Journal Summary Data from places with legal assisted dying have allayed concerns about potential abuses and patient safety, but a lingering challenge comes from the medical establishment. Creating a centralized mechanism for prescribing lethal medication could overcome this hurdle.
Abstract In the United States, the decision of whether to withdraw or continue to provide artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) for patients in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) is placed largely in the hands of surrogate decision‐makers, such as spouses and immediate family members. This practice would seem to be consistent with a strong national emphasis on autonomy and patient‐centered healthcare. When there is ambiguity as to the patient’s advanced wishes, the presumption has been that decisions should weigh in favor of maintaining life, and therefore, that it is the withdrawal rather than the continuation of ANH that requires particular justification. I will argue that this default position should be reversed. Instead, I will argue that the burden of justification lies with those who would continue artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH), and in the absence of knowledge as to the patient’s advanced wishes, it is better to discontinue ANH. In particular, I will argue that among patients in PVS, there is not a compelling interest in being kept alive; that in general, we commit a worse violation of autonomy by continuing ANH when the patient’s wishes are unknown; and that more likely than not, the maintenance of ANH as a bridge to a theoretical future time of recovery goes against the best interests of the patient.
Abstract What makes an act of killing morally wrong is not that the act causes loss of life or consciousness but rather that the act causes loss of all remaining abilities. This account implies that it is not even pro tanto morally wrong to kill patients who are universally and irreversibly disabled, because they have no abilities to lose. Applied to vital organ transplantation, this account undermines the dead donor rule and shows how current practices are compatible with morality.
Abstract One of the requirements in the Dutch regulation for euthanasia and assisted suicide is that the doctor must be satisfied ‘that the patient’s suffering is unbearable, and that there is no prospect of improvement.’ In the notorious Chabot case, a psychiatrist assisted a 50 year old woman in suicide, although she did not suffer from any somatic disease, nor strictly speaking from any psychiatric condition. In Seduced by Death, Herbert Hendin concluded that apparently the Dutch regulation now allows physicians to assist anyone in suicide simply because he or she is unhappy. In this paper, I reject Hendin’s conclusion and in particular his description of Mrs Boomsma as someone who was ‘simply unhappy.’ After a detailed narration of her lifestory, I turn to the American philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s account of volitional incapacity and love for a more accurate characterization of her suffering. Having been through what she had, she could only go on living as another person than the one she had been when she was a happy mother. That would have violated her integrity, and that she could not bring herself to do.
Abstract There are not enough solid organs available to meet the needs of patients with organ failure. Thousands of patients every year die on the waiting lists for transplantation. Yet there is one currently available, underutilized, potential source of organs. Many patients die in intensive care following withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment whose organs could be used to save the lives of others. At present the majority of these organs go to waste. In this paper we consider and evaluate a range of ways to improve the number and quality of organs available from this group of patients. Changes to consent arrangements (for example conscription of organs after death) or changes to organ donation practice could dramatically increase the numbers of organs available, though they would conflict with currently accepted norms governing transplantation. We argue that one alternative, Organ Donation Euthanasia, would be a rational improvement over current practice regarding withdrawal of life support. It would give individuals the greatest chance of being able to help others with their organs after death. It would increase patient autonomy. It would reduce the chance of suffering during the dying process. We argue that patients should be given the choice of whether and how they would like to donate their organs in the event of withdrawal of life support in intensive care. Continuing current transplantation practice comes at the cost of death and prolonged organ failure. We should seriously consider all of the alternatives.
M Sercu, P Pype, T Christiaens, M Grypdonck, A Derese, M Deveugele
Journal of Medical Ethics
Abstract Background: In 2002, Belgium set a legal framework for euthanasia, whereby granting and performing euthanasia is entrusted entirely to physicians, and—as advised by Belgian Medical Deontology—in the context of a trusted patient–physician relationship. Euthanasia is, however, rarely practiced, so the average physician will not attain routine in this matter.
Aim: To explore how general practitioners in Flanders (Belgium) deal with euthanasia. This was performed via qualitative analysis of semistructured interviews with 52 general practitioners (GPs).
Results: Although GPs can understand a patient’s request for euthanasia, their own willingness to perform it is limited, based on their assumption that legal euthanasia equates to an injection that ends life abruptly. Their willingness to perform euthanasia is affected by the demanding nature of a patient’s request, by their views on what circumstances render euthanasia legitimate and by their own ability to inject a lethal dose. Several GPs prefer increasing opioid dosages and palliative sedation to a lethal injection, which they consider to fall outside the scope of euthanasia legislation.
Conclusions: Four attitudes can be identified: (1) willing to perform euthanasia; (2) only willing to perform as a last resort; (3) feeling incapable of performing; (4) refusing on principle. The situation where GPs have to consider the request and—if they grant it—to perform the act may result in arbitrary access to euthanasia for the patient. The possibility of installing transparent referral and support strategies for the GPs should be further examined. Further discussion is needed in the medical profession about the exact content of the euthanasia law.
