Dishonest deed, clear conscience: When cheating leads to moral disengagement and motivated forgetting

Lisa L Shu, Francesca Gino, Max H Bazerman

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Abstract
People routinely engage in dishonest acts without feeling guilty about their behavior. When and why does this occur? Across four studies, people justified their dishonest deeds through moral disengagement and exhibited motivated forgetting of information that might otherwise limit their dishonesty. Using hypothetical scenarios (Studies 1 and 2) and real tasks involving the opportunity to cheat (Studies 3 and 4), the authors find that one’s own dishonest behavior increased moral disengagement and motivated forgetting of moral rules. Such changes did not occur in the case of honest behavior or consideration of the dishonest behavior of others. In addition, increasing moral saliency by having participants read or sign an honor code significantly reduced unethical behavior and prevented subsequent moral disengagement. Although dishonest behavior motivated moral leniency and led to forgetting of moral rules, honest behavior motivated moral stringency and diligent recollection of moral rules.


Shu LL, Gino F, Bazerman MH. Dishonest deed, clear conscience: When cheating leads to moral disengagement and motivated forgetting. Pers Soc Psychol B. 2011 Feb 9;37(3):330-349.

Obstetrician-gynecologists’ views on contraception and natural family planning: a national survey

RE Lawrence, Kenneth A Rasinski, John D Yoon, Farr A Curlin

American Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology
American Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology

Abstract
Objective

To characterize beliefs about contraception among obstetrician-gynecologists (Ob/Gyns).

Study design
National mailed survey of 1800 U.S. Ob/Gyns. Criterion variables were whether physicians have a moral or ethical objection to – and whether they would offer – six common contraceptive methods. Covariates included physician demographic and religious characteristics.

Results
1154 of 1760 eligible Ob/Gyns responded (66%). Some Ob/Gyns object to intrauterine devices (4.4% object, 3.6% would not offer), progesterone implants and/or injections (1.7% object, 2.1% would not offer), tubal ligations (1.5% object, 1.5% would not offer), oral contraceptive pills (1.3% object, 1.1% would not offer), condoms (1.3% object, 1.8% would not offer), and the diaphragm or cervical cap with spermicide (1.3% object, 3.3% would not offer). Religious physicians were more likely to object (OR 7.4) and to refuse to provide a contraceptive (OR 1.9).

Conclusion
Controversies about contraception are ongoing, but among Ob/Gyns objections and refusals to provide contraceptives are infrequent.


Lawrence RE, Rasinski KA, Yoon JD, Curlin FA. Obstetrician-gynecologists’ views on contraception and natural family planning: a national survey. Am J Obstet Gynecol. 2011;204(2):124e1-124e7.

A Not-So-New Eugenics: Harris and Savulescu on Human Enhancement

Robert Sparrow

The Hastings Center Report
The Hastings Center Report

Abstract
John Harris and Julian Savulescu, leading figures in the “new” eugenics, argue that parents are morally obligated to use genetic and other technologies to enhance their children. But the argument they give leads to conclusions even more radical than they acknowledge. Ultimately, the world it would lead to is not all that different from that championed by eugenicists one hundred years ago.


Sparrow R. A Not-So-New Eugenics: Harris and Savulescu on Human Enhancement. Hast Cent Rep. 2011 January-February;32-42.

Betrayal of conscience

Jeanine Young-Mason

Clinical Nurse Specialist
Clinical Nurse Specialist

Extract
. . .It behooves us always to strive to understand and search for the roots of other’s humanity without which we are left with dangerous assumptions and fear. All violence breeds tragic consequences for the victims and for the perpetrators who are betraying the consciences they have been given. In sum, the tragedy is not that the perpetrators have no conscience but that they are by their actions betraying the conscience they have in denying the humanity of others.


Young-Mason J. Betrayal of conscience. Clin Nurse Spec. 2011 January;25(1):49.

Rights, professional obligations, and moral disapproval

Mark R Wicclair

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Extract
The claim that providing post-transplant care to Mr. C would compromise a physician’s moral integrity might have a consequentialist basis or it might rest on a conception of moral complicity. From a consequentialist perspective, it might be thought that refusing to provide post-transplant care would act as a disincentive for patients like Mr. C to go to China for organ transplants. That is, it might be thought that refusing to provide follow-up care will promote a reduction in unethical transplant practices, and transplant physicians might believe that they have an ethical obligation to do what they can to effectuate such a reduction. Alternatively, a physician might believe that to avoid moral complicity in an unethical practice, she must refrain from any direct or indirect participation in that practice, which includes providing post-transplant care.


Wicclair MR. Rights, professional obligations, and moral disapproval. Camb Q. Healthc Ethics. 2011;20(1):144-147.

