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George J Annas, Theodore W Ruger, Jennifer Prah Ruger
New England Journal of Medicine
Extract Our incremental, fragmented, and incomplete health insurance system means that different Americans have different access to health care on the basis of their income, employment status, age, and sex. The decision in Hobby Lobby unravels only one more thread, perhaps, but it tugs on a quilt that is already inequitable and uneven. A central goal of the ACA was to repair some of this incremental fragmentation by universalizing certain basic health care entitlements. In ruling in favor of idiosyncratic religious claims over such universality, the Court has once again expressed its disagreement with this foundational health-policy goal.
Extract Religious groups, doctor’s organizations, ethicists and abortion rights advocates are raising concerns around the review of an Ontario policy that outlines, among other things, physicians’ right to object to patients’ requests for services on moral grounds.
The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario’s Physicians and Ontario Human Rights Code is up for its five-year review, with both public and expert opinion being sought. . .
An Interview With a Doctor Involved in the Early Development of Both and Two of His Successors
Jan L. Bernheim, Wim Distelmans, Arsène Mullie, Michael A. Ashby
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
Abstract This article analyses domestic and foreign reactions to a 2008 report in the British Medical Journal on the complementary and, as argued, synergistic relationship between palliative care and euthanasia in Belgium. The earliest initiators of palliative care in Belgium in the late 1970s held the view that access to proper palliative care was a precondition for euthanasia to be acceptable and that euthanasia and palliative care could, and should, develop together. Advocates of euthanasia including author Jan Bernheim, independent from but together with British expatriates, were among the founders of what was probably the first palliative care service in Europe outside of the United Kingdom. In what has become known as the Belgian model of integral end-of-life care, euthanasia is an available option, also at the end of a palliative care pathway. This approach became the majority view among the wider Belgian public, palliative care workers, other health professionals, and legislators. The legal regulation of euthanasia in 2002 was preceded and followed by a considerable expansion of palliative care services. It is argued that this synergistic development was made possible by public confidence in the health care system and widespread progressive social attitudes that gave rise to a high level of community support for both palliative care and euthanasia. The Belgian model of so-called integral end-of-life care is continuing to evolve, with constant scrutiny of practice and improvements to procedures. It still exhibits several imperfections, for which some solutions are being developed. This article analyses this model by way of answers to a series of questions posed by Journal of Bioethical Inquiry consulting editor Michael Ashby to the Belgian authors.
I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Gregory D. Curfman
New England Journal of Medicine
Extract At the tail end of this year’s Supreme Court term, religious freedom came into sharp conflict with the government’s interest in providing affordable access to health care. In a consolidated opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell (collectively known as Hobby Lobby) delivered on June 30, the Court sided with religious freedom, highlighting the limitations of our employment-based health insurance system.
Hobby Lobby centered on the contraceptives-coverage mandate, which derived from the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate that many employers offer insurance coverage of certain “essential” health benefits, including coverage of “preventive” services without patient copayments or deductibles.
Abstract Criminalisation of prostitution, and minority rights for disabled persons, are important contemporary political issues. The article examines their intersection by analysing the conditions and arguments for making a legal exception for disabled persons to a general prohibition against purchasing sexual services. It explores the badness of prostitution, focusing on and discussing the argument that prostitution harms prostitutes, considers forms of regulation and the arguments for and against with emphasis on a liberty-based objection to prohibition, and finally presents and analyses three arguments for a legal exception, based on sexual rights, beneficence, and luck egalitarianism, respectively. It concludes that although the general case for and against criminalisation is complicated there is a good case for a legal exception.
Abstract The publicity surrounding the recent McMath and Muñoz cases has rekindled public interest in brain death: the familiar term for human death determination by showing the irreversible cessation of clinical brain functions. The concept of brain death was developed decades ago to permit withdrawal of therapy in hopeless cases and to permit organ donation. It has become widely established medical practice, and laws permit it in all U.S. jurisdictions. Brain death has a biophilosophical justification as a standard for determining human death but remains poorly understood by the public and by health professionals. The current controversies over brain death are largely restricted to the academy, but some practitioners express ambivalence over whether brain death is equivalent to human death. Brain death remains an accepted and sound concept, but more work is necessary to establish its biophilosophical justification and to educate health professionals and the public.
