Rapid Response: extract Jocelyn Downie and Udo Schuklenk conclude, first, that the Canadian experience denies the existence of a ‘slippery slope’ expanding medical termination from a limited to a broader medical constituency. Second, they argue a failure to provide social constituents of health and support is a significant factor in the increased requests for ‘medical aide in dying.’ (1) It is hard to credit their conclusions on either point. . . .
. . . As a Canadian long engaged in this debate–legal and social–as well as in the care of those with chronic conditions I thus find their arguments incomplete and their conclusions inaccurate. . .
G. Bravo, C. Rodrigue, M. Arcand, J. Downie, M.-F. Dubois, S. Kaasalaine, C.M. Hertogh,S. Pautex, L. Van den Block
Geriatric Nursing
Abstract We conducted a survey in a random sample of 514 Quebec nurses caring for the elderly to assess their attitudes towards extending medical aid in dying to incompetent patients and to explore associated factors. Attitudes were measured using clinical vignettes featuring a hypothetical patient with Alzheimer disease. Vignettes varied according to the stage of the disease (advanced or terminal) and the presence or absence of a written request. Of the 291 respondents, 83.5% agreed with the current legislation that allows physicians to administer aid in dying to competent patients who are at the end of life and suffer unbearably. A similar proportion (83%, p = 0.871) were in favor of extending medical aid in dying to incompetent patients who are at the terminal stage of Alzheimer disease, show signs of distress, and have made a written request before losing capacity.
Abstract In Canada, as in many developed countries, healthcare conscientious objection is growing in visibility, if not in incidence. Yet the country’s health professional policies on conscientious objection are in disarray. The article reports the results of a comprehensive review of policies relevant to conscientious objection for four Canadian health professions: medicine, nursing, pharmacy and dentistry. Where relevant policies exist in many Canadian provinces, there is much controversy and potential for confusion, due to policy inconsistencies and terminological vagueness. Meanwhile, in Canada’s three most northerly territories with significant Aboriginal populations, whose already precarious health is influenced by funding and practitioner shortages, there are major policy gaps applicable to conscientious objection. In many parts of the country, as a result of health professionals’ conscientious refusals, access to some legal health services – including but not limited to reproductive health services such as abortion – has been seriously impeded. Although policy reform on conscientious conflicts may be difficult, and may generate strenuous opposition from some professional groups, for the sake of both patients and providers, such policy change must become an urgent priority.
Extract I am deeply disturbed by the negative responses (posted as e-letters) to the guest editorial by Sanda Rogers and Jocelyn Downie. Most of the authors articulate an uncompromising ideological position in favour of the right to life of a fetus, while ignoring the basic human rights of women who, presumably, are their patients. . . . Why should an individual doctor’s personal beliefs trump the legal definition of “person” and of “human being,” violate the constitutionally entrenched rights of women to sexual and reproductive autonomy, and violate international human rights?
