‘To thine own self be true’: On the loss of integrity as a kind of suffering

Henri Wijsbek

Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
One of the requirements in the Dutch regulation for euthanasia and assisted suicide is that the doctor must be satisfied ‘that the patient’s suffering is unbearable, and that there is no prospect of improvement.’ In the notorious Chabot case, a psychiatrist assisted a 50 year old woman in suicide, although she did not suffer from any somatic disease, nor strictly speaking from any psychiatric condition. In Seduced by Death, Herbert Hendin concluded that apparently the Dutch regulation now allows physicians to assist anyone in suicide simply because he or she is unhappy. In this paper, I reject Hendin’s conclusion and in particular his description of Mrs Boomsma as someone who was ‘simply unhappy.’ After a detailed narration of her lifestory, I turn to the American philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s account of volitional incapacity and love for a more accurate characterization of her suffering. Having been through what she had, she could only go on living as another person than the one she had been when she was a happy mother. That would have violated her integrity, and that she could not bring herself to do.


Wijsbek H. ‘To thine own self be true’: On the loss of integrity as a kind of suffering. Bioethics. 2012 Jan;26(1):1-7.

Should we allow organ donation euthanasia? Alternatives for maximizing the number and quality of organs for transplantation

Dominic Wilkinson, Julian Savulescu

Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
There are not enough solid organs available to meet the needs of patients with organ failure. Thousands of patients every year die on the waiting lists for transplantation. Yet there is one currently available, underutilized, potential source of organs. Many patients die in intensive care following withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment whose organs could be used to save the lives of others. At present the majority of these organs go to waste. In this paper we consider and evaluate a range of ways to improve the number and quality of organs available from this group of patients. Changes to consent arrangements (for example conscription of organs after death) or changes to organ donation practice could dramatically increase the numbers of organs available, though they would conflict with currently accepted norms governing transplantation. We argue that one alternative, Organ Donation Euthanasia, would be a rational improvement over current practice regarding withdrawal of life support. It would give individuals the greatest chance of being able to help others with their organs after death. It would increase patient autonomy. It would reduce the chance of suffering during the dying process. We argue that patients should be given the choice of whether and how they would like to donate their organs in the event of withdrawal of life support in intensive care. Continuing current transplantation practice comes at the cost of death and prolonged organ failure. We should seriously consider all of the alternatives.


Wilkinson D, Savulescu J. Should we allow organ donation euthanasia? Alternatives for maximizing the number and quality of organs for transplantation. Bioethics. 2012 Jan;26(1):32-48.

Are general practitioners prepared to end life on request in a country where euthanasia is legalised?

M Sercu, P Pype, T Christiaens, M Grypdonck, A Derese, M Deveugele

Journal of Medical Ethics
Journal of Medical Ethics

Abstract
Background: In 2002, Belgium set a legal framework for euthanasia, whereby granting and performing euthanasia is entrusted entirely to physicians, and—as advised by Belgian Medical Deontology—in the context of a trusted patient–physician relationship. Euthanasia is, however, rarely practiced, so the average physician will not attain routine in this matter.

Aim: To explore how general practitioners in Flanders (Belgium) deal with euthanasia. This was performed via qualitative analysis of semistructured interviews with 52 general practitioners (GPs).

Results: Although GPs can understand a patient’s request for euthanasia, their own willingness to perform it is limited, based on their assumption that legal euthanasia equates to an injection that ends life abruptly. Their willingness to perform euthanasia is affected by the demanding nature of a patient’s request, by their views on what circumstances render euthanasia legitimate and by their own ability to inject a lethal dose. Several GPs prefer increasing opioid dosages and palliative sedation to a lethal injection, which they consider to fall outside the scope of euthanasia legislation.

Conclusions: Four attitudes can be identified: (1) willing to perform euthanasia; (2) only willing to perform as a last resort; (3) feeling incapable of performing; (4) refusing on principle. The situation where GPs have to consider the request and—if they grant it—to perform the act may result in arbitrary access to euthanasia for the patient. The possibility of installing transparent referral and support strategies for the GPs should be further examined. Further discussion is needed in the medical profession about the exact content of the euthanasia law.


