Abstract Recognition of conscientious objection seems reasonable in relation to controversial and contentious issues, such as physician assisted suicide and abortion. However, physicians also advance conscience-based objections to actions and practices that are sanctioned by established norms of medical ethics, and an account of their moral force can be more elusive in such contexts. Several possible ethical justifications for recognizing appeals to conscience in medicine are examined, and it is argued that the most promising one is respect for moral integrity. It is also argued that an appeal to conscience has significant moral weight only if the core ethical values on which it is based correspond to one or more core values in medicine. Finally, several guidelines pertaining to appeals to conscience and their ethical evaluation are presented.
Journal Extract “The question is whether we will ever be able to learn from history,” Alexander Mitscherlich said in 1947. He was a member of the German Medical Commission, who by order of the German General Medical Council witnessed the Nuremberg Trial. “I believe,” Mitscherlich continued, “that we won’t master it by just keeping our distance morally. This is doubtless easy to achieve. However, it is useless for us as soon as we think of the dark future of this century, in which situations might occur leading to a similar coldness and ignorance towards the right to live of people more defenseless and disregarded” [1]. 1
Over the ensuing decades, neither physicians nor the public faced the tiring process of reviewing and questioning history. Even the reports of the German Medical Commission met with a growing disinterest and disapproval from the physicians in post-war Germany. 2 Almost 50 percent of the German physicians were members of the NSDAP (Nazi Party), and they resumed their work after 1945 after only a brief interruption.
Thus it is understandable that it was not the physicians’ organizations nor the medical historical departments of the universities that turned towards history at the beginning of the1980s. Rather, it was their children [End Page 373] and grandchildren, who were working in the hospitals, the psychiatric institutions, and homes for persons with disabilities. They began to ask what happened 40 or 50 years ago where they were working. They were not involved personally, nor did they blame their fathers and mothers. This is the generation to which I also belong. 3
After Auschwitz and Hadamar, particularly in Germany, discussion about medical ethics and about the future of medicine are nowadays impossible without reference to history. 4 This consideration was the basis of the program entitled “Medicine and Conscience” in the German Section of International Congress of Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, held in Nuremberg in October 1996. 5 As a result of this congress, on the 50th anniversary of the pronouncement of judgment in the Nuremberg Trial, 20 August 1997, the Nuremberg Code 1997 was presented. Based on the historical experiences and the fundamental ideas of the 1947 Code, the 1997 Code is designed to answer current medical questions about the application of biosciences to human beings. It discusses 10 topics, including medical experiments, reproductive medicine, genetic diagnostics and therapy, transplantation, euthanasia, and distribution of resources. (Due to the time limit and the theme of this symposium, I will focus only on the topic of medical research.) The Nuremberg Code 1997 follows the widespread practice of considering informed consent to be a prerequisite in all fields of public health care service.
The critical-historical link to the Nuremberg Code 1947 that we attempted to make with Code 1997 had to confront two fundamental issues. First, we had to determine whether the Code’s significance was only historical or universally valid. To put it differently: was the 1947 Code only to be understood from the historical context? Did it only aim at the judgment of the practices of the Nazi physicians? Or did it imply a universal validity for medical research and medicine in a civilized world?
Historical evidence, as well as a look at the text of the Code, clearly speaks for a universal validity. Telford Taylor, the chief prosecutor of Nuremberg, stated in his introduction that the trial was no mere murder trial, since the defendants were physicians who had sworn the Hippocratic oath and thus had become murderers in the execution of their profession. Logically, the judges created with the Nuremberg Code a basis for the judgment of crimes which became possible within the bounds of medicine. 6[End Page 374]
Johanna H. Groenewoud, Agnes van der Heide, Bregje D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Dick L Willems, Paul J van der Maas, Gerrit van der Wal
New England Journal of Medicine
Abstract Background and Methods The characteristics and frequency of clinical problems with the performance of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are uncertain. We analyzed data from two studies of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands (one conducted in 1990 and 1991 and the other in 1995 and 1996), with a total of 649 cases. We categorized clinical problems as technical problems, such as difficulty inserting an intravenous line; complications, such as myoclonus or vomiting; or problems with completion, such as a longer-than-expected interval between the administration of medications and death.
