Extract Discussion: CMA policy states that “a physician should not be compelled to participate in the termination of a pregnancy.” In addition, “a physician whose moral or religious beliefs prevent him or her from recommending or performing an abortion should inform the patient of this so that she may consult another physician.” You should therefore advise the patient that you do not provide abortion services. You should also indicate that because of your moral beliefs, you will not initiate a referral to another physician who is willing to provide this service (unless there is an emergency). However, you should not interfere in any way with this patient’s right to obtain the abortion. At the patient’s request, you should also indicate alternative sources where she might obtain a referral. This is in keeping with the obligation spelled out in the CMA policy: “There should be no delay in the provision of abortion services.”.
Abstract The issue of pharmacists refusing to dispense birth control or emergency contraception recently has become a major debate in the battle over reproductive rights. Several states have enacted legislation to protect refusing pharmacists, and many more are considering such laws. I explore these new laws against the backdrop of the existing legal landscape governing the actions of pharmacists, including tort law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and free exercise jurisprudence. I then consider how courts might interpret refusal clauses upon which pharmacists may rely. I argue that courts should read pharmacist refusal statutes narrowly by limiting the protected act of conscience to the actual refusal to dispense medication, and not extending protection to behavior that could violate the pharmacist’s duty of care to patients. Such an approach will not only minimize the impact of refusals on the interests of patients and employers, but will meld these new statutes with the existing legal framework addressing religious objectors, which has consistently shown concern for third-party rights.
Extract I am deeply disturbed by the negative responses (posted as e-letters) to the guest editorial by Sanda Rogers and Jocelyn Downie. Most of the authors articulate an uncompromising ideological position in favour of the right to life of a fetus, while ignoring the basic human rights of women who, presumably, are their patients. . . . Why should an individual doctor’s personal beliefs trump the legal definition of “person” and of “human being,” violate the constitutionally entrenched rights of women to sexual and reproductive autonomy, and violate international human rights?
Farr A Curlin, Ryan E Lawrence, Marshall H Chin, John D Lantos
New England Journal of Medicine
Abstract Background There is a heated debate about whether health professionals may refuse to provide treatments to which they object on moral grounds. It is important to understand how physicians think about their ethical rights and obligations when such conflicts emerge in clinical practice.
Methods We conducted a cross-sectional survey of a stratified, random sample of 2000 practicing U.S. physicians from all specialties by mail. The primary criterion variables were physicians’ judgments about their ethical rights and obligations when patients request a legal medical procedure to which the physician objects for religious or moral reasons. These procedures included administering terminal sedation in dying patients, providing abortion for failed contraception, and prescribing birth control to adolescents without parental approval.
Results A total of 1144 of 1820 physicians (63%) responded to our survey. On the basis of our results, we estimate that most physicians believe that it is ethically permissible for doctors to explain their moral objections to patients (63%). Most also believe that physicians are obligated to present all options (86%) and to refer the patient to another clinician who does not object to the requested procedure (71%). Physicians who were male, those who were religious, and those who had personal objections to morally controversial clinical practices were less likely to report that doctors must disclose information about or refer patients for medical procedures to which the physician objected on moral grounds (multivariate odds ratios, 0.3 to 0.5).
Conclusions Many physicians do not consider themselves obligated to disclose information about or refer patients for legal but morally controversial medical procedures. Patients who want information about and access to such procedures may need to inquire proactively to determine whether their physicians would accommodate such requests.
Abstract The ideal conscience statutes will balance the interests on both sides. Conscientious objectors should be free to practice in accordance with their beliefs, but should have to give employers and patients reasonably advanced notice that they may not be reliable in certain situations.173 The individual objector should avoid knowingly entering into employment situations guaranteed to create conflict. While health care providers have a duty to ensure informed decision making, women seeking unbiased clinical care should not be subjected to lectures on personally held views of morality. Places of worship are a more appropriate arena for proselytizing. Institutional and individual objectors should develop appropriate accommodations through referral and notice to avoid inconvenience, delay, and possible injury to the patients who depend on them.
Extract pharmacists are autonomous, moral agents who are accountable for their choices and entitled—within limits— to decide in which activities they will participate. Pharmacists’ professionalism is defended, their responsibilities in the provision of drug therapy are set forth in the context of pharmaceutical care, and these lead to the conclusion that pharmacists’ refusals may be ethically justified. There are important limits on how are being asked to participate in actions they find morally objectionable. Notably, they must ensure that these prescriptions are filled by someone else in a timely manner and must refrain from any abusive or demeaning treatment of patients, as summed up in our Principle of Conscientious Refusal to Dispense.
Abstract The pharmacist who wants her integrity and self-conception to be respected must accord respect to the woman whose views about sex, life processes, and parenthood differ from her own by courteously offering her own rationale and a referral.
Abstract This article argues that practitioners have a professional ethical obligation to dispense emergency contraception, even given conscientious objection to this treatment. This recent controversy affects all medical professionals, including physicians as well as pharmacists. This article begins by analyzing the option of referring the patient to another willing provider. Objecting professionals may conscientiously refuse because they consider emergency contraception to be equivalent to abortion or because they believe contraception itself is immoral. This article critically evaluates these reasons and concludes that they do not successfully support conscientious objection in this context. Contrary to the views of other thinkers, it is not possible to easily strike a respectful balance between the interests of objecting providers and patients in this case. As medical professionals, providers have an ethical duty to inform women of this option and provide emergency contraception when this treatment is requested.
Extract Religious initiatives to propose, legislate, and enforce laws that protect denial of care or assistance to patients, (almost invariably women in need), and bar their right of access to lawful health services, are abuses of conscientious objection clauses that aggravate public divisiveness and bring unjustified criticism toward more mainstream religious beliefs. Physicians who abuse the right to conscientious objection and fail to refer patients to nonobjecting colleagues are not fulfilling their profession’s covenant with society.
Extract Conclusion . . . The only solution to this dilemma may be the solution that the APhA suggested, namely, to endorse a conscience clause, but simultaneously require pharmacists to refer a valid prescription to another service provider. Those members of the profession who bear the burden of this course of action are those who believe that a referral is equivalent to the act itself. However, such a view safeguards most of the ethical goals of pharmacists while simultaneously serving the public need for effective provision of legally prescribed drugs.
