Extract Rajendra Kale. . .advocates for physician regulatory agencies to undertake a recommendation to ban the disclosure of the sex of a fetus before 30 weeks gestation. This advocacy is misguided at best and dangerous at worst. . . . Blaming women for the scourge of gender-based violence is also not a solution. This is why limiting access to abortion based on this specific reason is dangerous health policy. Does this mean that some women will decide to abort female fetuses preferentially? Sadly, yes.
Extract I referred to a 2010 study in which Asians were defined, for the purposes of that study, as “people from India, China, Korea, Vietnam and Philippines.”3 I did not intend to suggest that . . . evidence of sex selection, disparity of infant sex. . . applied to all those groups; indeed, the results were varied. I apologize for the ambiguity.
Extract Forces worldwide are leading to greater intermingling of cultures with different perspectives on status of women, and it is unlikely that sex-selective abortions can be reduced without conscious efforts to raise awareness of gender equality at all levels of society.
Extract Jürgen Habermas’s recent observations regarding the increasing gulf between traditional religions and contemporary secularism is correct (2002, 2008). The dominant bioethical and political ideologies of the contemporary Western world have come to be not merely secular but often passionately atheistic. Throughout Western Europe and North America, for example, there is a growing movement to undermine the salience of religious discourse, to undue its influence in the public forum, and to erase religion from the public space. Attempts to frame all of medicine within a completely secular morality, relegating religious belief and practice to the realm of private personal choice, have become ever more prominent. Here, one need only consider the current clash between the US Roman Catholic bishops and President Obama’s administration over whether Catholic employers, such as Catholic hospital systems, ought to be legally required to provide insurance coverage for artificial contraception, including abortifacients, in their employer sponsored health care plan.1 In law and public policy, there has been a profound rupture from Traditional Christianity, which secular proponents aggressively seek to place in the distant past, as if Christianity had been an unfortunate, perhaps immoral, accident of history. Habermas’s acknowledgment of the vast divide between traditional religions that approach the world and moral analysis with knowledge of a God Who commands, and secular worldviews that begin all epistemic and normative analysis with the prior assumption that God does not exist, elucidates the fundamental debates of contemporary bioethics.
Abstract Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus’ health. By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled.
Abstract What makes an act of killing morally wrong is not that the act causes loss of life or consciousness but rather that the act causes loss of all remaining abilities. This account implies that it is not even pro tanto morally wrong to kill patients who are universally and irreversibly disabled, because they have no abilities to lose. Applied to vital organ transplantation, this account undermines the dead donor rule and shows how current practices are compatible with morality.
Abstract “Access” is the new catchphrase for expanding privacy rights. This shift moves from seeking merely legalization, to demanding government assistance and the participation of private citizens. . . . This article will begin by examining the chief access arguments being used against conscience protections today: that the health professionals hold a monopoly so they are bound to offer abortion, that health professionals must defer their pro-life consciences to abortion’s legal status, and that health professionals must not impose their pro-life views. The article will conclude that, if access principles really flowed from a neutral concern for patient choices, they would require rather than strike down conscience protections. In many cases patients desire in their physicians the traditional Hippocratic values that unequivocally support human life and therefore oppose participating in activities such as abortion. The right of patients to access such physicians can only exist by guaranteeing the right of physicians to practice according to those values.
Extract When Asians migrated to Western countries they brought welcome recipes for curries and dim sum. Sadly, a few of them also imported their preference for having sons and aborting daughters. Female feticide happens in India and China by the millions, but it also happens in North America in numbers large enough to distort the male to female ratio in some ethnic groups.1–4 Should female feticide in Canada be ignored because it is a small problem localized to minority ethnic groups?
Extract Easy access to abortion and advances in prenatal sex determination have combined to make Canada a haven for parents who would terminate female fetuses in favour of having sons, despite overwhelming censure of the practice, economists and bioethics experts say.
Arguing that Canadian lawmakers’ silence on the issue is undermining the status of women, they’re calling for federal legislation to uphold societal and professional values opposing sex-selective abortion, either through a direct ban or restrictions on the disclosure of fetal gender. They also contend that sex-selective abortion is forcing physicians to compromise between their ethical obligations to discourage sex selection and legal obligations to respect their patients’ autonomy. . .
Extract “Do doctors have the right to refuse certain treatments on the grounds of personal conscience?” Is the question asking about Conway’s point about what the doctor sincerely, on medical grounds, considers to be in the patient’s best interests, or is the question asking about a doctor’s refusal to attend to a patient on the basis of some irrational prejudice? Horses of quite different colours — racing in different races.