Results In 114 cases, the physician’s intention was to provide assistance with suicide, and in 535, the intention was to perform euthanasia. Problems of any type were more frequent in cases of assisted suicide than in cases of euthanasia. Complications occurred in 7 percent of cases of assisted suicide, and problems with completion (a longer-than-expected time to death, failure to induce coma, or induction of coma followed by awakening of the patient) occurred in 16 percent of the cases; complications and problems with completion occurred in 3 percent and 6 percent of cases of euthanasia, respectively. The physician decided to administer a lethal medication in 21 of the cases of assisted suicide (18 percent), which thus became cases of euthanasia. The reasons for this decision included problems with completion (in 12 cases) and the inability of the patient to take all the medications (in 5).
Conclusions There may be clinical problems with the performance of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. In the Netherlands, physicians who intend to provide assistance with suicide sometimes end up administering a lethal medication themselves because of the patient’s inability to take the medication or because of problems with the completion of physician-assisted suicide.
Abstract This contribution deals with the issue of the professional autonomy of the medical doctor. Worldwide, the physician’s autonomy is guaranteed and limited, first of all, by Codes of Medical Ethics. In Italy, the latest version of the national Code of Medical Ethics (Code 1998) was published in 1998 by the Federation of provincial Medical Asso- ciations (FNOMCEO). The Code 1998 acknowledges the physician’s autonomy regarding the scheduling, the choice and application of diagnostic and therapeutic means, within the principles of professional responsibility. This responsibility has to make reference to the following fundamental ethical principles: (1) the protection of human life; (2) the protection of the physical and psychological health of the human being; (3) the relief from pain; (4) the respect for the freedom and the dignity of the human person, without discrimination; (5) an up-to-date scientific qualification (Art. 5). The authors underline that autonomy is an anthropological – and consequently ethical – characteristic of the human person. Different positions on autonomy in bioethics (individualistic, evolutionistic, utilitarian and personalistic models) are explained. The relation between the professional autonomy of the physician and the autonomy of the patient and of colleagues is discussed. In fact, the medical doctor is obliged: (1) to respect the fundamental rights of the person, first of all his/her life; (2) to ensure the continuity of the care, even if he can only relieve the patient’s suffering; (3) to maintain, except under certain circumstances, professional secrecy and confidentiality regarding patients and their medical records. Moreover, the physician cannot deny the patient correct and appropriate information. He/she should not perform any diagnostic or therapeutic activity without the informed consent of the patient and the medical doctor must give up medical treatment in case of documented refusal of the individual. Furthermore, the medical doctor has the right to raise conscientious objections if he/she is requested to perform medical actions that are contrary to his/her conscience or medical opinion, unless this attitude would seriously and immediately harm the patient. Regarding the relationships with colleagues, the physician is obliged to solidarity, mutual respect, and care of sick colleagues. Finally, the authors discuss the Italian legislation affecting the physician’s professional autonomy: (1) the SSN health care Acts; (2) the so- called Charter for Public Health Care Services; (3) the Acts on privacy; (4) Good Clinical Practice.
Extract Ask your pharmacist: It’s the ubiquitous slogan of the past decade, underscoring the campaigns of most national and provincial pharmacy organizations as they promote the value of pharmacy services. But what if the question is about RU-486, the abortion drug, or Preven, the morning-after-pill? What if the question is from a physician seeking information on terminal sedation or assisted suicide?
Such questions push, and often breach, an ethical boundary for some pharmacists, who find their desire to help the patient in conflict with their moral convictions. And the ethical quagmire is likely to get deeper as advocacy groups press the federal government to allow physician-assisted suicide and various health organizations promote greater access to emergency postcoital contraception.