Yanna Van Wesemael, Joachim Cohen, Johan Bilsen, Tinne Smets, Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Luc Deliens
Journal of Paint and Symptom Management
Abstract Context: Since 2002, the administration of a lethal drug by a physician at the explicit request of the patient has been legal in Belgium. The incidence of euthanasia in Belgium has been studied, but the process and outcomes of euthanasia requests have not been investigated.
Objectives: To describe which euthanasia requests were granted, withdrawn, and rejected since the enactment of the euthanasia law in terms of the characteristics of the patient, treating physician, and aspects of the consultation with a second physician.
Methods: A representative sample of 3006 Belgian physicians received a questionnaire investigating their most recent euthanasia request.
Results: The response rate was 34%. Since 2002, 39% of respondents had received a euthanasia request. Forty-eight percent of requests had been carried out, 5% had been refused, 10% had been withdrawn, and in 23%, the patient had died before euthanasia could be performed. Physicians’ characteristics associated with receiving a request were not being religious, caring for a high number of terminally ill patients, and having experience in palliative care. Patient characteristics associated with granting a request were age, having cancer, loss of dignity, having no depression, and suffering without prospect of improvement as a reason for requesting euthanasia. A positive initial position toward the request from the attending physician and positive advice from the second physician also contributed to having a request granted.
Conclusion: Under the Belgian Act on Euthanasia, about half of the requests are granted. Factors related to the reason for the request, position of the attending physician toward the request, and advice from the second physician influence whether a request is granted or not.
European Archive of Psychiatry & Clinical Neuroscience
Abstract Under the Euthanasia Program of Nazi Germany, more than 200,000 psychiatric patients were killed by doctors in psychiatric institutions. After summarising the historical facts and the slow and still going-on process of illuminating and understanding what happened, some ethical consequences are drawn. What can we learn from history? The following aspects are addressed: the special situation of psychiatry in times of war, bioethics and biopolitics, the responsibility of the psychiatrist for the individual patient, the effects of hierarchy on personal conscience and responsibility, the unethical “curable- uncurable” distinction and the atrocious concept that persons differ in their value.
Kenneth Chambaere, Johan Bilsen, Joachim Cohen, Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Freddy Mortier, Luc Deliens
Canadian Medical Association Journal
Abstract Background: Legalization of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide has been heavily debated in many countries. To help inform this debate, we describe the practices of euthanasia and assisted suicide, and the use of life-ending drugs without an explicit request from the patient, in Flanders, Belgium, where euthanasia is legal.
Methods: We mailed a questionnaire regarding the use of life-ending drugs with or without explicit patient request to physicians who certified a representative sample (n = 6927) of death certificates of patients who died in Flanders between June and November 2007.
Results: The response rate was 58.4%. Overall, 208 deaths involving the use of life-ending drugs were reported: 142 (weighted prevalence 2.0%) were with an explicit patient request (euthanasia or assisted suicide) and 66 (weighted prevalence 1.8%) were without an explicit request. Euthanasia and assisted suicide mostly involved patients less than 80 years of age, those with cancer and those dying at home. Use of life-ending drugs without an explicit request mostly involved patients 80 years of older, those with a disease other than cancer and those in hospital. Of the deaths without an explicit request, the decision was not discussed with the patient in 77.9% of cases. Compared with assisted deaths with the patient’s explicit re quest, those without an explicit request were more likely to have a shorter length of treatment of the terminal illness, to have cure as a goal of treatment in the last week, to have a shorter estimated time by which life was shortened and to involve the administration of opioids.
Interpretation: Physician-assisted deaths with an explicit patient request (euthanasia and assisted suicide) and without an explicit request occurred in different patient groups and under different circumstances. Cases without an explicit request often involved patients whose diseases had unpredictable end-of-life trajectories. Although opioids were used in most of these cases, misconceptions seem to persist about their actual life-shortening effects.
Pub Med Abstract The paper [in Spanish] analyzes the right of healthcare professionals to conscientious objection in multicultural societies. The ethical relativism characteristic of these societies abides with an apparently paradoxical reduction of the exercise of freedom of conscience. “Apparently” because, in the end, ethical relativism tends to adopt dogmatic attitudes. Special attention is paid to the situation of Spanish healthcare in relation to euthanasia and abortion. With regard to euthanasia, the “death with dignity” draft bill of Andalucía is considered. With regard to abortion, we will pay attention to the reform of the Penal Code in the context of a new regulation about “reproductive health” of women, which means the adoption of a system of time limits, and the characterization of abortion as a women’s right. It is concluded that freedom of conscience of healthcare professionals will probably be at risk if proposed legal policies don’t change.