Beyond Money: Conscientious Objection in Medicine as a Conflict of Interests

Alberto Giubilini, Julian Savulescu

Journal of Medical Ethics
Journal of Medical Ethics

Abstract
Conflict of interests (COIs) in medicine are typically taken to be financial in nature: it is often assumed that a COI occurs when a healthcare practitioner’s financial interest conflicts with patients’ interests, public health interests, or professional obligations more generally. Even when non-financial COIs are acknowledged, ethical concerns are almost exclusively reserved for financial COIs. However, the notion of “interests” cannot be reduced to its financial component. Individuals in general, and medical professionals in particular, have different types of interests, many of which are non-financial in nature but can still conflict with professional obligations. The debate about healthcare delivery has largely overlooked this broader notion of interests. Here, we will focus on health practitioners’ moral or religious values as particular types of personal interests involved in healthcare delivery that can generate COIs and on conscientious objection in healthcare as the expression of a particular type of COI. We argue that, in the healthcare context, the COIs generated by interests of conscience can be as ethically problematic, and therefore should be treated in the same way, as financial COIs.


Giubilini A, Savulescu J. Beyond Money: Conscientious Objection in Medicine as a Conflict of Interests. Bioethical Inquiry 17, 229–243 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-020-09976-9

Beyond Money: Conscientious Objection in Medicine as a Conflict of Interests

Alberto Giubilini, Julian Savulescu

Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry

Abstract
Conflict of interests (COIs) in medicine are typically taken to be financial in nature: it is often assumed that a COI occurs when a healthcare practitioner’s financial interest conflicts with patients’ interests, public health interests, or professional obligations more generally. Even when non-financial COIs are acknowledged, ethical concerns are almost exclusively reserved for financial COIs. However, the notion of “interests” cannot be reduced to its financial component. Individuals in general, and medical professionals in particular, have different types of interests, many of which are non-financial in nature but can still conflict with professional obligations. The debate about healthcare delivery has largely overlooked this broader notion of interests. Here, we will focus on health practitioners’ moral or religious values as particular types of personal interests involved in healthcare delivery that can generate COIs and on conscientious objection in healthcare as the expression of a particular type of COI. We argue that, in the healthcare context, the COIs generated by interests of conscience can be as ethically problematic, and therefore should be treated in the same way, as financial COIs.


Giubilini A, Savulescu J. Beyond Money: Conscientious Objection in Medicine as a Conflict of Interests. J Bioethic Inq. 2020 May 12;17(2):229-243.

(Editorial) A right to be unconscious

Julian Savulescu, Janet Radcliffe-Richards

Anaesthesia
Anaesthesia

Extract
[Referring to Sinmyee et al] This seems to us to be an important, landmark paper. This is because the issues it addresses are important in their own right: how to ensure death without suffering in jurisdictions where assisted dying (including assisted suicide or euthanasia) is allowed, and also, because the technicalities are the same, in cases of capital punishment by lethal injection. Moreover, the paper shows the potential for the use of anaesthesia in contexts beyond surgery. Anaesthesia in its ordinary uses is intended to facilitate surgery designed to restore a patient to improved health and functioning. In assisted dying, however, there is no question of restoring health. The proposition is to use anaesthesia primarily to prevent suffering in a patient who is about to die and, in this sense, places anaesthesia on a new footing as a primary medical intervention, serving a purpose in its own right. . .


Savulescu J, Radcliffe-Richards J.  A right to be unconscious. Anaesthesia. 2019 May; 74(5): 557-559

Doctors Have no Right to Refuse Medical Assistance in Dying, Abortion or Contraception

Julian Savulescu, Udo Schuklenk

Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
In an article in this journal, Christopher Cowley argues that we have ‘misunderstood the special nature of medicine, and have misunderstood the motivations of the conscientious objectors’. We have not. It is Cowley who has misunderstood the role of personal values in the profession of medicine. We argue that there should be better protections for patients from doctors’ personal values and there should be more severe restrictions on the right to conscientious objection, particularly in relation to assisted dying. We argue that eligible patients could be guaranteed access to medical services that are subject to conscientious objections by: (1) removing a right to conscientious objection; (2) selecting candidates into relevant medical specialities or general practice who do not have objections; (3) demonopolizing the provision of these services away from the medical profession.


Savulescu J, Schuklenk U.  (2016) Doctors Have no Right to Refuse Medical Assistance in Dying, Abortion or Contraception. Bioethics. doi:10.1111/bioe.12288

A Defence of Conscientious Objection in Medicine: A Reply to Schuklenk and Savulescu

Christopher Cowley

Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
In a recent (2015) Bioethics editorial, Udo Schuklenk argues against allowing Canadian doctors to conscientiously object to any new euthanasia procedures approved by Parliament. In this he follows Julian Savulescu’s 2006 BMJ paper which argued for the removal of the conscientious objection clause in the 1967 UK Abortion Act. Both authors advance powerful arguments based on the need for uniformity of service and on analogies with reprehensible kinds of personal exemption. In this article I want to defend the practice of conscientious objection in publicly-funded healthcare systems (such as those of Canada and the UK), at least in the area of abortion and end-of-life care, without entering either of the substantive moral debates about the permissibility of either. My main claim is that Schuklenk and Savulescu have misunderstood the special nature of medicine, and have misunderstood the motivations of the conscientious objectors. However, I acknowledge Schuklenk’s point about differential access to lawful services in remote rural areas, and I argue that the health service should expend more to protect conscientious objection while ensuring universal access.


