Journal Articles Archives - Page 44 of 67 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

Anesthetizing the public conscience: lethal injection and animal euthanasia

(The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science)

Ty Alper

Extract
People are never executed using the anesthetic-only procedure that veterinarians and shelter workers use on animals. And animals are never euthanized by the three-drug formula prison officials use on human beings. As detailed in this Article, the veterinary and animal welfare communities widely condemn the use of neuromuscular blocking agents such as pancuronium. Particularly given the popular assumption that execution of humans by lethal injection is no different than “putting an animal to sleep,” the condemnation of the use of curariform drugs in the euthanasia context should give courts pause when assessing the risks of the three-drug formula under the Eighth Amendment. . . The Humane Society mandates a method of euthanasia the primary benefit of which is that it is actually humane. At a time when the public’s trust in the administration of capital punishment in this country appears to be eroding, the states, on the other hand, have clung to a method whose primary benefit is that it looks humane- but that in reality risks the unnecessary infliction of excruciating pain and suffering.

Alper T. Anesthetizing the public conscience: lethal injection and animal euthanasia (The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science). Fordham Urban Law J. 2008;35(4):817-856.

Conscientious Objectors Behind the Counter: Statutory Defenses to Tort Liability for Failure to Dispense Contraceptives

Jennifer E. Spreng

Extract
Conclusion
Pharmacists are already involved in litigation over conscience clauses; it is probably only a matter of time before a woman sues a pharmacist for wrongful conception. Changes in the pharmacy profession and correlative tort duties mean a common law or statutory duty to dispense or sell emergency or daily oral contraceptives is not outside the realm of possibility. Many religious pharmacists have compelling reasons to refuse to sell, but federal Free Exercise protections are currently uncertain. State statutory conscience clauses offer some protection and do not violate the Establishment Clause. Therefore, more states should not hesitate to provide
this protection to all healthcare providers.

Spreng JE. Conscientious Objectors Behind the Counter: Statutory Defenses to Tort Liability for Failure to Dispense Contraceptives. 1 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 337, 337-40 (2008)

Conscientious commitment

Bernard M. Dickens

Extract
In some regions of the world, hospital policy, negotiated with the health ministry and police, requires that a doctor who finds evidence of an unskilled abortion or abortion attempt should immediately inform police authorities and preserve the evidence. Elsewhere, religious leaders forbid male doctors from examining any part of a female patient’s body other than that being directly complained about. Can a doctor invoke a conscientious commitment to medically appropriate and timely diagnosis or care and refuse to comply with such directives?

Dickens BM. Conscientious commitment. Lancet [Internet]. 2008 Apr 12; 371(9620): 1240 – 1241

Access to abortion: what women want from abortion services

Ellen R Wiebe, S Sandhu

Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada

Abstract
Objective: Whether Canadian physicians can refuse to refer women for abortion and whether private clinics can charge for abortions are matters of controversy. We sought to identify barriers to access for women seeking therapeutic abortion and to have them identify what they considered to be most important about access to abortion services.

Methods: Women presenting for abortion over a two-month period at two free-standing abortion clinics, one publicly funded and the other private, were invited to participate in the study. Phase I of the study involved administration of a questionnaire seeking information about demographics, perceived barriers to access to abortion, and what the women wanted from abortion services. Phase II involved semi-structured interviews of a convenience sample of women to record their responses to questions about access. Responses from Phase I questionnaires were compared between the two clinics, and qualitative analysis was performed on the interview responses.

Results: Of 423 eligible women, 402 completed questionnaires, and of 45 women approached, 39 completed interviews satisfactorily. Women received information about abortion services from their physicians (60.0%), the Internet (14.8%), a telephone directory (7.8%), friends or family (5.3%), or other sources (12.3%). Many had negative experiences in gaining access. The most important issue regarding access was the long wait time; the second most important issue was difficulty in making appointments. In the private clinic, 85% of the women said they were willing to pay for shorter wait times, compared with 43.5% in the public clinic.

Conclusion: Physicians who failed to refer patients for abortion or provide information about obtaining an abortion caused distress and impeded access for a significant minority of women requesting an abortion. Management of abortion services should be prioritized to reflect what women want: particularly decreased wait times for abortion and greater ease and convenience in booking appointments. Since many women are willing to pay for services in order to have an abortion within one week, this option should be considered by policy makers.

Wiebe ER, Sandhu S. Access to abortion: what women want from abortion services. J Obstet Gynaecol Can. 2008 Apr;30(4):327-331.

To Die, to Sleep: US Physicians’ Religious and Other Objections to Physician-Assisted Suicide, Terminal Sedation, and Withdrawal of Life Support

Farr A Curlin, Chinyere Nwodim, Jennifer L Vance, Marshall H Chin, John D Lantos

American Journal of Hospice and Palliative Care

Abstract
This study analyzes data from a national survey to estimate the proportion of physicians who currently object to physician-assisted suicide (PAS), terminal sedation (TS), and withdrawal of artificial life support (WLS), and to examine associations between such objections and physician ethnicity, religious characteristics, and experience caring for dying patients. Overall, 69% of the US physicians object to PAS, 18% to TS, and 5% to WLS. Highly religious physicians are more likely than those with low religiosity to object to both PAS (84% vs 55%, P < .001) and TS (25% vs 12%, P < .001). Objection to PAS or TS is also associated with being of Asian ethnicity, of Hindu religious affiliation, and having more experience caring for dying patients. These findings suggest that, with respect to morally contested interventions at the end of life, the medical care patients receive will vary based on their physicians’ religious characteristics, ethnicity, and experience caring for dying patients.

Curlin FA, Nwodim C, Vance JL, Chin MH, Lantos JD. To Die, to Sleep: US Physicians’ Religious and Other Objections to Physician-Assisted Suicide, Terminal Sedation, and Withdrawal of Life Support. American J Hospice & Pall Care. 2008;25(12):112-120.

