Law Archives - Page 18 of 39 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

Medically Assisted Death: Nancy B. v. Hotel-Dieu de Quebec

Bernard M Dickens

Abstract
In Nancy B. v. Hotel-Dieu de Quebec, the Quebec Superior Court held that a patient was legally entitled to discontinue and decline medical treatment when she found it unacceptable. The author discusses how this case is consistent with several other, decisions, yet distinguishable from certain Canadian decisions which contributed to its outcome. Through an analysis of Criminal Code provisions against homicide and on the duty to preserve life, the doctrine of informed consent, and related jurisprudence, the author argues that the Nancy B. decision narrows the gap between allowing a patient to suffer natural death and medically assisting death. The author also raises issues associated with the notion of medical futility. He concludes that “the Nancy B. case moves the discourse in medical ethics and law towards the feminist “carebased” paradigm and suggests that the carefully- circumscribed judicial response was an appropriate legal answer to the question of how best to care for Nancy B..

Dickens BM. Medically Assisted Death: Nancy B. v. Hotel-Dieu de Quebec. McGill Law Journal. 1993;38(1053-1070.

Anesthetizing the public conscience: lethal injection and animal euthanasia

(The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science)

Ty Alper

Extract
People are never executed using the anesthetic-only procedure that veterinarians and shelter workers use on animals. And animals are never euthanized by the three-drug formula prison officials use on human beings. As detailed in this Article, the veterinary and animal welfare communities widely condemn the use of neuromuscular blocking agents such as pancuronium. Particularly given the popular assumption that execution of humans by lethal injection is no different than “putting an animal to sleep,” the condemnation of the use of curariform drugs in the euthanasia context should give courts pause when assessing the risks of the three-drug formula under the Eighth Amendment. . . The Humane Society mandates a method of euthanasia the primary benefit of which is that it is actually humane. At a time when the public’s trust in the administration of capital punishment in this country appears to be eroding, the states, on the other hand, have clung to a method whose primary benefit is that it looks humane- but that in reality risks the unnecessary infliction of excruciating pain and suffering.

Alper T. Anesthetizing the public conscience: lethal injection and animal euthanasia (The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science). Fordham Urban Law J. 2008;35(4):817-856.

Conscientious Objectors Behind the Counter: Statutory Defenses to Tort Liability for Failure to Dispense Contraceptives

Jennifer E. Spreng

Extract
Conclusion
Pharmacists are already involved in litigation over conscience clauses; it is probably only a matter of time before a woman sues a pharmacist for wrongful conception. Changes in the pharmacy profession and correlative tort duties mean a common law or statutory duty to dispense or sell emergency or daily oral contraceptives is not outside the realm of possibility. Many religious pharmacists have compelling reasons to refuse to sell, but federal Free Exercise protections are currently uncertain. State statutory conscience clauses offer some protection and do not violate the Establishment Clause. Therefore, more states should not hesitate to provide
this protection to all healthcare providers.

Spreng JE. Conscientious Objectors Behind the Counter: Statutory Defenses to Tort Liability for Failure to Dispense Contraceptives. 1 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 337, 337-40 (2008)

(Correspondence) LVADs and the Limits of Autonomy

Jeremy Simon, Ruth Fischbach

Extract
Jeremy Simon’s commentary argues that physicians may decline to deactivate an LVAD even at the request of a capable patient. . . . No doctor may be forced to act against her conscience to end a patient’s life. A physician moved by Simon’s argument would be covered by this doctrine. As for legal precedents, if there have been any cases regarding the removal of destination LVADs, there certainly have not been enough for the case law in this matter to be considered settled. . .

Simon J, Fischbach R. (Correspondence) LVADs and the Limits of Autonomy. Hast Cent Rep. 2008 May-June;5.

Conscientious Commitment

Bernard M Dickens

Extract
Religion has no monopoly on conscience, however. History, both distant and recent, shows how health-care providers and others, driven by conscientious concerns, can defy laws and religious opposition to provide care to vulnerable, dependent populations. They might also defy the medical establishment. Pioneers of the birth control movement were not doctors, and were opposed by medical, state, and religious establishments. As long ago as 1797, Jeremy Bentham advocated means of birth control, and in the following century, John Stuart Mill was briefly imprisoned for distributing birth control handbills. Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant were similarly prosecuted, in 1877, for selling pamphlets about birth control.

Dickens BM. Conscientious Commitment. The Lancet. 2008;371(1240-1241.

(Report) Reproductive Rights in Poland: The Effects of the Anti-Abortion Law

Wanda Nowicka

Extract
This report on the monitoring of reproductive rights in Poland was created in the framework of the project financed by the European Commission and realised by the Federation for Women and Family Planning, entitled Proactive monitoring of women’s reproductive rights as a part of human rights in Poland. The report provides a comprehensive overview of reproductive rights in Poland. It deals with the legal issues involved, and the analysis of the Polish legal regulations on reproductive rights (E. Zielińska) deserves special attention, as well as the review of court cases conducted in Poland and at the European Court of Human Rights regarding the lack of access to termination of pregnancy in Poland (A. Bodnar). The report shows the real effects of the current law and social policy with regard to termination of pregnancy, family planning and sexual education (W. Nowicka). Through the use of qualitative research, the report also presents the attitude of the health service to the issues mentioned above and the role of doctors in restricting access to services connected with reproductive health (A. Domaradzka). Moreover, the report publishes guidelines for Poland from international institutions, which aim to improve the respect for human rights regarding reproductive health issues

Nowicka W, editor. Federation for Women and Family Planning. (Report) Reproductive Rights in Poland: The Effects of the Anti-Abortion Law. 2008 Mar;7-97.

