Law Archives - Page 23 of 39 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

(Editorial) The sacred and the secular: the life and death of Terri Schiavo

CMAJ

Extract
. . . In medical and legal opinion, Terri Schiavo’s cognizance of her self and her life ended in 1990, when she suffered a cardiac arrhythmia and massive cerebral cortical encephalopathy that left her in a persistent vegetative state. Her facial expressions, along with a seemingly “normal” sleep–wake cycle, constituted but one dimension of the cruelty of this condition. . .

. . .More than one commentator has viewed the “right- to-life” fight to prolong Schiavo’s pitiable existence as an anti-abortion campaign “by other means.” . . .

. . . there seems little doubt that, in North America, ideology and religion have begun to seriously distort the type of consensus-building that is the proper business of democratic politics . . .

Where do physicians find themselves in such debates? Medicine is a secular and scientific profession that, for all that, must still contend with the sacred matters of birth, life and death. In practice, physicians must set aside their own beliefs in deference to the moral autonomy of each patient — or else transfer that patient’s care to someone who can meet this secular ethic. . .

. . .The emotionalism and rancour that swirled around the Schiavo case underscores a wider societal duty borne by the medical and scientific community. This is to remain alert to political and legislative tendencies that impose imprecise moral generalizations on the majority, at the expense of reason, scientific understanding and, not infrequently, compassion.

CMAJ. (Editorial) The sacred and the secular: the life and death of Terri Schiavo. Can. Med. Assoc. J.. 2005 Apr 26;172(9):1151.

Un aspect crucial mais délicat des libertés de conscience et de religion des articles 2 et 3 des Chartes canadienne et québécoise: l’objection de conscience

Henri Brun

Abstract
The Supreme Court of Canada, obiter, in the Big M Drug Mart Case, has spoken of the “Constitutional Exemption”. It is the possibility not to be bound to obey the neutral laws that conflict with one’s conscience or religion. It is what we call in French l’objection de conscience. The institution exists in Canadian and Québec Law as a part of the right to freedom of conscience or religion expressed in 2a) and 3 of the Canadian and Québec Charters of Rights. And it goes well beyond the right not to fight within the armed forces. The Supreme Court of Canada has actually delivered six judgments touching on the subject in 1985 and 1986. The conditions under which l’objection de conscience come into play are not so well known however. Does it cover matters of worship or only rules of morals ? Secular or only religious principles ? Personal or only group beliefs ? Do the existence of the rule, the sincerity of the objector and the reasonableness of the exemption have to be proved? Above all, what is the difference between a creed and an opinion ? The following article tries to formulate answers to these questions, with the help of current case-law.

Brun H. Un aspect crucial mais délicat des libertés de conscience et de religion des articles 2 et 3 des Chartes canadienne et québécoise: l’objection de conscience. Les Cahiers de Droit. 1987;28(1):185-205.

(News) Abortion payment

Barbara Sibbald

Extract
The New Brunswick government is refusing to pay for abortions performed at private clinics, despite renewed warnings from Ottawa. Federal Health Minister Ujjal Dosanjh told the province it is violating the Canada Health Act . . . New Brunswick medicare only pays for abortions up to 12 weeks, performed in hospitals with the approval of 2 physicians. About 600 women a year pay up to 750 for the procedure at the Morgentaler clinic.

Sibbald B. Abortion payment. Can Med Assoc J. 2005 Mar 1;172(5):624.

Service or Servitude: Reflections on Freedom of Conscience for Health Care Workers

Sean Murphy

Abstract
The authors suggestion that patients should be able to access morally controversial services without compromising health care workers’ freedom of conscience is most welcome, as is their acknowledgment that “other options exist” when pharmacists decline to fill prescriptions.

However, the conflicting interests of patients and health care providers may be accommodated but cannot be balanced because they concern fundamentally different goods. Neither the concept of autonomy nor an appeal to the “needs” of the patient help to resolve conflicts in these situations, while fiduciary obligations cannot necessarily be invoked because they are not governed by fixed rules, and there can be no obligation to participate in wrongdoing.

The fact that post-coital interceptives can cause the death of an early embryo is at the heart of the controversy over the drugs. The authors’ advocacy of mandatory referral follows from their belief this is not wrong. Those with different beliefs do not share their conclusions. Conscientious objection does not prevent patients from obtaining post-coital interceptives from other sources. As the exercise of freedom of speech does not force others to agree with the speaker, the exercise of freedom of conscience does not force others to agree with an objector. Concerns about access to legal services or products can be addressed by dialogue, prudent planning, and the exercise of tolerance, imagination and political will. A proportionate investment in freedom of conscience for health care workers is surely not an unreasonable expectation.

Murphy S. Service or Servitude: Reflections on Freedom of Conscience for Health Care Workers (2004 Dec 20) Protection of Conscience Project (website).

The Limits of Conscientious Objection-May Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?

