Abortion Archives - Page 3 of 51 - Protection of Conscience Project Library

Conscientious objection to participation in abortion by midwives and nurses: a systematic review of reasons

Valerie Fleming Lucy Frith, Ans Luyben, Beate Ramsayer

Abstract
Background: Freedom of conscience is a core element of human rights respected by most European countries. It allows abortion through the inclusion of a conscience clause, which permits opting out of providing such services. However, the grounds for invoking conscientious objection lack clarity. Our aim in this paper is to take a step in this direction by carrying out a systematic review of reasons by midwives and nurses for declining, on conscience grounds, to participate in abortion.

Method: We conducted a systematic review of ethical arguments asking, “What reasons have been reported in the argument based literature for or against conscientious objection to abortion provision by nurses or midwives?” We particularly wanted to identify any discussion of the responsibilities of midwives and nurses in this area. Search terms were conscientious objection and abortion or termination and nurse or midwife or midwives or physicians or doctors or medics within the dates 2000–2016 on: HEIN legal, Medline, CINAHL, Psychinfo, Academic Search Complete, Web of Science including publications in English, German and Dutch. Final articles were subjected to a rigorous analysis, coding and classifying each line into reason mentions, narrow and broad reasons for or against conscientious objection.

Results: Of an initial 1085 articles, 10 were included. We identified 23 broad reasons, containing 116narrow reasons and 269 reason mentions. Eighty one (81) narrow reasons argued in favour of and 35 against conscientious objection. Using predetermined categories of moral, practical, religious or legal reasons, “moral reasons” contained the largest number of narrow reasons (n = 58). The reasons and their associated mentions in this category outnumber those in the sum of the other three categories.

Conclusions: We identified no absolute argument either for or against conscientious objection by midwives or nurses. An invisibility of midwives and nurses exists in the whole debate concerning conscientious objection reflecting a gap between literature and practice, as it is they whom WHO recommend as providers of this service. While the arguments in the literature emphasize the need for provision of conscientious objection, a balanced debate is necessary in this field, which includes all relevant health professionals.

Fleming V, Frith L, Luyben A, Ramsayer B. Conscientious objection to participation in abortion by midwives and nurses: a systematic review of reasons. BMC Medical Ethics. 2018;19:31. doi:10.1186/s12910-018-0268-3.

Testing conscientious objection by the norm of medicine

Toni C. Saad, Gregory Jackson

Abstract
Debate persists over the place of conscience in medicine. Some argue for the complete exclusion of conscientious objection, while others claim an absolute right of refusal. This paper proposes that claims of conscientious objection can and should be permitted if they concern kinds of actions which fall outside of the normative standard of medicine, which is the pursuit of health. Medical practice which meets this criterion we call medicine qua medicine. If conscientious refusal concerns something consonant with the health-restoring aims of medicine, it entails a desertion of professional duty. If, however, it relates to something other than medicine qua medicine, it can rightly be refused. It thus becomes possible to test instances of conscientious objection to determine their validity, and thereby conserve both the principle of conscientious objection and define its scope. This test of conscience prevents arbitrary discrimination, and preserves doctors’ agency. It is a theoretical razor rooted in the practical reasoning of medicine whose operation will prompt, if nothing else, reflection on the goals of medicine.

Saad TC, Jackson G. Testing conscientious objection by the norm of medicine. Clinical Ethics 2018 Mar; 13(1); 9-16.

Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake:The Birth of the Medical Profession

Thomas A Cavanaugh

Thomas A. Cavanagh. Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake:The Birth of the Medical Profession. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 177 pp.

Publisher’s Description
T. A. Cavanaugh’s Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake: The Birth of the Medical Profession articulates the Oath as establishing the medical profession’s unique internal medical ethic – in its most basic and least controvertible form, this ethic mandates that physicians help and not harm the sick. Relying on Greek myth, drama, and medical experience (e.g., homeopathy), the book shows how this medical ethic arose from reflection on the most vexing medical-ethical problem – injury caused by a physician – and argues that deliberate iatrogenic harm, especially the harm of a doctor choosing to kill (physician assisted suicide, euthanasia, abortion, and involvement in capital punishment), amounts to an abandonment of medicine as an exclusively therapeutic profession. The book argues that medicine as a profession necessarily involves stating before others what one stands for: the good one seeks and the bad one seeks to avoid on behalf of the sick, and rejects the view that medicine is purely a technique lacking its own unique internal ethic. It concludes noting that medical promising (as found in the White Coat Ceremony through which U. S. medical students matriculate) implicates medical autonomy which in turn merits respect, including honoring professional conscientious objections.

