Project Administrator, Author at Protection of Conscience Project Library

Striking a Balance Between Faith and Freedom: Military Conscientious Objection as a Model for Pharmacist Refusal

Maria Teresa Weidner

Lexis Nexis Summary
Pharmacists who have subscribed to this movement assert that they have a “right” to refuse to fill valid patient prescriptions whenever doing so might violate their own religious or moral beliefs. … The governments of Arkansas, Florida, and South Dakota sought to both endorse and shield from liability instances of religiously motivated pharmacist refusal to dispense family planning products. … Such expectations, as demonstrated in the policy positions set forth by organizations like the American Pharmacists Association (APhA) and Pharmacists for Life, harm the profession by undermining its credibility while underscoring the need to preserve the regulating power of liability as a tool to protect patient interests. … These factors, compounded with the profession’s own struggle for professional legitimacy and insistence on recognition of the practitioners’ “clinical role” in the provision of medication to patients indicate that a defense against alleged malpractice based on a free exercise theory would not succeed both based on the secular nature of the profession and as a matter of existing free exercise jurisprudence. … South Dakota’s legislature has already demonstrated as much by including a provision in its pharmacist refusal clause permitting pharmacists to refuse to dispense palliative drugs that might be used to hasten death, clearly a measure that can affect women and men alike

Weidner MT. Striking a Balance Between Faith and Freedom: Military Conscientious Objection as a Model for Pharmacist Refusal. J Gender, Race & Just. 2008 Jan;11(2):369-408

The Cost of Conscience: Kant on Conscience and Conscientious Objection

Jeanette Kennett

Abstract
The spread of demands by physicians and allied health professionals for accommodation of their private ethical, usually religiously based, objections to providing care of a particular type, or to a particular class of persons, suggests the need for a re-evaluation of conscientious objection in healthcare and how it should be regulated. I argue on Kantian grounds that respect for conscience and protection of freedom of conscience is consistent with fairly stringent limitations and regulations governing refusal of service in healthcare settings. Respect for conscience does not entail that refusal of service should be cost free to the objector. I suggest that conscientious objection in medicine should be conceptualized and treated analogously to civil disobedience.

Kennett J. The Cost of Conscience: Kant on Conscience and Conscientious Objection. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. 2017 Jan; 26(1): 69 – 81
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180116000657

The right to die and the medical cartel

M Cholbi

Abstract
Advocates of a right to die increasingly assert that the right in question is a positive right (a right to assistance in dying) and that the right in question is held against physicians or the medical community. Physician organizations often reply that these claims to a positive right to die should be rejected on the grounds that medicine’s aims or “internal” norms preclude physicians from killing patients or assisting their patients in killing themselves. The aim of this article is to rebut this reply. Rather than casting doubt on whether assisted dying is consistent with medicine’s “internal” norms, I draw attention to the socioeconomic contexts in which contemporary medicine is practiced. Specifically, contemporary medicine typically functions as a public cartel, one implication of which is that physicians enjoy a monopoly on the most desirable life-ending technologies (fast acting lethal sedatives, etc). While there may be defensible public health reasons for medicine functioning as a cartel and having this monopoly on desirable life-ending technologies, Rawlsian contract-based reasoning illustrates that the status of medicine as a cartel cannot be reconciled with its denying the public access to supervised use of desirable life-ending technologies. The ability to die in ways that reflect one’s conception of the good is arguably a primary social good, a good that individuals have reasons to want, whatever else they may want. Individuals behind Rawls’ veil of ignorance, unaware of their health status, values, etc, will thus reason that they may well have a reasonable desire for the life-ending technologies the medical cartel currently monopolizes. They thus have reasons to endorse a positive right to physician assistance in dying. On the assumption that access to desirable life-ending technologies will be controlled by the medical community, a just society does not permit that community to deny patients access to these technologies by an appeal to medicine’s putative “internal” aims or norms. The most natural response to my Rawlsian argument is to suggest that it only shows that individuals have a positive right against the medical community to access life-ending technologies but not a right to access such technologies from individual physicians. Individual physicians could still refuse to provide such technologies as a matter of moral conscience. Such claims of conscience should be rejected, however. A first difficulty with this proposal is that it is in principle possible for a sufficiently large number of individuals within a profession to invoke claims of conscience so as to materially hinder individuals from exercising their positive right to die, as appears to be the case in several jurisdictions with respect to abortion and other reproductive health treatments. Second, unlike conscientious objectors to military service, physicians who conscientiously object to providing assistance in dying would not be subject to fundamental deprivations of rights if they refused to provide assistance. Physicians who deny patients access to these technologies use their monopoly position in the service of a kind of moral paternalism, hoarding a public resource with which they have been entrusted so as to promote their own conception of the good over that of their patients.

Cholbi M. The right to die and the medical cartel. Ethics Med Pub Health. 2015 Nov 19;1(4):486-493.