If these practices compromise your moral convictions, could you be fired by your employer for refusing to fill a prescription? More specifically, is there a point at which your personal beliefs supersede your obligation to the patient? That’s the difficult question posed by an Alberta-based group called Concerned Pharmacists for Conscience, which has suggested a conscience clause to protect pharmacists in such situations.
Abstract The potential and actual applications of reproductive technologies have been reviewed by many governmental committees, and laws have been enacted in several countries to accommodate, limit and regulate their use. Regulatory systems have nevertheless left some legal and ethical issues unresolved, and have caused other issues to arise. Issues that regulatory systems leave unresolved, or that systems have created, include disposal of embryos that remain after patients’ treatments are concluded, and multiple implantation and pregnancy. This may result in risks to maternal, embryonic and neonatal life and health, and the contentious relief that may be achieved by selective reduction of multiple pregnancies. A further concern arises when clinics must or choose to publicize their success rates, and they compete for favorable statistics by questionable patient selection criteria and treatment priorities..
Abstract In this note, Katherine A. White explores the conflict between religious health care providers who provide care in accordance with their religious beliefs and the patients who want access to medical care that these religious providers find objectionable. Specifically, she examines Roman Catholic health care institutions and HMOs that follow the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services and considers other religious providers with similar beliefs. In accordance with the Directives, these institutions maintain policies that restrict access to “sensitive” services like abortion, family planning , HIV counseling, infertility treatment, and termination of life-support. White explains how most state laws protecting providers’ right to refuse treatments in conflict with religious principles do not cover this wide range of services. Furthermore, many state and federal laws and some court decisions guarantee patients the right to receive this care. The constitutional complication inherent in this provider-patient conflict emerges in White’s analysis of the interaction of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and patients’ right to privacy. White concludes her note by exploring the success of both provider-initiated and legislatively mandated compromise strategies. She first describes the strategies adopted by four different religious HMOs which vary in how they increase or restrict access to sensitive services. She then turns her focus to state and federal “bypass” legislation, ultimately concluding that increased state supervision might help these laws become more viable solutions to provider-patient conflicts.
Extract More specifically, this article explores the question: Is it morally permissible for a lawyer to decline representation of a prospective client who seeks to obtain a legal but immoral objective, if the lawyer reasonably believes that the prospective client will be otherwise unable to obtain legal representation?
Extract Bruce Ackerman’s “We The People: Transformations” is elegantly conceived, theoretically clever, rhetorically inventive, and empirically convincing, but it remains ideologically inadequate. . . . In the absence of attention to how people in the United States have come to think about a higher law, Ackerman has fallen back on a Whiggish view where love of liberty and justice is assumed to be part of the human endowment, at least of American humans. Fused convictions about democratic governance and liberal aspirations motivate Ackerman’s We the People. . . . This Whiggish overlay upon the argument of Transformations appears most strikingly in the discussion of Reconstruction, in which all acts are optimized-whether those of intransigent Radical Republicans or white supremacist Southern Redeemers. Some higher force is orchestrating this partisan cacophony into a melodious resolution. . . . I will pose the proposition that two higher law concepts have polarized American politics from Alexander Hamilton through Ronald Reagan, and that they need to be put into the picture of Ackerman’s grand transformative moments.
Abstract Human rights protections have developed to resist governmental intrusion in private life and choices. Abortion laws have evolved in legal practice to protect not fetuses as such but state interests, particularly in prenatal life. National and international tribunals are increasingly called upon to resolve conflicts between state enforcement of continuation of pregnancy against women’s wishes and women’s reproductive choices. Legal recognition that human life begins at conception does not resolve conflicts between respect due to women’s reproductive self-determination and due to prenatal life. Human rights protect healthcare providers’ claims to conscientious objection, but not at the cost of women’s lives and enduring health.