Sercu M, Pype P, Christiaens T, Grypdonck M, Derese A, Deveugele M. Are general practitioners prepared to end life on request in a country where euthanasia is legalised? J Med Ethics. 2012 Jan 10;38(5) 274-280.

It’s in My Patients’ Best Interests, So What’s The Problem?

Rachelle Blue

Journal of Legal Medicine
Journal of Legal Medicine

Extract
Upon completion of her DDS degree, Martha . . .enters into a verbal agreement with the principal dentist . . . After working at the practice for several months, Martha notices that her paycheques seem to be consistently smaller than expected . . . she sees that the office has not been collecting the twenty percent co-payment from the insured patients, and has been routinely writing this amount off . . . Her initial gut reaction is that the insured patients are benefiting from the practice, so maybe it’s not such a big deal. However, her recent education in dental ethics causes her to take a more reflective approach.


Blue R. It’s in My Patients’ Best Interests, So What’s The Problem?. J Leg Med. 2012;33(1):129-136.

Comparative analysis of moral distress and values of the work organization between American and Spanish podiatric physicians

M E Losa Iglesias, R Becerro de Bengoa Vallejo, P Salvadores Fuentes

Journal of the American Podiatric Medical Association
Journal of the American Podiatric Medical Association

Abstract
Background: Moral distress is a stress symptom arising from situations that involve ethical dimensions where the health-care provider believes that he or she is unable to preserve all interests and values at stake. The aims of this study were to evaluate the impact of, and identify possible differences in, moral distress in podiatric physicians in the United States and Spain and to determine the ethical principles most closely related to moral distress.

Methods: A 2008 e-mail survey of 93 US podiatric physicians and 93 Spanish podiatric physicians (N = 186) presented statements about different ethical dilemmas, values, and goals in the workplace.

Results: Although moral distress is strongly present across the sample for all of the questions, the US sample shows higher levels of any kind of moral distress concerning questions about patients’ treatment and economic constraints, overload of paperwork, and acting against one’s conscience. In the US sample, 91.4% of physicians agreed mostly or completely with the statement that they often had to compromise their own values to cope with the demands of the workplace; 89.25% of US podiatric physicians indicated that their own professional values were congruent with the values of the organization; and a similar percentage (77.5%) reported a strong identification with the goals and framework of their work organization. The Spanish sample had similar results.


Iglesias MEL, de Bengoa Vallejo RB, Fuentes PS. Comparative analysis of moral distress and values of the work organization between American and Spanish podiatric physicians. J Am Podiatr Med Assoc. 2012 Jan;102(1):57-63.

Conscientious objection to sexual and reproductive health services: international human rights standards and European law and practice

Ximena Andión-Ibañez, Christina Zampas

European Journal of Health Law
European Journal of Health Law

Abstract
The practice of conscientious objection often arises in the area of individuals refusing to fulfil compulsory military service requirements and is based on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as protected by national, international and regional human rights law. The practice of conscientious objection also arises in the field of health care, when individual health care providers or institutions refuse to provide certain health services based on religious, moral or philosophical objections. The use of conscientious objection by health care providers to reproductive health care services, including abortion, contraceptive prescriptions, and prenatal tests, among other services is a growing phenomena throughout Europe. However, despite recent progress from the European Court of Human Rights on this issue (RR v. Poland, 2011), countries and international and regional bodies generally have failed to comprehensively and effectively regulate this practice, denying many women reproductive health care services they are legally entitled to receive. The Italian Ministry of Health reported that in 2008 nearly 70% of gynaecologists in Italy refuse to perform abortions on moral grounds. It found that between 2003 and 2007 the number of gynaecologists invoking conscientious objection in their refusal to perform an abortion rose from 58.7 percent to 69.2 percent. Italy is not alone in Europe, for example, the practice is prevalent in Poland, Slovakia, and is growing in the United Kingdom. This article outlines the international and regional human rights obligations and medical standards on this issue, and highlights some of the main gaps in these standards. It illustrates how European countries regulate or fail to regulate conscientious objection and how these regulations are working in practice, including examples of jurisprudence from national level courts and cases before the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, the article will provide recommendations to national governments as well as to international and regional bodies on how to regulate conscientious objection so as to both respect the practice of conscientious objection while protecting individual’s right to reproductive health care.