Palliative care professionals’ willingness to perform euthanasia or physician assisted suicide

Julia Zenz, Michael Tryba, Michael Zenz

Abstract
Background: Euthanasia and physician assisted suicide (PAS) are highly debated upon particularly in the light of medical advancement and an aging society. Little is known about the professionals’ willingness to perform these practices particularly among those engaged in the field of palliative care and pain management. Thus a study was performed among those professionals.

Methods: An anonymous questionnaire was handed out to all participants of a palliative care congress and a pain symposium in 2013. The questionnaire consisted of 8 questions regarding end of life decisions. Proposed patient vignettes were used.

Results: A total of 470 eligible questionnaires were returned, 198 by physicians, 272 by nurses. The response rate was 64 %. The majority of professionals were reluctant to perform euthanasia or PAS: 5.3 % of the respondents would be willing to perform euthanasia on a patient with a terminal illness if asked to do so. The reluctance grew in case of a patient with a non-terminal illness. The respondents were more willing to perform PAS than euthanasia. Nurses were more reluctant to take action as opposed to the physicians. The majority of the respondents would attempt to treat the patient’s symptoms first before considering life-ending measures. As regards any decision making process the majority would consult with a colleague.

Conclusions: This is the first German study to ask about the willingness of professionals to take action as regards euthanasia and PAS without biased phrasing. As opposed to the general acceptance that is respectively high, the actual willingness to perform life-ending measures is low. The German debate on physician assisted suicide and its possible legalization should also incorporate clarifications regarding the responsibility who should eventually perform these acts.

Zenz J, Tryba M, Zenz M. Palliative care professionals’ willingness to perform euthanasia or physician assisted suicide. BMC Palliative Care. 2015 Nov 14;14(1).

“Conscientious Objection” in Reproductive Healthcare is Immoral and Should Be Abolished

Joyce H Arthur

Extract
The majority of so-called “conscientious objection” is exercised today in reproductive healthcare and is not really about protecting the right to conscience. It’s about a person in a privileged position of authority (there by choice) imposing their personal beliefs on a vulnerable other in a dependent position (not there by choice).

Arthur JH. “Conscientious Objection” in Reproductive Healthcare is Immoral and Should Be Abolished. Joyce Arthur Blog. 2015.

A study of the first year of the end-of-life clinic for physician-assisted dying in the Netherlands

Marianne C Snijdewind, Dick L Willems, Luc Deliens, Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Kenneth Chambaere

Abstract
Importance: Right to Die NL, an organization in the Netherlands that advocates for the option of euthanasia, founded the End-of-Life Clinic in 2012 to provide euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide for patients who meet all legal requirements but whose regular physicians rejected their request. Many patients whose requests are rejected have less common situations, such as a psychiatric or psychological condition, dementia, or being tired of living.

Objective: To study outcomes of requests for euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide received by the clinic and factors associated with granting or rejecting requests.

Design: Analysis of application forms and registration files from March 1, 2012, to March 1, 2013, the clinic’s first year of operation, for 645 patients who applied to the clinic with a request for euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide and whose cases were concluded during the study period. Main Outcomes and

Measures: A request could be granted, rejected, or withdrawn or the patient could have died before a final decision was reached. We analyzed bivariate and multivariate associations with medical conditions, type of suffering, and sociodemographic variables.

Results: Of the 645 requests made by patients, 162 requests (25.1%) were granted, 300 requests (46.5%) were refused, 124 patients (19.2%) died before the request could be assessed, and 59 patients (9.1%) withdrew their requests. Patients with a somatic condition (113 of 344 [32.8%]) or with cognitive decline (21 of 56 [37.5%]) had the highest percentage of granted requests. Patients with a psychological condition had the smallest percentage of granted requests. Six (5.0%) of 121 requests from patients with a psychological condition were granted, as were 11 (27.5%) of 40 requests from patients who were tired of living.

Conclusions and Relevance: Physicians in the Netherlands have more reservations about less common reasons that patients request euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, such as psychological conditions and being tired of living, than the medical staff working for the End-of-Life Clinic. The physicians and nurses employed by the clinic, however, often confirmed the assessment of the physician who previously cared for the patient; they rejected nearly half of the requests for euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, possibly because the legal due care criteria had not been met.

Snijdewind MC, Willems DL, Deliens L, Onwuteaka-Philipsen BD, Chambaere K. A study of the first year of the end-of-life clinic for physician-assisted dying in the Netherlands. JAMA Internal Medicine. 2015 Oct;175(10):1633-1640.

Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake

Amy J Sepinwall

Abstract
In the paradigmatic case of conscientious objection, the objector claims that his religion forbids him from actively participating in a wrong (for example, by fighting in a war). In the religious challenges to the Affordable Care Act’s employer mandate, on the other hand, employers claim that their religious convictions forbid them from merely subsidizing insurance through which their employees might commit a wrong (for example, by using contraception). The understanding of complicity underpinning these challenges is vastly more expansive than the standard that legal doctrine or moral theory contemplates. Courts routinely reject claims of conscientious objection to taxes that fund military initiatives or to university fees that support abortion services. In Hobby Lobby, however, the Supreme Court took the corporate owners at their word: the mere fact that Hobby Lobby believed that it would be complicit, no matter how idiosyncratic its belief, sufficed to qualify it for an exemption. In this way, the Court made elements of an employee’s health-care package the “boss’s business” (to borrow from the nickname of the Democrats’ proposed bill to overturn Hobby Lobby).

