Abstract This paper argues that the provider conscience regulation recently put into place in the USA is misguided. The rule is too broad in the scope of protection it affords, and its conception of what constitutes assistance in the performance of an objectionable procedure reveals that it is unworkable in practice. Furthermore, the regulation wrongly treats refusal of other reproductive services as on a par with conscientious objection to participation in abortion. Finally, the rule allows providers to refuse even to discuss “objectionable” options with patients and serves to protect discriminatory refusals of medical care. For all of these reasons, this regulation is unwise.
Extract An appeal to the doctrine of double effect supposes that the end aimed at is morally good. I claim that women who use emergency contraception need only intend the contraceptive effect of the medication, and not any possible abortifacient effect it may have. If one denies that even the former is a permissible end, then the doctrine of double effect makes no difference.
Journal Extract It has been 40 years since the seminal papers on pharmacy’s status as a profession sparked debate about the pharmacist’s role in health care, yet the questions they raised are just as poignant today as they were then. The issue of pharmacy’s status as a profession and its role in health care has again been brought into question, albeit in a roundabout manner, through discussions over the pharmacist’s right to refrain from dispensing emergency contraception. The key to understanding the contemporary pharmacist’s role as part of the health care team, as well as the pharmacist’s alleged right to refrain from dispensing emergency contraception, is to examine a situation that almost every contemporary pharmacist experiences.
Abstract Some background information about the context of euthanasia in Belgium is presented, and Belgian law on euthanasia and concerns about the law are discussed. Suggestions as to how to improve the Belgian law and practice of euthanasia are made, and Belgian legislators and medical establishment are urged to reflect and ponder so as to prevent potential abuse.
Abstract Emergency contraception (EC) provides women with a safe means of preventing pregnancy following unprotected sexual intercourse or potential contraceptive failure, and is accepted as a legitimate method of fertility control. The right of women to access EC, along with other contraceptive methods, needs to be affirmed. The consequences of unintended pregnancy are serious, imposing appreciable burdens on children, women, men, and families. Every child has the right to be a wanted child and not enter this world because its mother was denied access to EC. For maximum effectiveness, barriers to access must be removed. It is essential that EC pills are available over-the-counter with no minimum age for access. There is a tension between the rights of women to access EC without medical or legal intervention and the rights of providers who have a conscientious objection to provision on religious or moral grounds. The principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, and beneficence all weigh in favor of the rights of a woman faced with the possibility of an unintended pregnancy to unrestricted access to EC against providers whose religious views are opposed to this.
Abstract Although for centuries conscientious objection was primarily claimed by those who for religious or ethical reasons refused to join the ranks of the military (whether out of a general principle or in response to a particular violent conflict), in recent decades a significant broadening of the concept can be seen. In Thailand, for example, doctors recently refused medical attention to injured policemen suspected of having violently repressed a demonstration. In Argentina a few public defenders have rejected for conscientious reasons to represent individuals accused of massive human rights violations. In different countries all over the world there are doctors who refuse to perform euthanasia, schoolteachers who reject to teach the theory of evolution, and students who refuse to attend biology classes where frogs are dissected.
Abstract Pharmacy, like other health care professions, is both a knowledge-based and a value-based profession. However, the values that inform practice activities are rarely made explicit. We sought to identify the values drawn on by UK pharmacists through qualitative interviews on day-to-day practice activities focused around practitioners’ conceptions of ‘the good pharmacist’, good practice and their experiences of ethical issues and dilemmas. The study was based upon loosely structured, one-to-one interviews of 38 selected practitioners reflecting a range of practice roles and settings. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed following the principles of grounded theory. The accounts of practice (of self and colleagues) in the data showed pharmacists to be very dedicated and conscientious. Practice was predominantly discussed and presented by practitioners drawing upon a scientific mode of rationality. Value and ethical judgements were typically presented within this mode, with more open-ended and complex discussion of values and ethics appearing quite rarely. Two core values generally drawn on in reported practice emerged from the analysis – these were, ‘the patient’s best interests’ and a value we labelled ‘respect for medicines’. Common dilemmas arose from conflicting values, for example competing obligations to different parties, sometimes brought to a head by the conflicting demands of ‘rules’ of various sorts. Reported dilemmas related to rule breaking, resource allocation, patient communication and teamwork. There was a tendency for practitioners to ‘fall back’, often unreflectively, on their own personal value judgements when addressing these dilemmas. However, in the main, the values and dilemmas reported clearly show the socially embedded nature of professional ethics and, thereby, contribute to the social science re-theorisations of professional ethics needed if work on ethics development is to be realistic.
Holly Fernandez Lynch. Conflicts of Conscience in Health Care: An Institutional Compromise. Boston: The MIT Press; 2008, 368 pp. ISBN: 9780262123051
Extract Lynch demystifies the practice of medicine as a value-neutral panacea to remedy social ills with physicians as unwavering obligors to provide service on demand. . . . As far as the provision of services goes, protecting patient and physician interests are, as Lynch argues, not mutually exclusive propositions. In practice, physicians who check their moral apprehensions at the hospital doors may even compromise patient safety. An enlightened approach, as proposed here, encourages health professionals to embrace moral plurality to inform, rather than stymie, the provision of services in the best interests of patients—while respecting physician individuality.
Conflicts of Conscience in Health Care: An Institutional Compromise will serve as an excellent resource for educators and policymakers eager to parse the complex issues of patient wants, physician duties, and institutional prerogatives to secure individual and population health and well-being.
Extract The challenge is thus to accommodate conscience- based treatment refusals without jeopardizing the foundations of pluralistic medical professionalism. I believe that medical professionals functioning in pluralistic healthcare settings may be excused from providing certain information or services if they apologize to those in need of this aid, and if those in need of aid can be assured equitable access to the information or services in question. Note carefully, I am proposing conditions for excusing professionals who fail to maintain moral neutrality; I am not defending a right to conscience-based denials of healthcare, or ‘civil rights’ protections for refusers. . .Refusals to refer to other professionals or to transfer prescriptions are inexcusable.
Abstract Recent legislation in Wisconsin mandating provision of emergency contraception to victims of sexual assault may create a conflict of conscience for some health care professionals. Although disputes exist over the exact mechanism of action of emergency contraception, those professionals who espouse a particularly strict stance may be reluctant to dispense the medication for fear that it could prevent a fertilized embryo from implanting in the uterus. While no objection of conscience clause was written into the new law, Wisconsin law has a long tradition of recognizing rights of conscience in matters of religious conflict. This legal tradition both at statutory and common law levels is summarized with application to the recent emergency contraception mandate. A case is made for a potential legal defense should a health care professional abstain from dispensing emergency contraception.
Bradley CT. Emergency Contraception and Physicians’ Rights of Conscience: A Review of Current Legal Standards in Wisconsin. Wis Med J. 2009 May; 108(3):156-160