Conscientious refusals by hospitals and emergency contraception

Mark R Wicclair

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Journal’s Extract
Hospitals sometimes refuse to provide goods and services or honor patients’ decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment for reasons that appear to resemble appeals to conscience. For example, based on the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (ERD), Catholic hospitals have refused to forgo medically provided nutrition and hydration (MPNH), and Catholic hospitals have refused to provide emergency contraception (EC) and perform abortions or sterilization procedures. I consider whether it is justified to refuse to offer EC to victims of sexual assault who present at the emergency department (ED). A preliminary question, however, is whether a hospital’s refusal to provide services can be conceptualized as conscience based.


Wicclair MR. Conscientious refusals by hospitals and emergency contraception. Camb Q Healthc Ethics. 2011;20(1):130-138.

Professional Right of Conscience

Margaret W Beal, Joyce Cappiello

Journal of Midwifery & Women's Health
Journal of Midwifery & Women’s Health

Abstract
In recent years there have been numerous media reports of professionals attempting to expand the right of conscience and deny health care services requested by consumers. While the media has focused the most attention on pharmacists’ right to refuse access to contraception, this trend is an expansion of the right originally established to protect professionals from being required to perform abortions or to provide direct assistance with abortions. State legislatures have addressed this issue, in some cases by overtly protecting consumers’ rights and in other cases by broadening professional right of conscience. In this article, the literature on provider right of conscience is reviewed, and approaches advised by professional organizations are discussed.


Beal MW, Cappiello J. Professional Right of Conscience. J. Midwifery Womens Health. 2008;53(5):406-412.

From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom

Michael J. Perry

San Diego Law Review
San Diego Law Review

Abstract
The right to moral freedom is not only analogous to the right to religious freedom. The right to moral freedom, as I explain in this essay, represents a broadening of the right to religious freedom – a broadening that for many of us is compelling.


Perry MJ. From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom. 47 San Diego L. Rev. 993 (2010).

Obstacles and challenges following the partial decriminalisation of abortion in Colombia

Eduardo Díaz Amado, Maria Cristina Calderón García, Katherine Romero Cristancho, Elena Prada Salas, Eliane Barreto Hauzeur

Reproductive Health Matters
Reproductive Health Matters

Abstract
During a highly contested process, abortion was partially decriminalised in Colombia in 2006 by the Constitutional Court: when the pregnancy threatens a woman’s life or health, in cases of severe fetal malformations incompatible with life, and in cases of rape, incest or unwanted insemination. However, Colombian women still face obstacles to accessing abortion services. This is illustrated by 36 cases of women who in 2006-08 were denied the right to a lawful termination of pregnancy, or had unjustified obstacles put in their path which delayed the termination, which are analysed in this article. We argue that the obstacles resulted from fundamental disagreements about abortion and misunderstandings regarding the ethical, legal and medical requirements arising from the Court’s decision. In order to avoid obstacles such as demands for a judge’s authorisation, institutional claims of conscientious objection, rejection of a claim of rape, or refusal of health insurance coverage for a legal termination, which constitute discrimination against women, three main strategies are suggested: public ownership of the Court’s decision by all Colombian citizens, a professional approach by those involved in the provision of services in line with the law, and monitoring of its implementation by governmental and non-governmental organisations.


Amado ED, García MCC, Cristancho KR, Salas EP, Hauzeur EB. Obstacles and challenges following the partial decriminalisation of abortion in Colombia. Reprod Health Matters. 2010;118-126.

Clause de conscience et dépistage de la trisomie 21 ou comment substituer un jugement moral à une volonté d’accroître la liberté décisionnelle des femmes enceintes

Statement of conscience in trisomy 21 screening: Pregnant women’s free will jeopardized

E. Azria

Journal de Gynécologie Obstétrique et biologie de la reproduction
Journal de Gynécologie Obstétrique et biologie de la reproduction

Extract
[Paragraph de conclusion]
C’est précisément parce qu’« il ne peut y avoir d’anesthésie des consciences » qu’il faut s’opposer fermement à toute mesure qui restreindraient davantage encore la liberté décisionnelle des femmes en matière de dépistage prénatal. L’idée de clause de conscience soutenue par Leblanc et Ardouin en fait partie.

[Concluding paragraph] It is precisely because “there can be no anesthesia of conscience” that we must strongly oppose any measures that would further restrict women’s decision-making freedom in prenatal screening. The idea of a conscience clause supported by Leblanc and Ardouin is one of them.


Azria E. Clause de conscience et dépistage de la trisomie 21 ou comment substituer un jugement moral à une volonté d’accroître la liberté décisionnelle des femmes enceintes. J Gynecol Obstet Biol Reprod (Paris). 2010 Nov;39(7):592-4. French.