Pharmacists and the “Duty” To Dispense Emergency Contraceptives

Jennifer E Spreng

Abstract
Stories abound of both women with prescriptions turned away at the pharmacy door and members of the most trusted health care profession losing jobs and running afoul of ethics rules. Scholars have spilt much intellectual ink divining whether a pharmacist must dispense Plan B, the primary emergency contraceptive. Now, many are calling for a common law “duty to dispense” that could serve as a foundation for a wrongful pregnancy action against a dissenting pharmacist. Such a duty simply does not arise from established tort principles or pharmacist-specific precedents. Only in rare circumstances will a pharmacist and customer have the type and quality of relationship giving rise to a duty to dispense. Nevertheless, law changes over time and makes allowances for unique circumstances. Pharmacists are taking on more responsibility for drug therapy. They have an awkward role in the distribution of Plan B. Moreover, while the law may protect pharmacists’ consciences, it may not be so receptive to pharmacists-as-activists. Dissenting pharmacists can take practical steps to protect themselves today, but tomorrow is another day.

Spreng JE. Pharmacists and the “Duty” To Dispense Emergency Contraceptives. Issues Law Med. 2008 Spring;23(3):215-277.

Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms

Judith F Daar

Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice

Extract
Conclusion
The constitutional jurisprudence surrounding assisted conception is only beginning to take shape . . . . When conception occurs naturally, both positive and negative rights surrounding procreation are fairly clear, but grow murky as the reproductive process invites third parties to assist. As methods of assisted conception show increasing technological promise for those whose physical characteristics, social status, or both require they look to ART for family formation, worrisome trends suggest that third party actors are quietly mounting status-based barriers to fertility treatment. Barriers to ART are taking shape on the basis of patient characteristics including wealth, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and marital status, all under the guise of preventing harm to offspring and society at large. However, judgments by ART providers and public lawmakers that certain individuals will be unfit parents, veer dangerously close to the coercive eugenics practices of early twentieth century America, practices whose only positive legacy is the extreme caution with which we now approach state-sponsored limitations on reproduction.

Like a pentimento, ART barriers are only beginning to come into view from the experiences of an increasingly diverse and nontraditional reproductive medicine patient population. As each barrier emerges-whether it be a provider refusing treatment to a single or gay or lesbian prospective parent, or a lawmaker attempting to limit the availability of a reproductive technology for reasons unrelated to human health-it is essential to evaluate these actions by the same standards we would evaluate barriers to natural conception. . . . State-sponsored or state-approved limitations on any individual’s right to procreate simply cannot stand in a society that acknowledges the preeminence of reproductive freedom. Justice Douglas’ selfevident observation that reproduction is a basic human right is as durable and universal as the human race-it simply must be nurtured in order to continue to thrive.

Daar JF. Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms. Berkeley J Gender Law Just. 2008 Mar;23(1):18-82.

The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes Over Deeply Divisive Healthcare Procedures

Robin Fretwell Wilson

Extract
Refusals by individual pharmacies and pharmacists to fill prescriptions for emergency contraceptives (“EC”) have dominated news headlines. . .These refusals. . .reflect moral and religious concerns about facilitating an act that would cut-off a potential human life.

Recently, conscience-based refusals have ballooned far beyond EC. Pharmacists are refusing to fill prescriptions for birth control, and other ancillary care professionals are asserting their own conscience concerns.

Conclusion
Ultimately we must decide as a community whether we prize access more highly than religious freedom. The older healthcare conscience clauses offer us a range of methods to manage the clash between competing moral interests. If urgency for the service cannot be achieved through better information, state legislatures could make a number of choices. They could choose not to burden the professional’s choice at all—prizing religious liberty more highly than access. They could force providers to provide every service legally requested—prizing patient access more highly than moral or religious freedom. Or they could choose to allow individuals of conscience to exempt themselves up to the point that it creates a hardship for the patient or employer. In a pluralistic society, a live-and-let-live regime like this may be the most we can hope for.

Wilson RF. The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes Over Deeply Divisive Healthcare Procedures. Am J Law Med. 2008 Mar 01;34(1):41-63.

The Tao of Conscience: Conflict and Resolution (Conscience in Medicine)

Linda MacDonald Glenn, Jeanann Boyce

Extract
The strength of the nondualistic-approach is that it will contribute to “meaningful dialogue about the role of the conscience” which depends on “shared definitions of the relevant terms” (Lawrence and Curlin 2007, 10). This approach of “shared definitions” can also be termed commensurability— when two people who hold incommensurable values can create common ground when one or both changes their values, empathize or agree to disagree and work towards a common goal (Glenn 2003). . . The alternative to seeking commensurability is the enforcement of a law, which is a solution that does not always resolve the underlying issues. The legal system devotes many resources to the resolving of problems, but the result is often “winner-take-all”—without regard to the long-term consequences and impact on the relationship of the parties.

Glenn LM, Boyce J. The Tao of Conscience: Conflict and Resolution (Conscience in Medicine). Am J Bioeth. 2007;7(12):33.