Andión-Ibañez X, Zampas C. Conscientious objection to sexual and reproductive health services: international human rights standards and European law and practice. European J Health Law. 2012;19(3):231-256.

Moral Mandate or Personal Preference? Possible Avenues for Accommodation of Civil Servants Morally Opposed to Facilitating Same-Sex Marriage

Matthew Chandler

Brigham Young University Law Review
Brigham Young University Law Review

Extract
This Comment, based on a review of other exemptions, concludes that enacting legislation to accommodate civil servants while still providing equal service to all members of the public would be both the most effective method of accommodation and the method most likely to be enacted by legislatures. The current methods of accommodation provide little protection for conscientious objectors because legislatures enact them infrequently and courts interpret them narrowly.


Chandler M. Moral Mandate or Personal Preference? Possible Avenues for Accommodation of Civil Servants Morally Opposed to Facilitating Same-Sex Marriage. Brigham Young U Law Rev. 2011 Dec (5):1625-1658.

A clear case for conscience in healthcare practice

Giles Birchley

Journal of Medical Ethics
Journal of Medical Ethics

Abstract
The value of conscience in healthcare ethics is widely debated. While some sources present it as an unquestionably positive attribute, others question both the veracity of its decisions and the effect of conscientious objection on patient access to health care. This paper argues that the right to object conscientiously should be broadened, subject to certain provisos, as there are many benefits to healthcare practice in the development of the consciences of practitioners. While effects such as the preservation of moral integrity are widely considered to benefit practitioners, this paper draws on the work of Hannah Arendt to offer several original arguments in defence of conscience that may more directly benefit patients, namely that a pang of conscience may be useful in rapidly unfolding situations in which there is no time to reflect satisfactorily upon activities and that, given the hierarchical nature of healthcare institutions, a right to defy authority on the basis of conscience may benefit junior staff who lack the institutional power to challenge the orders of superiors.


Birchley G. A clear case for conscience in healthcare practice. J Med Ethics. 2012;38(1):13-17.

Conscientious objection, health care and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights

Mark Campbell

Medical Law International
Medical Law International

Abstract
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides protection for freedom of thought, conscience and religion. From one perspective, it may be said that Article 9 guarantees a right to conscientious objection in health care, whereas from another perspective, a Strasbourg case, such as Pichon and Sajous v France, effectively means that Article 9 provides little or no protection in that context. In this article it is argued that the matter is more complex than either of these two positions would suggest. Moreover, given the nature of the subject matter, national authorities should be afforded a significant margin of appreciation in the way that they protect and regulate conscientious objection. By way of illustration, there is a discussion of the ways in which Article 9 might affect conscientious objection in health care under English law. The final part of the article considers the conceptual limitations of Article 9 in thinking about conscientious objection in health care; in particular, the claim that the extent to which Article 9 of the Convention provides protection for a conscientious objection in the health care context is a different question from whether conscientious objection by doctors and other health care practitioners is justified in principle.


Campbell M. Conscientious objection, health care and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Medical Law International. 2011 Dec 06;11(4):284-304.

(Debate) Should doctors feel able to practise according to their personal values and beliefs? No.

Julian Savulescu

The Medical Journal of Australia
The Medical Journal of Australia

Abstract
Conscientious objection by doctors, as is commonly practised, is discriminatory medicine. Only a fully justified and publicly accepted set of objective values results in ethical medicine as a proper public service with agreed and justified moral and legal standards to which doctors should be held.


Savulescu J. (Debate) Should doctors feel able to practise according to their personal values and beliefs? No. Med J Aust. 2011 Nov;195(9):497.