the physician provide information to the patient about health care organizations that will provide competent medical care. We show that only indirect referral is ethically required in healthy women for termination of an unwanted pregnancy or a pregnancy complicated by fetal anomalies because the indications for this procedure are solely autonomy based. Direct referral for termination of pregnancy is not ethically required but is permissible. Conscience-based objections to direct referral for termination of pregnancy have merit; conscience-based objections to indirect referral do not.

Chervenak FA, McCullough LB. The ethics of direct and indirect referral for termination of pregnancy. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 2008 Jul 30;199(3):232.e1-232.e3.

Access to abortion: what women want from abortion services

Ellen R Wiebe, S Sandhu

Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada

Abstract
Objective: Whether Canadian physicians can refuse to refer women for abortion and whether private clinics can charge for abortions are matters of controversy. We sought to identify barriers to access for women seeking therapeutic abortion and to have them identify what they considered to be most important about access to abortion services.

Methods: Women presenting for abortion over a two-month period at two free-standing abortion clinics, one publicly funded and the other private, were invited to participate in the study. Phase I of the study involved administration of a questionnaire seeking information about demographics, perceived barriers to access to abortion, and what the women wanted from abortion services. Phase II involved semi-structured interviews of a convenience sample of women to record their responses to questions about access. Responses from Phase I questionnaires were compared between the two clinics, and qualitative analysis was performed on the interview responses.

Results: Of 423 eligible women, 402 completed questionnaires, and of 45 women approached, 39 completed interviews satisfactorily. Women received information about abortion services from their physicians (60.0%), the Internet (14.8%), a telephone directory (7.8%), friends or family (5.3%), or other sources (12.3%). Many had negative experiences in gaining access. The most important issue regarding access was the long wait time; the second most important issue was difficulty in making appointments. In the private clinic, 85% of the women said they were willing to pay for shorter wait times, compared with 43.5% in the public clinic.

Conclusion: Physicians who failed to refer patients for abortion or provide information about obtaining an abortion caused distress and impeded access for a significant minority of women requesting an abortion. Management of abortion services should be prioritized to reflect what women want: particularly decreased wait times for abortion and greater ease and convenience in booking appointments. Since many women are willing to pay for services in order to have an abortion within one week, this option should be considered by policy makers.

Wiebe ER, Sandhu S. Access to abortion: what women want from abortion services. J Obstet Gynaecol Can. 2008 Apr;30(4):327-331.

Opinion no. 385: The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists

American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists

Abstract
Health care providers occasionally may find that providing indicated, even standard, care would present for them a personal moral problem-a conflict of conscience particularly in the field of reproductive medicine. Although respect for conscience is important, conscientious refusals should be limited if they constitute an imposition of religious or moral beliefs on patients, negatively affect a patient’s health, are based on scientific misinformation, or create or reinforce racial or socioeconomic inequalities. Conscientious refusals that conflict with patient well-being should be accommodated only if the primary duty to the patient can be fulfilled. All health care providers must provide accurate and unbiased information so that patients can make informed decisions. Where conscience implores physicians to deviate from standard practices, they must provide potential patients with accurate and prior notice of their personal moral commitments. Physicians and other health care providers have the duty to refer patients in a timely manner to other providers if they do not feel that they can in conscience provide the standard reproductive services that patients request. In resource-poor areas, access to safe and legal reproductive services should be maintained. Providers with moral or religious objections should either practice in proximity to individuals who do not share their views or ensure that referral processes are in place. In an emergency in which referral is not possible or might negatively have an impact on a patient’s physical or mental health, providers have an obligation to provide medically indicated and requested care.

ACOG. The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine. ACOG Committee on Ethics. 2007;385):1-6.

Conscience in America: the slippery slope of mixing morality with medicine

Georgia Chudoba

Extract

Extract
Conscience clauses in this country are becoming dangerously broad and over-inclusive. What was once a protection for physicians who objected to performing abortions is now a tool for religious activists to obstruct a patient’s right to contraceptives, sterilization, and any other medical procedure that they feel is “morally” wrong. The Legislature must place limits on these clauses to protect patients’ rights. At the onset of new medical research on stem cells and infertility treatments, it is crucial that Congress enact legislation that will protect patients’ rights to these treatments. There needs to be a balance between the doctor’s right of conscience and the patient’s right to treatment.

Chudoba G. Conscience in America: the slippery slope of mixing morality with medicine. Southwestern University Law Review. 2007;36(1):85-106.

The Pharmacist’s Personal and Professional Integrity (Conscientious Objection and Emergency Contraception)

(Conscientious Objection and Emergency Contraception)

Howard Brody, Susan S Night

Extract
We conclude that, although a “duty to refer” may not describe very well an actual, working policy that effectively balances the duties of personal and professional integrity for the objecting pharmacist, Card’s (2007) mandatory-service policy fails at a basic level to respect the dual dictates of personal and professional integrity. A policy that attempts to maximize the extent to which both duties can be fulfilled might be denounced by Card as a “moderate” policy in the sense that he finds objectionable. Nonetheless, it is ethically the soundest option.

Brody H, Night SS. The Pharmacist’s Personal and Professional Integrity (Conscientious Objection and Emergency Contraception). Am J Bioeth. 2007;7(6):16-17.