Law Archives - Page 14 of 43 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

The cultural context of patient’s autonomy and doctor’s duty: Passive euthanasia and advance directives in Germany and Israel

Silke Schicktanz, Aviad Raz, Carmel Shalev

Abstract
The moral discourse surrounding end-of-life (EoL) decisions is highly complex, and a comparison of Germany and Israel can highlight the impact of cultural factors. The comparison shows interesting differences in how patient’s autonomy and doctor’s duties are morally and legally related to each other with respect to the withholding and withdrawing of medical treatment in EoL situations. Taking the statements of two national expert ethics committees on EoL in Israel and Germany (and their legal outcome) as an example of this discourse, we describe the similarity of their recommendations and then focus on the differences, including the balancing of ethical principles, what is identified as a problem, what social role professionals play, and the influence of history and religion. The comparison seems to show that Israel is more restrictive in relation to Germany, in contrast with previous bioethical studies in the context of the moral and legal discourse regarding the beginning of life, in which Germany was characterized as far more restrictive. We reflect on the ambivalence of the cultural reasons for this difference and its expression in various dissenting views on passive euthanasia and advance directives, and conclude with a comment on the difficulty in classifying either stance as more or less restrictive.

Schicktanz S, Raz A, Shalev C. The cultural context of patient’s autonomy and doctor’s duty: Passive euthanasia and advance directives in Germany and Israel. Med Health Care Phil. 2010 Jul 31;13(4):363-369.

A Most Fundamental Freedom of Choice: An International Review of Conscientious Objection to Elective Abortion

Erin Whitcomb

St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary — St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary

Abstract
Conclusion
American President Thomas Jefferson once explained, “[t]he price of freedom is eternal vigilance.”210 He also warned, “It behooves every man who values liberty of conscience for himself, to resist invasions of it in the case of others.”211 As this Note demonstrates, even in constitutional democracies that have provided their people with broad, enumerated individual liberties, the threat of erosion of rights is ever-present. No rights, even those that seem most fundamental—like freedom of conscience—are immune. They must be avidly protected and defended. The individual choice guaranteed by statutory conscience protection demonstrates respect for the autonomy of health care providers, promotes the integrity of the medical profession,212 and protects the rights of healthcare professionals without compromising those of patients. Failure to protect individual conscience rights will be devastating to any democratic society.213

The absence of a statute compelling health care professionals’ participation in abortion is irrelevant to those in functionally equivalent circumstances, just as the cases of registered nurse Sister Charles in South Africa, American nurse Catherina Cenzon-DeCarlo, and the unnamed Canadian medical student remind us. Health care professionals who are discriminated against on the basis of their conscientious unwillingness to participate in elective abortion procedures must not be left without a remedy. South Africa and Canada should enact statutory conscience protection measures without delay. Similarly, the statutory and regulatory conscience protection established thus far in the United States must be vigilantly protected from erosion.

A matter of choice for one person should not result in a matter of compulsion for another, particularly where the matter is one of such significant moral or religious import. The “freedom to choose” so often associated with elective abortion must be extended to medical professionals who would choose to follow the dictates of their own consciences in abstaining from a practice, which, in their view, is hostile to the ethical obligations of the practice of medicine and violates the profound and inherent dignity of the human person.

Whitcomb E. A Most Fundamental Freedom of Choice: An International Review of Conscientious Objection to Elective Abortion. St. John’s J Legal Com. 2010;24(4):771-809.

Making Rules and Unmaking Choice: Federal Conscience Clauses, the Provider Conscience Regulation, and the War on Reproductive Freedom

Rachel White-Domain

Extract
Conclusion
This Comment analyzes the PCR, which is currently under review by the Obama Administration. As currently written, the PCR promises to have devastating effects on the healthcare system. . .

Commenters have predicted that the PCR will be used to discriminate against patients based on their sexual orientation. 196 And because reproductive healthcare remains so controversial in this country, women will be disproportionately disadvantaged by the PCR, which now allows almost all employees-not only the doctor, but potentially the nurse, the pharmacist, the pharmacist’s assistant, the receptionist, the ambulance driver, and the janitor-to have a say in whether she can access her chosen healthcare without interference.