Autonomy in Tension: Reproduction, Technology, and Justice

Louise P King, Rachel L Zacharias, Josephine Johnston

Abstract
Respect for autonomy is a central value in reproductive ethics, but it can be a challenge to fulfill and is sometimes an outright puzzle to understand. If a woman requests the transfer of two, three, or four embryos during fertility treatment, is that request truly autonomous, and do clinicians disrespect her if they question that decision or refuse to carry it out? Add a commitment to justice to the mix, and the challenge can become more complex still. Is it unfair for insurance policies to exclude from coverage the costs of giving fertility to those who lack it or restoring fertility in those who have lost it? What does “just reproduction” look like in the face of multifarious understandings of both justice and autonomy and in light of increasingly complex and costly reproductive technologies? In today’s dialogue about reproduction, medicine, and ethics in the United States, old ethical issues—such as whether women ought to be allowed to access pregnancy termination—are more contested than they have been in decades, while new technologies—like those used to edit the genes of human embryos—suggest that our species could face unprecedented questions about who should exist. As we considered the discussions accompanying these issues and contemplated a special report responding to them, we found ourselves consistently circling back to two ethical commitments: respect for autonomy and the pursuit of justice. As one of the nine essays in this collection asks, why should certain women receive help to establish a pregnancy while others are thrown in jail when they miscarry or their child is stillborn? Respect for autonomy is required where individuals have the ability to make fully informed and voluntary choices. Yet does respecting autonomy require acceding to all the choices of patients or consumers of medical care? We consider these and related questions in this special report from the Hastings Center Report..

King LP, Zacharias RL, Johnston J. Autonomy in Tension: Reproduction, Technology, and Justice. Hastings Cent Rep. 2017 Nov 24;47:S3.

There is no defence for ‘Conscientious objection’ in reproductive health care

Christian Fiala, Joyce H. Arthur

European Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology

Abstract
A widespread assumption has taken hold in the field of medicine that we must allow health care professionals the right to refuse treatment under the guise of ‘conscientious objection’ (CO), in particular for women seeking abortions. At the same time, it is widely recognized that the refusal to treat creates harm and barriers for patients receiving reproductive health care. In response, many recommendations have been put forward as solutions to limit those harms. Further, some researchers make a distinction between true CO and ‘obstructionist CO’, based on the motivations or actions of various objectors. This paper argues that ‘CO’ in reproductive health care should not be considered a right, but an unethical refusal to treat. Supporters of CO have no real defence of their stance, other than the mistaken assumption that CO in reproductive health care is the same as CO in the military, when the two have nothing in common (for example, objecting doctors are rarely disciplined, while the patient pays the price). Refusals to treat are based on non-verifiable personal beliefs, usually religious beliefs, but introducing religion into medicine undermines best practices that depend on scientific evidence and medical ethics. CO therefore represents an abandonment of professional obligations to patients. Countries should strive to reduce the number of objectors in reproductive health care as much as possible until CO can feasibly be prohibited. Several Scandinavian countries already have a successful ban on CO.

Fiala C, Arthur JH. Eur J Obstet Gynecol Reprod Biol. 2017 Jul 23. pii: S0301-2115(17)30357-3. doi: 10.1016/j.ejogrb.2017.07.023. [Epub ahead of print]

The Conscience of the Pharmacist

John J Conley

Proceedings of the Sixteenth University Faculty for Life Conference — Proceedings of the University Faculty for Life

Abstract
Recent legal efforts to force pharmacists to distribute potentially abortifacient drugs constitute a violation of conscience. This campaign of coercion violates religious freedom, professional deontology, and the right to refuse even material cooperation in acts of grave evil.

Conley JJ. The Conscience of the Pharmacist. In: Koterski JW editors. Proceedings of the UFL Life and Learning Conference XVII. 2007;431-437.

