Protection of Conscience Project Library
Service, not Servitude
Extract
The question he must answer is, If the fetus is a human being (which indeed he or she is), what should he do? If a woman came in telling him that she was going to kill her 2-day-old baby, would he sit back not wanting to play “godlet”?
Shamess BA. (Correspondence) Abortion and the DPG ratio. Can Med Assoc J. 1991 Feb 01;144(3):277.
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Like it or not, physicians are going to be reading a lot about euthanasia in the next few years. . . . Many physicians are more or less comfortable with the idea of withholding or withdrawing “medically useless” treatment. In other words, they accept passive euthanasia. . . . .If the medical profession thinks a physician might become responsible for a patient’s death through inaction, but without automatically bearing moral guilt, why does it insist that a physician who becomes responsible for the death of a patient through action automatically becomes morally guilty? . . . Medical ethics should never be decided by consensus or because of what is politically expedient. . .I am not making a plea for active euthanasia. I am suggesting that Canadian physicians should look at this issue honestly and openly.
Kluge E-H. Euthanasia and related taboos. Can Med Assoc J. 1991 Feb 01;144(3):359-360.
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Can Christians accept martyrdom on the one hand and reject euthanasia on the other? What makes one form of killing acceptable, the other reprehensible? What judgements are to be made, for example, if, during childbirth, a choice must be made between saving the life of the child or the life of the mother? How do we decide whose life is more important and, therefore, whose life must be saved? Who has the most to lose or the most to gain? What is fair? And who makes that decision?
Battagin MG. Giving death a helping hand. Can Med Assoc J. 1991;144(3):358-359.
Extract
The facts Beck presents are frequently flawed and perverted to secure the impression he seeks to convey. For example, the effects of rubella during pregnancy were not “newly demonstrated” in 1967 but had been known for a quarter of a century. . . Beck’s distinction between abortion on the grounds of genetic abnormality and abortion carried out because the pregnancy is unwelcome appears to imply acceptance of the latter and puts him in a curious position. . . Beck attempts to discredit amniocentesis by quoting rare single case reports of damage presumed to be due to needle puncture, none of which were reported in the past 8 years and most of which occurred before the general use of real-time ultrasound monitoring. . . . Beck maintains that physicians should not be involved in prenatal screening for genetic anomalies or in the termination of a pregnancy involving a fetus with an abnormality of this type. . . Concomitantly, Beck apparently approves of the killing of normal fetuses in iatrogenically engineered multiple pregnancy.
Welch JP. (Correspondence) Eugenic abortion: an ethical critique. Can Med Assoc J. 1991 Jan 01;144(1):8-9.
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I wished to avoid discussion of abortion in unplanned and unwanted pregnancies in order to bring some sharpness of focus to my paper. The conclusion that I favour early abortion for trivial reasons is decidedly mistaken. . . . I agree with Welch that not advising patients about amniocentesis renders physicians culpable in law. This is, as my paper suggests, a highly undesirable but predictable result of genetic abortion. I therefore strongly urge all physicians and the CMA to rescind their approval of these destructive procedures, which have nothing whatsoever to do with the traditional role of medicine. . . I sincerely hope, however, that we never accept the philosophic position that “there are no right and wrong decisions.” To do so would be to disassociate ourselves from the historical, philosophic and moral stance of our profession. . . . The practice of selective feticide involves the destruction (one could more accurately say murder) of the fetus to assuage the distressed and anguished response of the mother and father (and society) to the birth of a handicapped child. If this is not a eugenic procedure, then the word has lost all meaning. . . .
Beck MN. (Correspondence) Eugenic abortion: an ethical critique. Can Med Assoc J. 1991;144(1):12-13.
Extract
Some people, however, would argue that an early human being does not become a “person” till sometime after birth, and others would argue that this time has arrived when fetal brain waves are recordable (about 6 weeks). Obviously, any point along the way, including the 23-week mark, is arbitrary and depends on each person’s perspective. . . surely it is not just or scientific to choose some arbitrary time.
Coffey PG. (Correspondence) The fetus as a person. Can Med Assoc J. 1990 Dec 01;143(11):1156.
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“You’re an interferer, not an adviser; like the rest of your ingenuous ilk.” . . . “You have no humility. You underestimate your patients. You assume they don’t know anything, that they just react to circumstances.”. . . He shook his neck and preened his feathers as he delivered the coup de grace. “Let me tell you: that’s what you do because you don’t like what they’re up to.” . . . “Give ’em credit for being able to run their own affairs, you paternalistic autocrat!” . . . “We live in a social democracy now” . . . “Stick to medicine (it’s hard enough for you to get that right). Leave morals for moralists. Too many cooks have spoiled that broth already.”
Bart J. (Correspondence) Abortion and the DPG ratio (Dr. Bart responds). Can Med Assoc J. 1990;143(9):832.
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He explains that advising a patient how to proceed morally (as in the matter of abortion) is playing God. . . Instead, we should refuse to play God: we should let the patient make her own decision and take the responsibility for herself. I cannot agree with Bart, at least not as far as Christian god- lore goes. As I recall, God gave man free choice, so that he could make his own decisions and take the responsibility for himself. Therefore, if we doctors do not wish to play God, we should be advising our patients how to proceed. In fact, we normally do advise our patients how to proceed,whether there be one suitable option or many. We also advise strongly against unsuitable options. Indeed, if a patient informs us that she intends to inflict bodily harm on anyone, we not only advise her not to do it but may even commit her to keep her from doing it. The sad exception, of course, is when a patient informs us that she intends to inflict bodily harm on her own baby in utero. In this case Bart would have it that we should dispassionately accept the patient’s decision. If killing on request isn’t playing God, then what is?
Arsenault G. (Correspondence) Abortion and the DPG ratio. Can Med Assoc J. 1990;143(9):829-832.
Extract
These two letters, one so clear, the other so impassioned, seem to have the right of it; so too do the arguments of their opponents when I read them. Therein lies the rub: everyone is right, according to his lights. The question for the rest of us is, How bright are these lights? I for one do not know. . . .”In a world where everyone is right, nothing is left but personal responsibility. That will take you down the straight and narrow road to whatever you and yours deserve. That is the true meaning of PR. I wish we all did just that, good PR, instead of living each others’ lives, which is where all the trouble comes from.” . . . “You mind your business, I’ll mind mine; then everyone will have an easier time.”.
Bart J. (Correspondence) Abortion and the DPG ratio (Dr. Bart responds). Can Med Assoc J. 1991;143(3):277.
Summary
Writer asks Canadian Medical Association to clarify if prohibition of abortion in Hippocratic Oath is considered invalid by the CMA.
Brown RH. (Correspondence) CMA’s Code of Ethics. Can Med Assoc J. 1990;143(2):88.