The PCR brought the ongoing debate over conscience clauses into the national spotlight. . . .this Comment argues that any analysis of conscience clauses must recognize that what is at stake is access to healthcare services, and that reduction of healthcare access can be accomplished not only explicitly, for example through the explicit redefining of the term “abortion,” but also through “strategic ambiguity.” . . .

White-Domain R. Making Rules and Unmaking Choice: Federal Conscience Clauses, the Provider Conscience Regulation, and the War on Reproductive Freedom. DePaul Law Rev. 2010 Summer;59(4):1249-1281.

Maryland’s conscience clause: leaving a woman’s right to a health care provider’s choice

Maria Cirincione

Extract
Conclusion
. . . Currently, ambiguities in the Maryland statute allow too much flexibility for providers in emergency rooms to refuse to provide or even inform patients about emergency contraception. This kind of state sanctioned refusal serves as the kind of government obstacle the Supreme Court has forbidden in upholding a woman’s right to bodily privacy. The Maryland legislature should act to eliminate the ambiguities in Maryland’s conscience legislation and explicitly protect a woman’s right to access emergency contraception in Maryland emergency rooms. In order to do so, the Maryland legislature should adopt the medical community’s definition for abortion that excludes emergency contraception. The new Maryland conscience statute should also provide explicit protections to patients receiving emergency room care. Physicians should be required to inform patients of emergency contraception if treatment in each particular case is medically indicated. Finally, physicians should be required to treat patients that request access to emergency contraception or to refer them to another provider who is willing to administer treatment within the effective time period of emergency contraception. . .

Cirincione M. Maryland’s conscience clause: leaving a woman’s right to a health care provider’s choice. J Health Care Law & Pol. 2010;13(1):171-202.

Professional Conscientious Objection in Medicine with Attention to Referral

Thomas A Cavanaugh

Extract
What duties accompany conscientious objection? To sum up what follows: The obligations to the patient remain unchanged, but for the denial of the contested request.

Specifically, what do these obligations entail? First, following from the very meaning of professing—and to develop a point previously mooted—full disclosure imposes the obligation to promulgate to the relevant parties one’s conscientious objection. This includes one’s prospective and current patients, colleagues, employers, and relevant institutions, for example hospitals and insurance companies. . . .

Second, conscientious objector status obliges the relevant professional to explain her reasons for her objection to those patients who request further information. . . . the patient is due the offer of an explanation. This does not, however, amount to the professional’s having a right to pontificate concerning the relevant matter. Rather, the interested patient ought to receive some answer to the question as to why the professional objects. Certainly, not all patients will be interested to know why. Those who are not interested ought not to be treated as captive audiences; those who do want to know ought to receive a considerate and considered answer. . .

Third, conscientious objector status bears exclusively on the patient’s contested request; it does not relate to the other care the physician, nurse, or pharmacist provides for the patient. If a relationship exists with the patient . . . the physician, nurse, or pharmacist must provide care to which she does not object. . .

Fourth, conscientious objector status requires the continued maintenance of confidentiality, particularly with respect to the fact that the professional objects to something the patient requests. . . .the professional must strenuously and scrupulously protect the patient’s privacy specifically concerning the patient’s request and the practitioner’s conscientious objection.

Finally, as earlier noted, while conscientious objection does not require referral to a third party who will abide by the patient’s request, it does require transfer of relevant documents, returning a prescription, and, more generally, acts which, while they may result in the act to which one objects, do not require one to aim at that act.

Cavanaugh T. Professional Conscientious Objection in Medicine with Attention to Referral. Ave Maria Law Rev. 2011;9(1):190-206.

Living Together with Disagreement: Pluralism, the Secular, and the Fair Treatment of Beliefs in Canada Today

Iain T Benson

Abstract
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Chamberlain,referred to above, in how it handled the definition of “secular” and pluralism as requiring the inclusion of religion and religious viewpoints, is a model for the law and the first serious consideration of a non-atheistic/agnostic (or secularistic) “secular” in Canada. It, and the TWU decision, provide the beginning outlines of an approach to both pluralism and the secular that will be superior to the preemptively non-religious and atheistic/agnostic understandings that preceded them. The decision also correctly describes the nature of pluralism as one that encourages a diversity of beliefs and that resists the co-option of “secular” society by totalistic conceptions of liberalism that exclude diversity.