Much of the critical reaction to Hobby Lobby focuses on the issue of corporate rights of religious freedom. Yet this issue is a red herring. The deeper concerns that Hobby Lobby raises—about whether employers may now refuse, on religious grounds, to subsidize other forms of health coverage (for example, blood transfusions or vaccinations) or to serve customers whose lifestyles they deplore (for example, gays and lesbians)—do not turn on the organizational form that the employer has adopted. Instead, the more significant issue goes to our understanding of complicity: When is it reasonable for an employer (for-profit or nonprofit, corporate or individual) to think itself complicit in the conduct of its employees or customers? And when is a reasonable claim of complicity compelling enough to warrant an accommodation, especially when that accommodation would impose costs on third parties?

Sepinwall AJ. Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake. U Chicago Law Rev. 2015 Fall; 82:1897-1980.

An argument for physician-assisted suicide and against euthanasia

Raphael Cohen-Almagor

Abstract
The article opens with the hypothesis that the default position that should guide healthcare providers when treating patients at the end-of-life is that patients opt for life. In the absence of an explicit request to die, we may assume that patients wish to continue living. Thus, the role of the medical profession is to provide patients with the best possible conditions for continued living. The article makes a case for physician-assisted suicide legislation. It examines the ‘quality-of-life’ argument, and the issue of the patient’s autonomy and competence. It is argued that (1) quality-of-life is a subjective concept. Only the patient can conclude for herself that her quality-of-life is so low to warrant ending it, and that (2) only competent patients may request ending their lives. Patients’ lives should not be actively terminated by the medical team without the explicit consent of patients. The article then probes the role of physicians at the end-of-life, arguing that medicine should strive to cater to the wishes of all patients, not only the majority of them. Physicians should not turn their backs to justified requests by their patients. Physicians are best equipped to come to the help of patients at all stages of their illness, including their end-of-life. At the same time, in ending life, the final control mechanism should be with the patient. Thus, physician-assisted suicide is preferred to euthanasia in order to lower the possibility of abuse and of ending the lives of patients without their consent and against their wishes. As matters of life and death are grave, they should be taken with utmost seriousness, requiring the instalment of ample checks against abuse and facilitating mechanisms designed to serve the patient’s best interests. The article concludes with 19 careful and detailed guidelines for physician-assisted suicide. These are necessary measures designed to ensure that the best interests of the patients are served as they wished.

Cohen-Almagor R. An argument for physician-assisted suicide and against euthanasia. Ethics Med Pub Health. 2015 Oct;1(4):431-441.

Multi-fetal Pregnancy Reduction in Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A License to Kill?

Siddharth Khanijou

Extract
Conclusion
The objective of this Article is not to make a case that multifetal pregnancy reduction should be banned. . . . The procreational autonomy bestowed by the Constitution cannot be extended to permit the unbridled, willful creation and destruction of fetuses. Autonomy does not grant society a license to absolute freedom from intervention in all matters regarding our reproductive capacity. . . .

Assisted reproductive technologies, like other medical technologies, do not exist in a vacuum. The potential economic and social harms that may result from irresponsible practice extend beyond the ART participants. . . . In an era where government silence equals acquiescence and where unregulated technology threatens to devalue humanity, political stalemate is not a valid excuse. Proactive federal oversight is central to cure the problems created over the past twenty- five years by the lack of regulation over ART.

Khanijou S. Multi-fetal Pregnancy Reduction in Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A License to Kill? DePaul J Health Care Law. 2005 Oct;8(2):403-430.

(Thesis) A Region at Odds: Abortion Politics in the Maritime Provinces, 1969-1988

Katrina Ackerman

Abstract
The inaccessibility of abortion services in the Maritime Provinces remains a constant topic in the media, and yet little research has been conducted to explain the barriers to the procedure in the region. Despite many excellent studies on the barriers enforced at a provincial level after the Supreme Court of Canada case R. v. Morgentaler (1988), which decriminalized abortion nationwide, few studies provide insight into to the reasoning for strong opposition to abortion access in the region. This dissertation endeavours to fill this gap in the scholarship through a historical analysis of abortion politics in the Maritime Provinces between 1969 and 1988. When the federal government liberalized the abortion law in 1969 at the behest of the women’s movement, Canadian Bar Association, and Canadian Medical Association, opposition to the medical procedure came to the forefront. Medical professionals, politicians, clergy, and citizens quickly united to form pro-life organizations and became a powerful countermovement in the region. Through an exploration of medical society, government, and social movement organization records in conjunction with interviews with residents, this dissertation offers insight into the effectiveness and longevity of pro-life activism in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. Furthermore, it illuminates the financial, physical, and psychological costs of attempting to terminate pregnancies in the region.

Ackerman K. (Thesis) A Region at Odds: Abortion Politics in the Maritime Provinces, 1969-1988. 2015.