Conscientious Commitment

Bernard M Dickens

Extract
Religion has no monopoly on conscience, however. History, both distant and recent, shows how health-care providers and others, driven by conscientious concerns, can defy laws and religious opposition to provide care to vulnerable, dependent populations. They might also defy the medical establishment. Pioneers of the birth control movement were not doctors, and were opposed by medical, state, and religious establishments. As long ago as 1797, Jeremy Bentham advocated means of birth control, and in the following century, John Stuart Mill was briefly imprisoned for distributing birth control handbills. Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant were similarly prosecuted, in 1877, for selling pamphlets about birth control.

Dickens BM. Conscientious Commitment. The Lancet. 2008;371(1240-1241.

Pharmacists and the “Duty” To Dispense Emergency Contraceptives

Jennifer E Spreng

Abstract
Stories abound of both women with prescriptions turned away at the pharmacy door and members of the most trusted health care profession losing jobs and running afoul of ethics rules. Scholars have spilt much intellectual ink divining whether a pharmacist must dispense Plan B, the primary emergency contraceptive. Now, many are calling for a common law “duty to dispense” that could serve as a foundation for a wrongful pregnancy action against a dissenting pharmacist. Such a duty simply does not arise from established tort principles or pharmacist-specific precedents. Only in rare circumstances will a pharmacist and customer have the type and quality of relationship giving rise to a duty to dispense. Nevertheless, law changes over time and makes allowances for unique circumstances. Pharmacists are taking on more responsibility for drug therapy. They have an awkward role in the distribution of Plan B. Moreover, while the law may protect pharmacists’ consciences, it may not be so receptive to pharmacists-as-activists. Dissenting pharmacists can take practical steps to protect themselves today, but tomorrow is another day.

Spreng JE. Pharmacists and the “Duty” To Dispense Emergency Contraceptives. Issues Law Med. 2008 Spring;23(3):215-277.

Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms

Judith F Daar

Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice

Extract
Conclusion
The constitutional jurisprudence surrounding assisted conception is only beginning to take shape . . . . When conception occurs naturally, both positive and negative rights surrounding procreation are fairly clear, but grow murky as the reproductive process invites third parties to assist. As methods of assisted conception show increasing technological promise for those whose physical characteristics, social status, or both require they look to ART for family formation, worrisome trends suggest that third party actors are quietly mounting status-based barriers to fertility treatment. Barriers to ART are taking shape on the basis of patient characteristics including wealth, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and marital status, all under the guise of preventing harm to offspring and society at large. However, judgments by ART providers and public lawmakers that certain individuals will be unfit parents, veer dangerously close to the coercive eugenics practices of early twentieth century America, practices whose only positive legacy is the extreme caution with which we now approach state-sponsored limitations on reproduction.

Like a pentimento, ART barriers are only beginning to come into view from the experiences of an increasingly diverse and nontraditional reproductive medicine patient population. As each barrier emerges-whether it be a provider refusing treatment to a single or gay or lesbian prospective parent, or a lawmaker attempting to limit the availability of a reproductive technology for reasons unrelated to human health-it is essential to evaluate these actions by the same standards we would evaluate barriers to natural conception. . . . State-sponsored or state-approved limitations on any individual’s right to procreate simply cannot stand in a society that acknowledges the preeminence of reproductive freedom. Justice Douglas’ selfevident observation that reproduction is a basic human right is as durable and universal as the human race-it simply must be nurtured in order to continue to thrive.

Daar JF. Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms. Berkeley J Gender Law Just. 2008 Mar;23(1):18-82.

Professional Responsibility and Individual Conscience: Protecting the Informed Consent Process from Impermissible Bias

Frank A Chervenak, Laurence B McCullough

Extract
The ethics of referral for abortion is autonomy based with a beneficence-based component, the clinician’s obligation to protect the woman’s health and life, similar to referral for cosmetic procedures. At a minimum, indirect referral— providing referral information but not ensuring that referral occurs—should be the clinical ethical standard of care. Direct referral for abortion is a matter of individual clinician discretion, not the clinical ethical standard of care. Conscience based objections to direct referral for termination of pregnancy have merit; conscience-based objections to indirect referral for termination of pregnancy do not.

Chervenak FA, McCullough LB. Professional Responsibility and Individual Conscience: Protecting the Informed Consent Process from Impermissible Bias. J Clin Ethics. 2008 Spring;19(1):24-25.

The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes Over Deeply Divisive Healthcare Procedures

Robin Fretwell Wilson

Extract
Refusals by individual pharmacies and pharmacists to fill prescriptions for emergency contraceptives (“EC”) have dominated news headlines. . .These refusals. . .reflect moral and religious concerns about facilitating an act that would cut-off a potential human life.

Recently, conscience-based refusals have ballooned far beyond EC. Pharmacists are refusing to fill prescriptions for birth control, and other ancillary care professionals are asserting their own conscience concerns.

Conclusion
Ultimately we must decide as a community whether we prize access more highly than religious freedom. The older healthcare conscience clauses offer us a range of methods to manage the clash between competing moral interests. If urgency for the service cannot be achieved through better information, state legislatures could make a number of choices. They could choose not to burden the professional’s choice at all—prizing religious liberty more highly than access. They could force providers to provide every service legally requested—prizing patient access more highly than moral or religious freedom. Or they could choose to allow individuals of conscience to exempt themselves up to the point that it creates a hardship for the patient or employer. In a pluralistic society, a live-and-let-live regime like this may be the most we can hope for.

Wilson RF. The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes Over Deeply Divisive Healthcare Procedures. Am J Law Med. 2008 Mar 01;34(1):41-63.