Abortion decriminalisation and statutory rights of conscience

Mary Neal

Extract
On 13 March 2017, the House of Commons voted by 172 to 142 in favour of a second reading for the Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Bill. The bill, introduced by Diana Johnson MP, would decriminalise abortion until the end of the 24th week of pregnancy, meaning that abortion could be performed until the end of the 24th week of pregnancy without the need to satisfy any statutory grounds, or to obtain two doctors’ authorisation. Many campaigners see this bill as a first step toward the longer-term goal of fully decriminalising abortion. [1]

The prospect of decriminalisation raises a number of interesting and important issues, including an issue which has been neglected in the debates over decriminalisation so far, namely what any change in the law might mean for the right of health professionals to withdraw from participation in abortion on grounds of conscience, under section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967. . . .

Neal M. Abortion decriminalisation and statutory rights of conscience. the bmjopinion [Internet]. 2017 Mar 24.

“She’s on her own”: a thematic analysis of clinicians’ comments on abortion referral

Nazeneen Homaifar, Lori Freedman,Valerie French

Abstract
Objective: The objective was to understand the motivations around and practices of abortion referral among women’s health providers.

Methods: We analyzed the written comments from a survey of Nebraska physicians and advanced-practice clinicians in family medicine and obstetrics-gynecology about their referral practices and opinions for a woman seeking an abortion. We analyzed clinician’s responses to open-ended questions on abortion referral thematically.

Results: Of the 496 completed surveys, 431 had comments available for analysis. We found four approaches to abortion referral: (a) facilitating a transfer of care, (b) providing the abortion clinic name or phone number, (c) no referral and (4) misleading referrals to clinicians or facilities that do not provide abortion care. Clinicians described many motivations for their manner of referral, including a fiduciary obligation to refer, empathy for the patient, respect for patient autonomy and the lack of need for referral. We found that abortion stigma impacts referral as clinicians explained that patients often desire additional privacy and clinicians themselves seek to avoid tension among their staff. Other clinicians would not provide an abortion referral, citing moral or religious objections or stating they did not know where to refer women seeking abortion. Some respondents would refer women to other providers for additional evaluation or counseling before an abortion, while others sought to dissuade the woman from obtaining an abortion.

Conclusions: While practices and motivations varied, few clinicians facilitated referral for abortion beyond verbally naming a clinic if an abortion referral was made at all.

Implications: Interprofessional leadership, enhanced clinician training and public policy that addresses conscientious refusal of abortion referral are needed to reduce abortion stigma and ensure that women can access safe care.

Homaifar N, Freedman L,French V. “She’s on her own”: a thematic analysis of clinicians’ comments on abortion referral. Contraception. 2017 May;95(5):470-476. doi: 10.1016/j.contraception.2017.01.007. Epub 2017 Jan 25.

Objection to conscience. An argument against conscience exemptions in healthcare

Alberto Giubilini

Abstract
I argue that appeals to conscience do not constitute reasons for granting healthcare professionals exemptions from providing services they consider immoral (e.g. abortion). My argument is based on a comparison between a type of objection that many people think should be granted, i.e. to abortion, and one that most people think should not be granted, i.e. to antibiotics. I argue that there is no principled reason in favour of conscientious objection qua conscientious that allows to treat these two cases differently. Therefore, I conclude that there is no principled reason for granting conscientious objection qua conscientious in healthcare. What matters for the purpose of justifying exemptions is not whether an objection is ‘conscientious’, but whether it is based on the principles and values informing the profession. I provide examples of acceptable forms of objection in healthcare.

Giubilini A. Objection to conscience. An argument against conscience exemptions in healthcare. Bioethics. 2016;31(5):400-408.

Doctors Have no Right to Refuse Medical Assistance in Dying, Abortion or Contraception

Julian Savulescu, Udo Schuklenk

Abstract
In an article in this journal, Christopher Cowley argues that we have ‘misunderstood the special nature of medicine, and have misunderstood the motivations of the conscientious objectors’. We have not. It is Cowley who has misunderstood the role of personal values in the profession of medicine. We argue that there should be better protections for patients from doctors’ personal values and there should be more severe restrictions on the right to conscientious objection, particularly in relation to assisted dying. We argue that eligible patients could be guaranteed access to medical services that are subject to conscientious objections by: (1) removing a right to conscientious objection; (2) selecting candidates into relevant medical specialities or general practice who do not have objections; (3) demonopolizing the provision of these services away from the medical profession.

Savulescu J, Schuklenk U. (2016) Doctors Have no Right to Refuse Medical Assistance in Dying, Abortion or Contraception. Bioethics. doi:10.1111/bioe.12288