These decisions ought to lead to a reconsideration of how we view law and policies in relation to all public aspects of society, including public education. Pluralism can be and needs to be re-conceptualized within existing legal norms and the Canadian historical tradition, so as to foster a richer conception of diversity and genuine tolerance with an appropriately communitarian focus. For pluralism to be pluralism, however, it is important to rescue it from a pseudo-liberalism that hides its totalistic claims.

Benson IT, Fielding A. Living Together with Disagreement: Pluralism, the Secular, and the Fair Treatment of Beliefs in Canada Today [Internet]. Camrose, Alberta: The Ronning Centre for the Study of Religion and Public Life; 2010: 1-48.

Liberalism Unbound: Towards a More Inclusive Public Sphere

A Response to Iain T. Benson, “Living Together with Disagreement:
Pluralism, the Secular and the Fair Treatment of Beliefs
in Canada Today”

Alex Fielding

Liberalism Unbound: Towards a More Inclusive Public Sphere

Abstract
This response will be divided into three segments. First, it will respond to Benson’s analysis of pluralism, liberalism, and the “secular”. Second, it will advocate for a return to John Stuart Mill’s harm principle as a better way of reconciling competing claims when equality rights and religious freedoms collide. Third, it will apply the harm principle to the contemporary issues of same-sex marriage and the religious objections of marriage commissioners. The central idea is that by moving away from the vague, all-encompassing language of “Charter values” to the harm principle, we create a more pluralistic public sphere that gives reasons for religious and ethnic minorities to reciprocate such tolerance and participate actively in civil society.

The physician’s right to conscientious objection: an evolving recognition in Europe

Tom Goffin

Abstract
Due to the growing number of medical treatments, physicians–who are also human beings with their own conscience and beliefs–are increasingly confronted with treatments that may conflict with their principles and convictions. Although several human rights documents recognize the freedom of conscience and belief, we could not locate the recognition of an explicit right to conscientious objection. Furthermore, a direct application of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as recognized by article 9 of the ECHR, does not include such a right due to the narrow interpretation of this right by the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Court seems to have taken steps away from this narrow interpretation in Pichon and Sajous v. France. Notwithstanding these steps, no general right to conscientious objection exists. Physicians therefore are dependent on a judgment if they refuse a certain treatment because of conscientious objections.

Goffin T. The physician’s right to conscientious objection: an evolving recognition in Europe. Med Law. 2010 Jun;29(2):227-37.

Crisis of Conscience: Pharmacist Refusal to Provide Health Care Services on Moral Grounds

Eileen P Kelly, Aimee Dars Ellis, Susan PS Rosenthal

Employee Responsibility and Rights Journal

Abstract
Advances in technology have resulted in medical procedures and practices that were unthought-of in previous generations. Embryonic stem cell research, abortifacients, birth control, and artificial insemination are just a few examples of these technological advances. While many individuals readily embrace such medical advances, others find them morally objectionable. A contentious national debate is now occurring over whether employee pharmacists have the right to refuse to fill legal prescriptions for emergency contraception because of conscientious objections. In the United States, existing public policy is somewhat muddled in both protecting and encroaching on the employee pharmacist’s right of refusal. This article discusses the legal and ethical nature of that controversy, as well as the clash of interests, rights and responsibilities between employers, employee pharmacists and customers from a U.S. perspective.

Kelly EP, Ellis AD, Rosenthal SP. Crisis of Conscience: Pharmacist Refusal to Provide Health Care Services on Moral Grounds. Employee Responsibilities and Rights J. 2011 May 22;23(1):37-54.

Practice against our beliefs

Colly A Tettelbach

Extract
The United States has embarked on a dangerous course. When the right of healthcare workers to refuse participation in certain procedures based on conscience is denied, we have started down the path of preparing rightminded, conscience-driven people to abandon ethical practice and in some situations to become killers. Anytime people are forced to act against what they believe to be right and coerced to do what they consider to be wrong, a very treacherous gulf has been crossed. When the right of conscience is removed from healthcare workers, we will have healthcare workers without conscience.

Tettelbach CA. Practice against our beliefs. J Christ Nurs. 2010;27(2):106-109.