Extract Introduction: Recently, the discussion regarding the physicians’ “Right of Conscience” (ROC) has been on the rise. This issue is often confined to the “reproductive health” arena (abortions, birth control, morning-after pills, fertility treatments, etc.) within the political context. The recent dispute of the Bush-Obama administrations regarding the legal protections of health workers who refuse to provide care that violates their personal beliefs is an example of the political aspects of this dispute.
Extract The administration of former President George W. Bush and the subsequent revival of the abortion disputes in the United States have put the ethical challenges of conscientious objection in the spotlight in many international journals on bioethics in the last decade. . . . In the last few years some clear administrative guidelines have been drawn up, considering the institutional realities of developed countries, most of them with private healthcare systems. These include rules that the objection or refusal is an individual right and not an institutional right and healthcare providers have a duty to refer a woman to a similar health care service provider.
I would suggest that this is not the reality for many developing countries.
Abstract Legal scholarship in this area debates the fairness of conscience clauses. The debate appears to be at an impasse and is, in any event, unsatisfying. This Article proposes the application of welfare economics as the guiding principle in policy determinations and presents an alternative approach to the current debate surrounding pharmacist conscience clauses. The theoretical application of welfare economics demonstrates that pharmacist conscience clause legislation may not maximize individuals’ well-being. A common law approach, whereby a pharmacist may be held liable for refusing to fill a prescription for a non-medical reason, most likely can reach the appropriate balance to minimize total social costs. If however, states refuse to repeal pharmacist conscience clause legislation or states continue to pass pharmacist conscience clause legislation, duty-to-fill legislation, which places a statutory duty on pharmacies or pharmacists to fill valid prescriptions, may be needed. If this is the case, duty-to-fill legislation should include a provision that pharmacies cannot refuse to carry any FDA approved medication due to any religious or personal objections. Importantly, duty-to-fill legislation does not alter any of the professional responsibilities and gatekeeper functions of a pharmacist. The pharmacist’s job to ensure the prescription is valid and legal remains. The expertise required for drug allergies or interactions is still a critical component of the profession. Interesting to note in this debate is that the word science is within the word conscience.
Abstract As state and local anti-discrimination provisions become more and more comprehensive, physicians who refuse to treat patients for reasons of sexual orientation or marital status are beginning to face legal liability. Increasingly, physicians are invoking codes of medical ethics alongside more familiar constitutional law claims in support of their claim to insulation from legal liability. This Article explores what medical ethics has to say about physicians who, for sincerely held religious reasons, refuse to treat patients for reasons of sexual orientation or marital status. The issue is explored through the lens of a case recently decided by the California Supreme Court in which infertility physicians refused to help a lesbian couple have a child with the aid of artificial insemination. Through a close examination of the provisions of medical ethics codes and the arguments based on those codes raised in the California case, this Article concludes that medical societies should not support carving out an exception from anti-discrimination laws for physicians who, for reasons of religious conscience, want to express their class-based biases in the clinic.
Tinne Smets, Johan Bilsen, Joachim Cohen, Mette L Rurup, Luc Deliens
Medical Care
Abstract Objectives: To study the reported medical practice of euthanasia in Belgium since implementation of the euthanasia law. . .
Research Design: Analysis of the anonymous database of all euthanasia cases reported to the Federal Control and Evaluation Committee Euthanasia.
Subjects: All euthanasia cases reported by physicians for review between implementation of the euthanasia law on September 22nd, 2002 and December 31, 2007 (n = 1917).
Measures: Frequency of reported euthanasia cases, characteristics of patients and the decision for euthanasia, drugs used in euthanasia cases, and trends in reported cases over time.