Cowley C. A Defence of Conscientious Objection in Medicine: A Reply to Schuklenk and Savulescu. Bioethics. 2016 Jun;30(5):358-364.

Conscience, values, and justice in Savulescu

Alvan A. Ikoku

American Medical Association Journal of Ethics
American Medical Association Journal of Ethics

Extract
Introduction

Savulescu’s 2006 article in the British Medical Journal takes up perennially unfinished work on the nature and place of conscience, carried out against the background of contested laws shaped by states and their institutions as well as peoples and their professions. His writing on conscientious objection essentially returns to and intervenes in an extended conversation made possible by continued shifts in relations between individual citizens and loci of authority; shifts that characterized the mid-to-late decades of the twentieth century, when debates about war, civil rights, reproduction, and capital punishment made objection a vital mode of participation and engendered fields of practice and scholarship organized around the mission to decentralize decision making.


Ikoku AA. Conscience, values, and justice in Savulescu. Virtual Mentor. 2013;15(3): doi: 10.1001/virtualmentor.2013.15.3.jdsc1-1303.

Should we allow organ donation euthanasia? Alternatives for maximizing the number and quality of organs for transplantation

Dominic Wilkinson, Julian Savulescu

Bioethics
Bioethics

Abstract
There are not enough solid organs available to meet the needs of patients with organ failure. Thousands of patients every year die on the waiting lists for transplantation. Yet there is one currently available, underutilized, potential source of organs. Many patients die in intensive care following withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment whose organs could be used to save the lives of others. At present the majority of these organs go to waste. In this paper we consider and evaluate a range of ways to improve the number and quality of organs available from this group of patients. Changes to consent arrangements (for example conscription of organs after death) or changes to organ donation practice could dramatically increase the numbers of organs available, though they would conflict with currently accepted norms governing transplantation. We argue that one alternative, Organ Donation Euthanasia, would be a rational improvement over current practice regarding withdrawal of life support. It would give individuals the greatest chance of being able to help others with their organs after death. It would increase patient autonomy. It would reduce the chance of suffering during the dying process. We argue that patients should be given the choice of whether and how they would like to donate their organs in the event of withdrawal of life support in intensive care. Continuing current transplantation practice comes at the cost of death and prolonged organ failure. We should seriously consider all of the alternatives.


Wilkinson D, Savulescu J. Should we allow organ donation euthanasia? Alternatives for maximizing the number and quality of organs for transplantation. Bioethics. 2012 Jan;26(1):32-48.

(Debate) Should doctors feel able to practise according to their personal values and beliefs? No.

Julian Savulescu

The Medical Journal of Australia
The Medical Journal of Australia

Abstract
Conscientious objection by doctors, as is commonly practised, is discriminatory medicine. Only a fully justified and publicly accepted set of objective values results in ethical medicine as a proper public service with agreed and justified moral and legal standards to which doctors should be held.


Savulescu J. (Debate) Should doctors feel able to practise according to their personal values and beliefs? No. Med J Aust. 2011 Nov;195(9):497.

A Not-So-New Eugenics: Harris and Savulescu on Human Enhancement

Robert Sparrow

The Hastings Center Report
The Hastings Center Report

Abstract
John Harris and Julian Savulescu, leading figures in the “new” eugenics, argue that parents are morally obligated to use genetic and other technologies to enhance their children. But the argument they give leads to conclusions even more radical than they acknowledge. Ultimately, the world it would lead to is not all that different from that championed by eugenicists one hundred years ago.


Sparrow R. A Not-So-New Eugenics: Harris and Savulescu on Human Enhancement. Hast Cent Rep. 2011 January-February;32-42.

The Proper Place of Values in the Delivery of Medicine (Conscience in Medicine)

Julian Savulescu

The American Journal of Bioethics
The American Journal of Bioethics

Extract
Physicians who fail to act in their patient’s interests breach the fundamental duty of care of a physician. It is negligent to deny a person who would benefit a blood transfusion, a vaccination, an abortion, intensive care or sedation at the end of their life. Physicians should not play God. If they morally disagree with some medical treatment, they can give their reasons to their patients and they can take that debate to the level of law and professional bodies. But in a liberal society they should not inflict their judgments on their patients. Physicians can disagree, but they should not dictate.


Savulescu J. The Proper Place of Values in the Delivery of Medicine (Conscience in Medicine). Am J Bioeth. 2007 Dec 19;21-22.