Abstract The issue of conscientious objection to agreed public policy is a vexed one. The clearest example is that of conscientious objection to military service. A free and democratic society has to respect the consciences of those who believe that killing in battle is absolutely wrong. Many disagree with the moral stance being taken, but it has been seen as the mark of a mature and civilised society to respect the conscience of pacifists. The freedom to be able to live by what one thinks most important has been seen as a constituent element in the freedoms that others have fought to preserve.
Respect for the conscience of those medical professionals who feel unable to participate in abortion appears to be in the same category (as would be respect for those who refused to participate in assisted suicide or euthanasia). Issues about the value of human life are at stake. Matters are undoubtedly complicated in the case of abortion by arguments over the supposed ‘humanity’ or ‘personhood’ of a fetus. Even so, some sincerely regard abortion as murder. Mutual respect is easy between people who agree. The problem in a democratic society arises when there is significant disagreement, but it is …
Abstract Although 65 treatises – either preserved or lost, but quoted by ancient authors like Bacchius (3rd century B.C.), Erotian (1st century A.D.) and Galen (c. 129-199 A.D.) – are ascribed to Hippocrates (c. 469-c. 399 B.C.) and consist of nearly 83 books, nonetheless there is no doubt that none of them was written by Hippocrates himself. This being the fact, we cannot help agreeing with Ulrich von Wilamowitz Möllendorf (1848-1931), who maintained that Hippocrates is a name without writings!
Indeed the most of the treatises of the “Corpus hippocraticum” are not the collection of Hippocrates’ works, but were likely the “library” of the Medical School of Kos. The fact that it contains some treatises that represent the theories of the Medical school of Cnidos (most probably founded by a certain Euryphon, almost contemporary with Hippocrates), with which it seems that Hippocrates entered into a relentless debate, is an absolute evidence.
Moreover, we must confess that, although Celsus (1st century B.C.-1st century A.D.) (De medicina, I, Prooemium) writes that “Hippocrates of Kos…separated this branch of learning (i.e. Medicine) from the study of philosophy”, we have nothing to learn from the hippocratic treatises under the scientific point of view.
However, whatever its origin, the “Oath” is a real landmark in the ethics of medicine and we can say – with Thuchydides (460/455-400 B.C.) (Histories, I, 22, 4) – that it is “an achievement for eternity”.
Suffice it to remember that every graduand in Medicine is generally still bound to take an oath that is a more or less modified and more or less updated text of the “Hippocratic oath” and that even the modern concept of bioethics has its very roots in the Hippocratic medical ethics.
“The art is long; life is short; opportunity fleeting; experiment treacherous; judgment difficult: The physician must be ready, not only to do his duty himself, but also to secure the co-operation of the patient, of the attendants and of externals, ” says the first “Aphorism” and the latest author of “Precepts” (chapter VI) writes: “where there is love of man, there is also love of the art”, and the “art” par excellence is medicine! These precepts go surely back to Hippocrates’s moral teaching.
Nonetheless, the preserved text of the marvellous “Oath” raises many problems. Namely:
1) which is the date of it”?
2) Is it mutilated or interpolated?
3) Who took the oath, i.e. all the practitioners or only those belonging to a guild?
4) What binding force had it beyond its moral sanction”?
5) Last but not least: was it a reality or merely a “counsel of perfection”?
In this article we have gathered and discussed all the available and most important sources, but do not presume to have solved all these problems and confine ourselves to proposing some reasonable hypotheses and letting the readers evaluate the positive and negative points of our proposals.
Abstract As a science and practice transcending metaphysical and ethical disagreements, ‘secular’ medicine should not exist. ‘Secularity’ should be understood in an Augustinian sense, not a secularist one: not as a space that is universally rational because it is religion-free, but as a forum for the negotiation of rival reasonings. Religion deserves a place here, because it is not simply or uniquely irrational. However, in assuming his rightful place, the religious believer commits himself to eschewing sheer appeals to religious authorities, and to adopting reasonable means of persuasion. This can come quite naturally. For example, Christianity (theo)logically obliges liberal manners in negotiating ethical controversies in medicine. It also offers reasoned views of human being and ethics that bear upon medicine and are not universally held – for example, a humanist view of human dignity, the bounding of individual autonomy by social obligation, and a special concern for the weak.
Abstract “Emergency contraception” case law from the state of Washington is reviewed and analyzed. Important legal, social policy, and professional ethical questions are considered with focus on professional and institutional conscientious objection to participating in this therapy.
Abstract [ES] La proliferación de los conflictos por motivos de conciencia en el contexto sanitario ha conducido con frecuencia a un tratamiento inadecuado de los mismos. En el caso de los profesionales sanitarios, es posible observar un uso inapropiado de conceptos como el de objeción de conciencia, banalizándolo o sacralizándolo, sin considerar el alcance que la negativa a prestar un tratamiento pueda tener para el resto de personas implicadas; en el caso de los usuarios, es frecuente que sus convicciones tengan un reconocimiento limitado a la hora de tomar decisiones que atañen a su bienestar. A partir de estas premisas, se pretende analizar las tensiones entre intereses, derechos y deberes de las partes implicadas, así como las relaciones de poder que se establecen entre quienes ostentan el conocimiento experto y quienes se encuentran en situación de mayor vulnerabilidad. Este análisis persigue identificar los problemas en los distintos niveles discursivos ¿de intereses, de derechos y deberes y de relaciones de poder- para establecer posteriormente una serie de límites que condicionen el ejercicio de la libertad de conciencia tanto para los profesionales como para los usuarios. Con ello se aspira a ofrecer un marco ético-normativo que pudiera servir como referencia para la resolución de conflictos, basado en una noción de conciencia menos individualista y más relacional-feminista.
