Extract This article considers the problem of line-drawing between autonomy-preserving and autonomy-negating influence in clinical relationships. The author’s purpose is not to propose particular boundaries, either with respect to reproductive decisions by HIV-infected women or for other clinical choices. Rather, he attempts to shed some light on what drives our disputes about whether one or another influence method is compatible with autonomous choice. The author argues that such disagreements reflect underlying conflicts between normative commitments, and that resolving these conflicts is essential to settling controversies over whether particular influences unduly interfere with autonomous choice.
Abstract I propose that a woman who becomes pregnant with the intent to abort will be treated as an initial aggressor, and as such she will be denied the “abortion exception” that will be granted to the woman who aborts an accidental, unwanted pregnancy. Moreover, I shall argue that a woman should not be allowed to designate the donee of the fetal tissue from her abortion, even though her pregnancy was accidental. Without this restriction, a woman who intends to become pregnant and abort may simply claim her pregnancy was accidental, and thereby claim the exception. Central to this study is the question of fetal worth, and the value to be ascribed to beings not like us, that is, not like human beings who have been born. Although I argue for a moral justification of elective abortions, I intend to show that such a justification should be a narrowly drawn exception to the prima facie duties neither to harm nor to instrumentalize others. I shall also argue that prohibiting a woman from becoming pregnant in order to abort is necessary because such a situation does not fall within the narrow exception for elective abortions, and that such a restriction is crucial to preserving our respect for those with no voice. Finally, I shall argue that the prohibition against becoming pregnant with the intent to abort does not vitiate a woman’s right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. Rather, this restriction is a necessary condition of the prima facie duties of nonmaleficence and non-insturmentalization.
Extract these Bills (one in the House of Representatives and a less wild version in the Senate) are unnecessary and deceptive. . . .The Bills would allow residents and programmes to abstain from abortions on any grounds, not just religious or moral. . . .So what is their objective? It is the de facto ending of abortion in the USA. By allowing more residents and more programmes to opt out of abortion training, safe termination of pregnancy in America will become even more difficult to obtain. Already, the number of competently trained graduates has fallen dramatically. Access to doctors and clinics has shrunk, and too many American women wanting an abortion already face a long and sometimes dangerous search for help. This is an attack on women’s choices and an interference in medical education. If it passes Congress, President Clinton should veto it immediately.
Extract It is this author’s position that the concerns of the selective conscientious objector ought to be legally recognized, not because an exemption is granted to the pacifist, but because it is the right thing to do in a democratic society that is respectful of its members’ religious commitments. This is not proposed as yet another right to add to the ever-growing list of individual rights in our society. The point of this essay is not to argue implicitly in defense of liberalism by arguing explicitly for a right deriving therefrom. Rather, it is proposed that the recognition of selective conscientious objection is necessary due to the presence of two existent legal concepts: the free exercise of religion, already extended to pacifists, and the right to confessional neutrality. “Compelling state interests” simply do not, in point of fact, override confessional neutrality. The government’s arguments about the feasibility of determining sincere selective objectors, about the drain of manpower that it claims would occur, and that the selective objector is merely a “political” dissenter and as such should not be granted this privilege, are not convincing.
Extract In this article, we describe the pharmacist’s potential involvement in what has been referred to as “physician assisted suicide”. We suggest that when a physician prescribes a medication for the purpose of terminating a patient’s life, and when that prescription is presented to a pharmacist for filling, a moral dilemma may exist. The basis of the dilemma is the choice a pharmacist may be required to make between the duty to fill a legal prescription for a medication that is deemed appropriate by both the prescriber and the patient, and the duty to adhere to one’s own belief that medication should not be used to end life. We contend that in filling a prescription, especially given the recent advances in pharmacy practice, a pharmacist is no mere bystander in drug therapy. Rather, the pharmacist is an active participant whose values, attitudes, and beliefs should be given consideration.
Abstract Debates regarding the development of new reproductive technologies (NRTs), funding for infertility treatments, and non-medical criteria for access to infertility treatments frequently invoke “rights to reproduce” or “procreative rights”. The claim of this right – literally the right to have children – is not the same thing as many other “reproductive rights” that are invoked in contraception, abortion, and pregnancy management discussions.
The author argues that the claim of a right to bear or beget children, which may in turn support research into NRTs and then funding and access claims, is not justified. Framing procreative decisions in terms of rights claims is a problematic ethical project, which in turn creates difficulties for the establishment of legal procreative rights. There are two critical problems: first, the distinction between positive (entitlement) and negative (liberty) rights claims leaves those requiring reproductive assistance in need of a different justification for their claims than those who need no help; second, a procreative right is generally claimed to be limited by the rights or interests of the future children, but a right of non-conception is an intemally contradictory concept.
The author then discusses variations of procreative rights claims, including claims of rights to enter reproductive contracts or to seek assistance, and other conceptual foundations for reproductive decisions. Thus, while reproductive rights are often helpful in protecting individuals and families from undue governmental intrusion, rights are shown to be a problematic, inadequate, and inappropriate framework to describe both the legal and moral status of claims for assisted procreation.
Abstract The deaths last September of a British Columbia physician and his wife have raised troubling questions about euthanasia and Alzheimer’s disease. Police described the deaths of Dr. Tom Powell and his wife Dr. Lorraine Miles, a retired dentist, as a murder-suicide. Friends of the couple wonder if more lenient laws concerning euthanasia and assisted suicide might have saved Miles’ life.
Extract The ethical principles of care have to balance patient autonomy or control with the justice owed to society as a whole. Our choices do not take place in a purely individual setting and the change in society’s attitude when a hastened death is available is illustrated by the changes that are taking place in the Netherlands.
Extract Proposals to legalize assisted suicide challenge hospice’s identity and integrity. In the wake of Measure 16, Oregon hospice programs must develop practical policies to balance traditional commitments not to hasten death and not to abandon patients with dying patients’ legal right to request lethal prescriptions. . . . . .
Regardless of the path an individual hospice may follow,-it cannot avoid the uncharted and unknown territory of a law that legalizes a lethal prescription and a scheduled death for some terminally ill patients. Whether a hospice forges a path through the middle of this territory through full participation, skirts along its borders by forms of indirect participation, or creates a detour through abstention and nonparticipation, the nature and mission of hospice in Oregon will be irreversibly altered.
Extract I too was dismayed and deeply concerned about the attack against Dr. Romalis. None the less, I must comment on Marshall and colleagues’ statement that “we abhor the use of violence in ethical debates.” These students must realize that therapeutic abortion is the only legalized medical procedure in which another human life is taken. . . Certainly the medical community should oppose violence against physicians practising in this area. Even if this perpetrator, or convicted US murderer Paul Hill, was exercising a difficult personal choice in targeting a physician who performs abortion, a violent act against a physician remains as abhorrent as abortion itself.