Results: The number of reported euthanasia cases increased every year from 0.23% of all deaths in 2002 to 0.49% in 2007. Compared with all deaths in the population, patients who died by euthanasia were more often younger (82.1% of patients who received euthanasia compared with 49.8% of all deaths were younger than 80, P < 0.001), men (52.7% vs. 49.5%, P = 0.005), cancer patients (82.5% vs. 23.5%, P < 0.001), and more often died at home (42.2% vs. 22.4%, P < 0.001). Euthanasia was most often performed with a barbiturate, sometimes in combination with neuromuscular relaxants (92.4%) and seldom with morphine (0.9%). In almost all patients, unbearable physical (95.6%) and/or psychological suffering (68%) were reported. A small minority of cases (6.6%) concerned nonterminal patients, mainly suffering from neuromuscular diseases.
Conclusions: The frequency of reported euthanasia cases has increased every year since legalization. Euthanasia is most often chosen as a last resort at the end of life by younger patients, patients with cancer, and seldom by nonterminal patients.
Abstract Freedom of religion, often recognised as “first freedom” in numerous legal traditions, also reflects the different conceptions of the place of the individual and the collectivity in society. Our study will analyse the Canadian, American and European constitutional models of freedom of religion and conscience. In a first chapter, we will examine the theoretical conceptions of religion in the social sciences as well as from the perspectives of legal approaches in order to discern the manner in which religion is conceived and to better understand its various influences. In this way, we hope to enhance our understanding of both identity and to a greater extent, culture, both in and out of law. In the second and third chapters, we will attempt to characterise the relationship between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion in Canada, as well as identify unresolved issues. In the final chapter, we will observe how freedom of conscience has been interpreted in the American legal setting as well as in the European Union, by way of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). We hypothesise that a better understanding of the relationship between the freedoms of conscience and religion can be arrived at by clarifying the theoretical conceptions of religion and conscience in comparative constitutional law.
Abstract Why is modern science less efficient than it used to be, why has revolutionary science declined, and why has science become so dishonest? One plausible explanation behind these observations comes from an essay First and second things published by CS Lewis. First Things are the goals that are given priority as the primary and ultimate aim in life. Second Things are subordinate goals or aims – which are justified in terms of the extent to which they assist in pursuing First Things. The classic First Thing in human society is some kind of religious or philosophical world view. Lewis regarded it as a ‘universal law’ that the pursuit of a Second Thing as if it was a First Thing led inevitably to the loss of that Second Thing: ‘You can’t get second things by putting them first; you can get second things only by putting first things first’. I would argue that the pursuit of science as a primary value will lead to the loss of science, because science is properly a Second Thing. Because when science is conceptualized as a First Thing the bottom-line or operational definition of ‘correct behaviour’ is approval and high status within the scientific community. However, this does nothing whatsoever to prevent science drifting-away from its proper function; and once science has drifted then the prevailing peer consensus will tend to maintain this state of corruption. I am saying that science is a Second Thing, and ought to be subordinate to the First Thing of transcendental truth. Truth impinges on scientific practice in the form of individual conscience (noting that, of course, the strength and validity of conscience varies between scientists). When the senior scientists, whose role is to uphold standards, fail to posses or respond-to informed conscience, science will inevitably go rotten from the head downwards. What, then, motivates a scientist to act upon conscience? I believe it requires a fundamental conviction of the reality and importance of truth as an essential part of the basic purpose and meaning of life. Without some such bedrock moral underpinning, there is little possibility that individual scientific conscience would ever have a chance of holding-out against an insidious drift toward corruption enforced by peer consensus.
Paula N Kagan, Marlaine C Smith, W Richard Cowling, Peggy L Chinn
Nursing Philosophy
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to present the theoretical and philosophical assumptions of the Nursing Manifesto, written by three activist scholars whose objective was to promote emancipatory nursing research, practice , and education within the dialogue and praxis of social justice. Inspired by discussions with a number of nurse philosophers at the 2008 Knowledge Conference in Boston, two of the original Manifesto authors and two colleagues discussed the need to explicate emancipatory knowing as it emerged from the Manifesto. Our analysis yielded an epistemological framework based on liberation principles to advance praxis in the discipline of nursing. This paper adds to what is already known on this topic, as there is not an explicit contribution to the literature of this specific Manifesto, its significance, and utility for the discipline. While each of us have written on emancipatory knowing and social justice in a variety of works, it is in this article that we identify, as a unit of knowledge production and as a direction towards praxis, a set of critical values that arose from the emancipatory conscienceness and intention seen in the framework of the Nursing Manifesto.