[Translation] The proliferation of conflicts for reasons of conscience in the health context has frequently led to their inadequate treatment. In the case of health professionals, it is possible to observe an inappropriate use of concepts such as conscientious objection, trivializing or sacralizing it, without considering the scope that the refusal to provide treatment may have for the rest of the people involved; In the case of users, it is common for their convictions to have limited recognition when making decisions that concern their well-being. Based on these premises, it is intended to analyze the tensions between interests, rights and duties of the parties involved, as well as the power relations that are established between those who hold expert knowledge and those who are in a situation of greater vulnerability. This analysis seeks to identify the problems at the different discursive levels – interests, rights and duties and power relations – to subsequently establish a series of limits that condition the exercise of freedom of conscience for both professionals and users. With this, it aspires to offer an ethical-regulatory framework that could serve as a reference for conflict resolution, based on a less individualist and more relational-feminist notion of conscience.
Abstract Many countries, Sweden among them, lack professional guidelines and established procedures for responding to young females requesting virginity certificates or hymen restoration due to honour-related threats. The purpose of the present survey study was to further examine the attitudes of the Swedish healthcare professionals concerned towards young females requesting virginity certificates or hymen restorations. The study indicates that a small majority of Swedish general practitioners and gynaecologists would accommodate these patients, at least given certain circumstances. But a large minority of physicians would under no circumstances help the young females, regardless of speciality, years of practice within medicine, gender, or experience of the phenomenon. Their responses are similar to other areas where it has been claimed that society should adopt a zero tolerance policy against certain phenomena, for instance drug policy, where it has also been argued that society should never act in ways that express support for the practice in question. However, this argument is questionable. A more pragmatic approach would also allow for follow-ups and evaluation of virginity certificates and hymen restorations, as is demonstrated by the Dutch policy. Hence, there are some obvious advantages to this pragmatic approach compared to the restrictive one espoused by a large minority of Swedish physicians and Swedish policy-makers in this area.
Abstract This paper aims to demonstrate how public disclosure can be used to balance physicians’ conscientious objections with their professional obligations to patients – specifically respect for patient autonomy and informed consent. It is argued here that physicians should be permitted to exercise conscientious objections, but that they have a professional obligation to provide advance notification to patients about those objections. It is further argued here that public disclosure is an appropriate and ethically justifiable limit to the principle of advance notification. The argument for publicly disclosing physicians’ conscientious objections is made in this paper by discussing three practical benefits of public disclosure in medicine, and then addressing how publicly disclosing physicians’ conscientious objections is not an undue invasion of privacy. Three additional concerns with public disclosure of physicians’ conscientious objections are briefly addressed – potential harassment of physicians, workplace discrimination, and mischaracterising physicians’ professional aptitude – concluding that each of these concerns requires further deliberation in the realm of business ethics.
Abstract Laboratory classes in which animals are seriously harmed or killed, or which use cadavers or body parts from ethically debatable sources, are controversial within veterinary and other biomedical curricula. Along with the development of more humane teaching methods, this has increasingly led to objections to participation in harmful animal use. Such cases raise a host of issues of importance to universities, including those pertaining to curricular design and course accreditation, and compliance with applicable animal welfare and antidiscrimination legislation. Accordingly, after detailed investigation, some universities have implemented formal policies to guide faculty responses to such cases, and to ensure that decisions are consistent and defensible from legal and other policy perspectives. However, many other institutions have not yet done so, instead dealing with such cases on an ad hoc basis as they arise. Among other undesirable outcomes this can lead to insufficient student and faculty preparation, suboptimal and inconsistent responses, and greater likelihood of legal challenge. Accordingly, this paper provides pertinent information about the evolution of conscientious objection policies within Australian veterinary schools, and about the jurisprudential bases for conscientious objection within Australia and the USA. It concludes with recommendations for the development and implementation of policy within this arena.
Abstract The legalization of physician-assisted death in states such as Washington and Oregon has presented defining ethical issues for hospice programs because up to 90% of terminally ill patients who use the state-regulated procedure to end their lives are enrolled in hospice care. The authors recently partnered with the Washington State Hospice and Palliative Care Organization to examine the policies developed by individual hospice programs on program and staff participation in the Washington Death with Dignity Act. This article sets a national and local context for the discussion of hospice involvement in physician-assisted death, summarizes the content of hospice policies in Washington State, and presents an analysis of these findings. The study reveals meaningful differences among hospice programs about the integrity and identity of hospice and hospice care, leading to different policies, values, understandings of the medical procedure, and caregiving practices. In particular, the authors found differences 1) in the language used by hospices to refer to the Washington statute that reflect differences among national organizations, 2) the values that hospice programs draw on to support their policies, 3) dilemmas created by requests by patients for hospice staff to be present at a patient’s death, and 4) five primary levels of noninvolvement and participation by hospice programs in requests from patients for physician-assisted death. This analysis concludes with a framework of questions for developing a comprehensive hospice policy on involvement in physician-assisted death and to assist national, state, local, and personal reflection.
Abstract The duty of referral that objecting physicians owe their patients, and that hospitals owe members of the communities they serve, requires identification of and patients’ reasonable access to physicians (or other qualified health service providers) able and willing to undertake the lawful procedures that objectors find offensive. Referral must be made in good faith, since objecting physicians cannot ethically or lawfully practise deception or evasion to compel their patients’ involuntary compliance with objectors’ own religious or moral beliefs.