Bernat JL. Whither Brain Death? The American Journal of Bioethics, 14:8, 3-8, (2014) DOI:10.1080/15265161.2014.925153
Abstract We seek to change the conversation about brain death by highlighting the distinction between brain death as a biological concept versus brain death as a legal status. The fact that brain death does not cohere with any biologically plausible definition of death has been known for decades. Nevertheless, this fact has not threatened the acceptance of brain death as a legal status that permits individuals to be treated as if they are dead. The similarities between “legally dead” and “legally blind” demonstrate how we may legitimately choose bright-line legal definitions that do not cohere with biological reality. Not only does this distinction bring conceptual coherence to the conversation about brain death, but it has practical implications as well. Once brain death is recognized as a social construction not grounded in biological reality, we create the possibility of changing the social construction in ways that may better serve both organ donors and recipients alike.
Abstract This article discusses the moral objection to the efficient breach theory, specifically the objection that it is not based upon a moral obligation to perform a contract. The efficient breach theory endorses the immoral behaviour of breaching a promise whenever the consequences of breach are considered to be superior (in the sense that they are more efficient or better) to those of performance. It considers that contracts (namely, those promises in which legal rules and institutions are involved) are simply vehicles for achieving economic efficiency. The efficient breach theory has been challenged by a number of critics. It is the idea underlying promissory obligations that a promise excludes or ignores the ordinary grounds – for example, utilitarian grounds – that a promisor may bear in mind and consider in the course of making the decision about whether they should perform the promise. This characteristic of promises can be explained by saying that a promise creates an exclusionary reason for action. This article also addresses two crucial questions. First, why do promises create exclusionary reasons for action in the first place? Without answering this question, it would be difficult to argue that promises should be understood differently from the way the efficient breach theory understands them. Second, how do we decide when breaching a promise is or is not immoral? This question is significant because without such knowledge, it would be difficult to argue that the efficient breach theory endorses the immoral behaviour of promise-breaking once a better opportunity presents itself.
Extract If capital punishment is constitutional, as it has long been held to be, then it “necessarily follows that there must be a means of carrying it out.”1 So the Supreme Court concluded in Baze v. Rees, a 2008 challenge to Kentucky’s lethal-injection protocol . . .
Lethal injection, the primary execution method used in all death-penalty states, was adopted precisely because its sanitized, quasi-clinical procedures were intended to ensure humane deaths consistent with the Eighth Amendment. But experiences like Clayton Lockett’s . . .demonstrate the dearth of safeguards for ensuring that this goal is actually achieved. . . Nevertheless, states have demonstrated their willingness to continue with lethal injections, and most federal courts have allowed executions to proceed in the face of constitutional challenges. The time is therefore ripe for the medical and scientific communities to consider, once again, their role in this process.
Kenneth Chambaere, Ilse Loodts, Luc Deliens, Joachim Cohen
Journal of Medical Ethics
Abstract OBJECTIVES: To examine the frequency and characteristics of decisions to forgo artificial nutrition and/or hydration (ANH) at the end of life. DESIGN: Postal questionnaire survey regarding end-of-life decisions (including ANH) to physicians certifying a large representative sample (n=6927) of Belgian death certificates in 2007.
SETTING: Flanders, Belgium, 2007.
PARTICIPANTS: Treating physicians of deceased patients.
RESULTS: Response rate was 58.4%. A decision to forgo ANH occurred in 6.6% of all deaths (4.2% withheld,3.0% withdrawn). Being female, dying in a care home or hospital and suffering from nervous system diseases(including dementia) or malignancies were the most important patient-related factors positively associated with a decision to forgo ANH. Physicians indicated that the decision to forgo ANH had had some life-shortening effects in 77% of cases. There had been no consultation with the patient in 81%, mostly due to incapacity (coma or dementia). The family, colleague physicians and nurses were involved in decision making in 76%,41% and 62%, respectively.
CONCLUSIONS: A substantial number of deaths are preceded by a decision to forgo ANH in Belgium. These decisions, ethically laden and involving a considerable chance of life shortening, are mostly not preceded by discussion with the patient despite existing patient rights legislation. It is recommended that physicians and patients and their families alike dedicate ample time to the discussion of treatment options and communication about the possibility of forgoing ANH and that this discussion takes place earlier as part of overall end-of life care planning rather than at the very end of life..