Abstract Background: In elderly care registered nurses (RNs) and nurse assistants (NAs) face ethical challenges which may trouble their conscience.
Objective: This study aimed to illuminate meanings of RNs’ and NAs’ lived experience of troubled conscience in their work in municipal residential elderly care.
Design: Interviews with six RNs and six NAs were interpreted separately using a phenomenological hermeneutic method.
Settings: Data was collected in 2005 among RNs and NAs working in special types of housings for the elderly in a municipality in Sweden.
Participants: The RNs and NAs were selected for participation had previously participated in a questionnaire study and their ratings in the questionnaire study constituted the selection criteria for the interview study.
Results: The RNs’ lived experience of troubled conscience was formulated in two themes. The first theme is ‘being trapped in powerlessness’ which includes three sub-themes: being restrained by others’ omission, being trapped in ethically demanding situations and failing to live up to others’ expectations. The second theme is ‘being inadequate’ which includes two sub-themes: lacking courage to maintain one’s opinion and feeling incompetent. The NAs’ lived experience of troubled conscience was formulated in the two themes. The first is ‘being hindered by pre-determined conditions’ which includes two sub-themes: suffering from lack of focus in one’s work and being restrained by the organisation. The second theme is ‘being inadequate’ which includes two sub-themes: lacking the courage to object and being negligent.
Conclusions: The RNs’ lived experience of troubled conscience were feelings of being trapped in a state of powerlessness, caught in a struggle between responsibility and authority and a sense of inadequacy fuelled by feelings of incompetence, a lack of courage and a fear of revealing themselves and endangering residents’ well-being. The NAs’ lived experience of troubled conscience was feelings of being hindered by pre-determined conditions, facing a fragmented work situation hovering between norms and rules and convictions of their conscience. To not endangering the atmosphere in the work-team they are submissive to the norms of their co-workers. They felt inadequate as they should be model care providers. The findings were interpreted in the light of Fromm’s authoritarian and humanistic conscience.
Author Summary Why is modern science less efficient than it used to be, why has revolutionary science declined, and why has science become so dishonest? One plausible explanation behind these observations comes from an essay First and second things published by CS Lewis. First Things are the goals that are given priority as the primary and ultimate aim in life. Second Things are subordinate goals or aims – which are justified in terms of the extent to which they assist in pursuing First Things. The classic First Thing in human society is some kind of religious or philosophical world view. Lewis regarded it as a ‘universal law’ that the pursuit of a Second Thing as if it was a First Thing led inevitably to the loss of that Second Thing: ‘You can’t get second things by putting them first; you can get second things only by putting first things first’. I would argue that the pursuit of science as a primary value will lead to the loss of science, because science is properly a Second Thing. Because when science is conceptualized as a First Thing the bottom-line or operational definition of ‘correct behaviour’ is approval and high status within the scientific community. However, this does nothing whatsoever to prevent science drifting-away from its proper function; and once science has drifted then the prevailing peer consensus will tend to maintain this state of corruption. I am saying that science is a Second Thing, and ought to be subordinate to the First Thing of transcendental truth. Truth impinges on scientific practice in the form of individual conscience (noting that, of course, the strength and validity of conscience varies between scientists). When the senior scientists, whose role is to uphold standards, fail to posses or respond-to informed conscience, science will inevitably go rotten from the head downwards. What, then, motivates a scientist to act upon conscience? I believe it requires a fundamental conviction of the reality and importance of truth as an essential part of the basic purpose and meaning of life. Without some such bedrock moral underpinning, there is little possibility that individual scientific conscience would ever have a chance of holding-out against an insidious drift toward corruption enforced by peer consensus.