Julie Cantor, K Baum

New England Journal of Medicine, NEJM — New England Journal of Medicine

Abstract
Several reports have detailed cases in which pharmacists have refused to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception. Should pharmacists have the right to refuse access to these medications? This Sounding Board article discusses arguments for and against the right to refuse and proposes a balanced solution to the problem.

Cantor JD, Baum K. The Limits of Conscientious Objection-May Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?. N Engl J Med. 2004 Nov 04;351(19):2008-212.

(News) Slow progress to reproductive rights

Jocalyn Clark

Extract
Religious fundamentalism and a lack of resources are the chief barriers to achieving sexual and reproductive rights for all by 2015, concluded the 2004 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) . . . Katherine McDonald, president of Action Canada for Population and Development, said that advocates of the Cairo consensus have been overly distracted by their efforts to isolate and shame US and conservative backlash and must reinvest in a commitment to human rights. “In-depth policy analyses of sexual, reproductive, and abortion rights are lacking,” she said.

Clark J. Slow progress to reproductive rights. Can Med Assoc J. 2004;171(8):841.

(News) “Conscience” clauses allow US corporate providers to refuse care

Janice Hopkins Tanne

British Medical Journal, BMJ — British Medical Journal

Extract
“Refusal clauses” and “conscience exceptions,” which allow US doctors, nurses, and healthcare workers to refuse to provide certain types of health care to patients, are being extended to hospitals, insurance companies, pharmacies, and managed care companies.

Tanne JH. “Conscience” clauses allow US corporate providers to refuse care. Br Med J. 2004;329(7464):476.

Advance Directives and Dementia

Gregory E Kaebnick

Abstract
A competent person can avoid the onset of dementia by refusing life-sustaining medical care and by voluntarily stopping eating and drinking, bringing life to an end well before any health crisis. A competent person can also try to limit the duration of dementia by drafting an advance directive that sets bounds on the life-sustaining care, including artificial nutrition and hydration, that medical caregivers can provide when the person no longer has the capacity to make her own medical decisions. But between these two strategies there can lie a significant gap. A person could live with moderate to severe dementia for a considerable time, no longer able to voluntarily stop eating and drinking yet also not yet requiring the life-sustaining care forbidden by advance directive. This gap has been much discussed in recent years in the Hastings Center Report. Several years ago (in the May-June 2014 issue), Paul Menzel and M. Colette Chandler-Cramer argued for what they described as a moderate correction to the dominant view that food and water should always be offered to a patient with dementia if the patient expresses a desire to eat and drink. The problem is taken up again by the legal scholar Norman L. Cantor in this issue (July-August 2018), and Cantor, too, tries to find a moderate alternative.

Kaebnick GE. Advance Directives and Dementia. Hastings Cent Rep. 2018 Aug 16;48(4):2.

New Refusal Clauses Shatter Balance Between Provider ‘Conscience’, Patient Needs

Adam Sonfield

Extract
A series of attention-grabbing lawsuits and a crop of new legislation have spotlighted a long-gathering movement to vastly expand the scope of policies allowing health care providers, institutions and payers to refuse to participate in sexual and reproductive health services by claiming a moral or religious objection. In some cases, these radical new policies are intentionally designed to undermine, if not actually eliminate, the ability of governments at all levels, and even private businesses, to balance providers’ “conscience” rights with the ability of patients to exercise their own conscience and gain access to health care services that they want and need.

Sonfield A. New Refusal Clauses Shatter Balance Between Provider ‘Conscience’, Patient Needs. Guttmacher Rep Public Pol. 2004 August:1-3.

War Crimes and Legal Immunities: The Complicities of Waffen-SS General Karl Wolff in Nazi medical experiments

Michael Salter, Suzanne Ost

Extract
There is a considerable amount of academic and popular literature on Nazi medical experimentation within concentration camps, however, the existing research largely focuses on the doctors and the details of their experiments and has neglected two interesting themes. The first neglected theme is the potential legal liabilities and defense strategies of those among the SS leadership, such as SS General Karl Wolff. Wolff facilitated these experiments in a purely administrative capacity, but without his contribution this type of war crime would not have been possible. Secondly, the research has neglected the extent to which Wolff was able to avoid legal accountability for these and other war crimes, as a result of his wartime cooperation with a U.S. intelligence agency and his post-war assistance to interrogators within the Allied Military Intelligence as well as the Nuremberg prosecutors. [2] The present article, which is the first in a series of related studies, focuses largely on the first theme. This article gives particular attention to Wolff’s attempts to avoid prosecution by insisting that the experiments were of a voluntary nature, based on the consent of the research subject, and were, therefore, not criminal acts. Additionally, the article focuses on Wolff’s claim that he did not possess the requisite mens rea or intent necessary to secure a criminal conviction.

Salter M, Ost S. War Crimes and Legal Immunities: The Complicities of Waffen-SS General Karl Wolff in Nazi medical experiments. Rutgers J Law Rel. 2004(1);1-69.